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EXECUTING THE WILL OF THE VOTERS?: 
A ROADMAP TO MEND OR END 
THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE’S 
MULTI-BILLION-DOLLAR 
DEATH PENALTY DEBACLE 
Judge Arthur L. Alarcón* & Paula M. Mitchell** 
 Since reinstating the death penalty in 1978, California taxpayers 
have spent roughly $4 billion to fund a dysfunctional death penalty 
system that has carried out no more than 13 executions. The current 
backlog of death penalty cases is so severe that most of the 714 
prisoners now on death row will wait well over 20 years before their 
cases are resolved. Many of these condemned inmates will thus 
languish on death row for decades, only to die of natural causes while 
still waiting for their cases to be resolved. Despite numerous warnings 
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of the deterioration of California’s capital punishment system and its 
now imminent collapse, the Legislature has repeatedly failed to enact 
measures that would improve this death row deadlock. At the same 
time, voters have continued to expand the death penalty through the 
direct voter initiative process to increase the number of death-eligible 
crimes. 
 This Article uncovers the true costs of administering the death 
penalty in California by tracing how much taxpayers are spending for 
death penalty trials versus non–death penalty trials and for costs 
incurred due to the delay from the initial sentence of death to the 
execution. In addition, the Article examines how the voter initiative 
process has misled voters into agreeing to the wasteful expenditure of 
billions of dollars on a system that has been ineffective in carrying out 
punishment against those who commit the worst of crimes. Our 
research reveals that in every proposition expanding the list of death-
eligible crimes between 1978 and 2000, the information provided by the 
Legislative Analyst’s Office in the Voter Information Guides told voters 
that the fiscal impact of these initiatives would be “none,” “unknown,” 
“indeterminable,” or “minor.” Relying, at least in part, on this 
information, Californians have used the voter initiative process to enact 
“tough on crime” laws that, without adequate funding from the 
Legislature to create an effective capital punishment system, have 
wasted immense taxpayer resources and created increasingly serious 
due process problems. 
 Finally, this Article analyzes corrective measures that the 
Legislature could take to reduce the death row backlog, and proposes 
several voter initiatives that California voters may wish to consider if 
the Legislature continues to ignore the problem. It is the authors’ view 
that unless California voters want to tolerate the continued waste of 
billions of tax dollars on the state’s now-defunct death penalty system, 
they must either demand meaningful reforms to ensure that the system 
is administered in a fair and effective manner or, if they do not want to 
be taxed to fund the needed reforms, they must recognize that the only 
alternative is to abolish the death penalty and replace it with a sentence 
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Whenever the people are well informed, they can be 
trusted with their own government; that whenever things 
get so far wrong as to attract their notice, they may be 
relied on to set them to rights.” 
—Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Richard Price, 1789 
 
Despite numerous warnings of the deterioration of California’s 
death penalty system over the last 25 years, and more recent signs of 
its imminent collapse, the Legislature and the Governor’s office have 
failed to respond to this developing crisis. The net effect of this 
failure to act has been the perpetration of a multibillion-dollar fraud 
on California taxpayers. California voters have been led to believe 
that the capital punishment scheme they have been financing for the 
last 32 years would execute those murderers guilty of committing 
“the worst of crimes.”1 This has not occurred. Instead, billions of 
taxpayer dollars have been spent to create a bloated system, in which 
condemned inmates languish on death row for decades before dying 
of natural causes and in which executions rarely take place. 
The electorate has the right to be informed about whether the 
Legislature is meeting its responsibility to avoid wasting the taxes it 
receives to fund the criminal justice system. Californians must 
demand an accounting of the real costs—the heretofore largely 
hidden costs—of administering an effective system of capital 
punishment. The costs of expensive death penalty trials are the tip of 
the iceberg; the exorbitant bills to the taxpayers begin to stack up in 
earnest after a death sentence is imposed. At that point, California 
taxpayers foot the $144 million annual bill for providing housing, 
healthcare, and legal representation to condemned inmates, many of 
whom are dying of natural causes.2 Unless California voters want to 
tolerate the continued waste of billions of tax dollars on the state’s 
now-defunct death penalty system, they must either demand 
meaningful reforms to ensure that the system is administered in a fair 
 
 1. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446–47 (2008) (“[T]he [death] penalty must be 
reserved for the worst of crimes and limited in its instances of application.”). 
 2. See infra Part I.A.4.b.i. 
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and effective manner or, if they do not want to be taxed to fund the 
needed reforms, they must recognize that the only alternative is to 
abolish the death penalty and replace it with a sentence of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 
By failing to provide the funds necessary to appoint competent 
counsel to represent capital prisoners in their automatic appeals and 
state habeas corpus proceedings, the state has ensured that, on 
average, death row inmates are warehoused in the costly condemned 
inmate facility at San Quentin for as many as 10 years before the 
California Supreme Court reviews their convictions and sentences on 
direct appeal.3 For the first four or five years of that period, 
condemned inmates simply sit awaiting the appointment of counsel.4 
If the conviction and sentence are affirmed on direct appeal, the 
condemned inmate waits an additional three or more years before 
state habeas corpus counsel is appointed,5 only to find that the 
California Legislature has not provided sufficient funds to permit 
counsel to conduct an adequate investigation into the merits of his or 
her claims of state and federal constitutional violations. Finally, 
because the California Legislature fails to provide adequate funds to 
state habeas corpus counsel, federal courts are compelled to ensure 
that appointed federal habeas corpus counsel is sufficiently funded to 
investigate claims of constitutional violations that should have been, 
but were not, investigated during the state habeas corpus proceeding. 
Under the current system, the cost to federal taxpayers to litigate the 
federal constitutional claims of those prisoners sentenced to death 
since 1978 will total approximately three-quarters of a billion 
dollars.6 
The Legislature’s failure to follow the recommendations made 
by the California Commission for the Fair Administration of Justice 
(“the Commission” or “the CCFAJ”) in 2008—the very commission 
it appointed to study the effectiveness of the death penalty in 
California—makes clear that the future of California’s death penalty 
 
 3. Arthur L. Alarcón, Remedies for California’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 
697, 723 (2007). 
 4. CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA 122 
(Gerald Uelmen ed., 2008) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT], available at http://www.ccfaj.org/ 
documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf. 
 5. Id. at 123. 
 6. See infra Part I.A.3. 
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is now up to the voters.7 It is the authors’ hope that once the 
electorate has been informed of what these unconscionable delays 
are costing the taxpayers, and the degree to which the system has 
become unworkable, California voters will have the information they 
need to demand real reform.8 Maintaining the status quo is 
untenable. We believe that an informed electorate, mindful of the 
Legislature’s chronic failure to act, will either direct their elected 
representatives to take action to reduce the delay in the review of 
capital cases, or decide to use the direct-initiative process to reform 
the present dysfunctional system, or abolish the system completely. 9 
 
OVERVIEW 
In 1978, California voters cast their ballots in favor of an 
initiative that promised to give California “famil[ies] the protection 
 
 7. The California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice (“the Commission” or 
“the CCFAJ”) issued its Final Report and Recommendations on the Administration of the Death 
Penalty in California (“Final Report”) on June 30, 2008. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4. 
Specifically, the Legislature has failed to follow the Commission’s recommendation that a 
constitutional amendment be passed that would allow condemned inmates’ appeals to be heard by 
the California Court of Appeal’s 110 justices in a timely manner, id. at 118, 147–49, and to enact 
legislation to provide funding for the timely appointment of post-conviction representation, id. at 
116–17, 131–33, which would immediately address some of the most serious problems 
responsible for the current unconscionable backlog. 
 8. Then-sitting California Supreme Court Chief Justice Ronald M. George explained in his 
testimony before the Commission that “[a]ny attempt at a ‘quick fix’ will likely create only 
additional confusion and further delay that potentially could adversely affect not only the right of 
defendants, but also the interests of the friends and families of victims, as well as the 
administration of justice overall. We are at a point now at which choices must be made and 
expectations adjusted accordingly.” Chief Justice Ronald M. George, Testimony Before the 
Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice 43 (Jan. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Testimony of 
Chief Justice Ronald M. George], available at www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/dp/expert/ 
Chief’sTestimony.pdf. 
 9. The Commission found that it would cost an additional $232.7 million per year to keep 
the death penalty and reduce delays to the national average, or, an additional $130 million per 
year to keep the death penalty in a narrower scope with fewer death-eligible crimes. FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 147. The Commission found that abolishing capital punishment and 
replacing it with a system that imposes a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for 
those now eligible for the death penalty would reduce the costs now incurred by the state of 
California from $137.7 million per year to $11.5 million per year. Id. at 146; see also Carol J. 
Williams, Death Row Foes Cite State Costs, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2009, at A3 (interviewing 
Mark Drozdowski, a deputy federal public defender who heads the Los Angeles capital case unit, 
and commenting that “California could save $1 billion by commuting all capital sentences to life 
without parole”). 
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of the strongest, most effective death penalty law in the nation.” 10 
The voter information pamphlet that is mailed to all registered 
voters in the state of California (“Voter Information Guide”) 
represented to voters that the costs of the new law were 
“[i]ndeterminable,” but that “an increase in the number of 
executions” would “offset[] part of the increase in the prison 
population.” 11 Between 1978 and 2000, California voters passed 
six additional crime initiatives, each one further broadening the 
scope of California’s death penalty by expanding the list of death-
eligible crimes. 12 At each of these elections, voters cast their ballots 
based on the information provided by the Legislative Analyst’s 
Office (LAO or “Legislative Analyst”) that was included in the 
Voter Information Guides. The LAO informed voters that the fiscal 
impact of these initiatives would be “none,” “unknown,” 
“indeterminable,” or “minor.” 13 
 
 10. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION, NOVEMBER 7, 1978: BALLOT 
PAMPHLET 35 (1978) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, NOVEMBER 1978], available 
at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1978g.pdf (rebutting the argument against Proposition 
7). Proposition 7, a voter initiative known as the Briggs Initiative, added 16 special circumstances 
to the existing list of 12 death-eligible crimes. For more on this, see infra Part II.B.2.d, titled The 
1978 Briggs Initiative Proposition 7—16 More Special Circumstances: 28 Death-Eligible 
Crimes. In the “Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 7” published in the Voter Information 
Guide, voters were told that “[t]his citizen’s initiative will give your family the protection of the 
strongest, most effective death penalty law in the nation.” CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, 
NOVEMBER 1978, supra, at 35. 
 11. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, NOVEMBER 1978, supra note 10, at 32–33. The 
Official Title and Summary Prepared by the Attorney General, which included the “Analysis by 
Legislative Analyst” for the Voter Information Guide stated: “Financial impact: Indeterminable 
future increase in state costs.” Id. at 32. The Legislative Analyst estimated that “over time, this 
measure would increase the number of persons in California prisons, and thereby increase the cost 
to the state of operating the prison system. . . . [But t]here could also be an increase in the 
number of executions as a result of this proposition, offsetting part of the increase in the prison 
population.” Id. at 33 (emphasis added). 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. The death penalty initiatives referenced here are discussed at length in Part II, infra. In 
summary, with each proposed initiative the Legislative Analyst told voters that the fiscal effect of 
these initiatives were: (1) “Fiscal impact: None.” (Prop 17); (2) “Financial impact: Indeterminable 
future increase in state costs.” (Prop 7); (3) “unknown increases in state costs.” (Prop 114); 
(4) “only a minor fiscal impact on state and local governments, or there may be a major fiscal 
impact.” (Prop 115); (5) “probably result in minor additional state costs.” (Prop 195); 
(6) “unknown state costs,” (Prop 196); (7) “unknown, but [] probably minor,” (Prop 18); or (8) no 
mention of costs at all with respect to the proposed addition of more death-eligible crimes 
(Prop 21). See generally California Ballot Measures Databases, U. CAL. HASTINGS C. L. LIBR., 
http://library.uchastings.edu/library/california-research/ca-ballot-measures.html (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2011) (providing full text and accompanying materials of California ballot propositions 
from 1911 to 2006). 
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32 INMATES HAVE DIED ON DEATH ROW WITH 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS STILL PENDING 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
According to records of the federal district courts 
and of the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation (CDCR), the following inmates died on 
death row (or in hospitals nearby) while their habeas 
corpus petitions were pending in federal court. The 
lengthy delays experienced by some of these 
condemned inmates in federal district court reflect the 
fact that federal habeas proceedings are often stayed 
one or more times, sometimes for a period of many 
years, in order to permit the condemned inmate 
petitioners to return to state court and “exhaust” habeas 
claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2006) 
(requiring exhausting of remedies available in state 
courts prior to filing a federal habeas corpus petition). 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 1. JOSEPH MUSSELWHITE died of natural causes on 
February 2, 2010, at the age of 47. He was convicted in 1990 of 
one count of first-degree murder with the special circumstance 
of murder in the commission of a robbery and one count of 
attempted second-degree murder. At the time of his death, his 
§ 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 
2002—had been pending in the Eastern District of California 
for eight years. 
 2.   CEDRIC HARRISON died of natural causes in a hospital on 
November 19, 2009. He was sentenced to death for two first-
degree murders committed in 1987. At the time of his death, his 
§ 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 
2009—was pending in the Eastern District of California.  
 3.  ALBERT HOWARD died at a hospital near San Quentin 
State Prison of natural causes on August 13, 2009, at the age of 
57. He was sentenced to death in 1983 for murdering a 74-year-
old woman in Tulare County. At the time of his death, his 
§ 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 
1993—had been pending in the Eastern District of California 
for 16 years. 
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Our research has disclosed that these death penalty initiatives 
have created the nation’s largest death row at a cost of roughly 
$4 billion to state and federal taxpayers for those judgments of 
death imposed since 1978. 14 The state is poised to spend an 
additional $1 billion in the coming years to construct an even larger 
death row facility that will accommodate over 1,000 condemned 
inmates and will require hiring 347 additional staff. 15 Since 
executions are virtually nonexistent in California, the planned 
facility is expected to fill rapidly and reach capacity by the year 
2014. 16 
Despite the fact that, as of May 2011, California’s death row 
houses over 714 condemned inmates, it has carried out only 13 of 
the 1,242 executions that have occurred in the country since 
1976. 17  
 
 14. As set forth in detail in Part I.A, infra, we have calculated the total expenditures for costs 
associated with administering the death penalty in California since 1978 to be approximately 
$4 billion. When the costs are factored in that will ultimately be borne by federal taxpayers to 
litigate the federal habeas corpus petitions of those condemned inmates who have not yet begun 
their federal proceedings—an additional $619 million—the cost will be closer to $5 billion. 
 15. CAL. STATE AUDITOR, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND 
REHABILITATION: ALTHOUGH BUILDING A CONDEMNED INMATE COMPLEX AT SAN QUENTIN 
MAY COST MORE THAN EXPECTED, THE COSTS OF OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR HOUSING 
CONDEMNED INMATES ARE LIKELY TO BE EVEN HIGHER 2, 26 (2008), available at 
http://www.bsa.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2007-120.2.pdf. The state has been preparing to construct and 
activate a new Condemned Inmate Complex (CIC) at San Quentin, which is estimated to cost 
over $400 million. See id. at 1. The new facility will cost an estimated $58.8 million per year to 
operate and is projected to cost $1.2 billion over the next 20 years. Id. On April 28, 2011, 
Governor Brown announced that construction of the planned CIC would not go forward at this 
time because “the state cannot justify the expense at a time of massive cuts to essential services.” 
Associated Press, Brown Cancels Plans for New Housing at San Quentin, SILICON VALLEY 
MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 28, 2011, 3:55PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/breakingnews/ci_ 
17951052?nclick_check=1. 
 16. CAL. STATE AUDITOR, supra note 15, at 2. 
 17. Just over three years ago, we noted that, with the 662 inmates on death row at that time, 
“the backlog in processing death row appeals is now so severe that California would have to 
execute five prisoners per month for the next ten years just to carry out the sentences of those 
currently on death row.” Alarcón, supra note 3, at 711. The California Department of Corrections 
and Rehabilitation (CDCR) currently lists the total number of death row inmates at 714. DIV. OF 
ADULT OPERATIONS, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., DEATH ROW TRACKING SYSTEM: 
CONDEMNED INMATE SUMMARY LIST 4 (2011) [hereinafter CONDEMNED INMATE SUMMARY 
LIST], available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Capital_Punishment/docs/ 
CondemnedInmateSummary.pdf (last revised May 5, 2011). As of April 1, 2011, the number of 
U.S. executions since 1976 was 1,245. U.S. Executions Since 1976, CLARK CNTY. PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY, http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/usexecute.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2011). 
Between 1978 and March 2011, California has only executed 13 people. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & 
REHAB., INMATES EXECUTED, 1978 TO PRESENT, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Capital_Punishment/ 
Inmates_Executed.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2011) [hereinafter INMATES EXECUTED, 1978 TO 
PRESENT]. California would now have to execute one prisoner per week for the next 13.8 years to  
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32 INMATES HAVE DIED ON DEATH ROW WITH 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS STILL PENDING 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 4.   FRED FREEMAN died of natural causes on July 25, 2009, at 
a hospital near San Quentin at the age of 69 after spending 
22 years on death row for a 1984 execution-style murder at a 
bar in Alameda County. At the time of his death, his § 2254 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 
1999—had been pending in the Northern District of California 
for 10 years. 
 5.   THOMAS EDWARDS died of natural causes on February 14, 
2009, at the age of 65. He was sentenced to death in 1986 for 
the murder of a 12-year-old girl. At the time of his death, his 
§ 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 
1993—had been pending in the Central District of California 
for 16 years.  
 6.   ISAAC GUTIERREZ JR. died in a hospital of natural causes 
on December 7, 2008, at the age of 64 while on San Quentin 
State Prison’s death row. Gutierrez was convicted of two 
murders, aiding and abetting rape, kidnapping, and attempted 
murder of a police officer, all of which took place on 
October 31, 1986. At the time of his death, his § 2254 Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 2005—had 
been pending in the Central District of California for three 
years. 
 7.  ALFREDO PADILLA died on July 25, 2008, of natural 
causes. At the time of his death, his § 2254 Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 2001—had been pending 
in the Eastern District of California for seven years. 
 8.   BILL BRADFORD died of natural causes at a state prison 
medical facility in Vacaville on March 10, 2008, at the age of 
61. Bradford had been on death row at San Quentin State 
Prison for 20 years, since May 1988, when he was convicted of 
murdering two women, one of whom was a minor. At the time 
of his death, his § 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—
which was filed in 1998—had been pending in the Central 
District of California for 10 years.  
 9.  BILLY RAY HAMILTON died of natural causes on 
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During that same period, 78 capital inmates died of natural or other 
causes while on death row in California (54 died due to natural 
causes, 18 committed suicide, and six had the cause of death 
reported as “other”). 18 The long wait for execution—which has 
been over 20 years for each of the five inmates executed in the last 
10 years 19—reflects a wholesale failure to fund the efficient, 
effective capital punishment system that California voters were told 
they were choosing. 
The long wait for the appointment of appellate counsel raises 
due process concerns that are troubling at best, and may give rise to 
federal constitutional violation claims in extreme cases. For 
example, death row inmate John Post died after spending nine 
years on death row waiting for the California Supreme Court to 
review his direct appeal. 20 He died on December 20, 2010, after 
being found unconscious in his cell. 21 The California Supreme 
Court did not appoint counsel to represent Mr. Post on his 
automatic appeal until he had been on death row for nearly five 
years. 22 His automatic appeal was still pending before the 
California Supreme Court when he died. 23 
Between 1978 and 2006, the California Supreme Court 
vacated the judgments or sentences in 95 death penalty cases it 
 
carry out the sentences of those currently on death row. We are not aware of any study that has 
been done to attempt to determine what it would cost to carry out executions on this scale. 
 18. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CONDEMNED INMATES WHO HAVE DIED SINCE 1978 
(2011), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Capital_Punishment/docs/ 
CONDEMNEDINMATESWHOHAVEDIEDSINCE1978.pdf. 
 19. INMATES EXECUTED, 1978 TO PRESENT, supra note 17. In the previous decade, from 
1992 to 2000, the times spent on death row awaiting execution ranged from nine years, seven 
months to 19 years, one month. Id. The cumulative average time served on death row for all 13 
inmates executed to date is 17.5 years. Id. 
 20. Andrew Blankstein, Man Jailed for Drive-By Dies on Death Row, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 
2010, at AA5. 
 21. Mr. Post was received onto California’s death row from Los Angeles County on 
December 26, 2001. He was found guilty of first-degree murder, with the special circumstance of 
having committed the murder by drive-by shooting, and sentenced to death. Id. 
 22. Counsel was appointed for him on October 10, 2006. See People v. Post (John), No. 
S103087 (Cal. Oct. 10, 2006) (counsel appointment order filed), available at 
http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=1834766&doc_no
=S103087 (last visited Mar. 26, 2011). 
 23. Docket (Register of Actions), Cal. Appellate Courts, 
http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=1834766&doc_no
=S103087 (last visited Mar. 26, 2011). 
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October 22, 2007, at the age of 57. He had been on death row 
since his March 2, 1981, conviction for multiple murders 
predicated on the killing of other victims. At the time of his 
death, his § 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—which 
was filed in 1989—had been pending in the Northern District 
of California for 18 years.  
 10.  HERBERT KOONTZ died of natural causes on May 5, 
2007, at the age of 72 after 13 years on death row. Koontz was 
convicted of murder during the commission or attempted 
commission of robbery, robbery, kidnapping for the purpose of 
robbery, and vehicle taking—each of which involved the use of 
a firearm in the commission of the crimes. He was also 
convicted of petty theft. At the time of his death, his § 2254 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 
2003—had been pending in the Eastern District of California 
for four years. 
 11.   MARCELINO RAMOS died of natural causes on January 
22, 2007, at the age of 49. He had been on death row since 
January 30, 1980. At the time of his death, his § 2254 Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 1998—had 
been pending in the Central District of California for nine 
years. 
 12.   ALEJANDRO GILBERT RUIZ died on January 4, 2007, of 
natural causes. He had been on death row since 1980. At the 
time of his death, his § 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus—which was filed in 1989—had been pending in the 
Central District of California for 18 years. 
 13.   ROBERT THOMPSON died of natural causes on October 1, 
2006. He had been on death row for nearly 23 years, since his 
December 6, 1983, conviction for the rape and murder of a 12-
year-old boy in 1981. At the time of his death, his § 2254 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 
1990—had been pending in the Central District of California 
for 16 years. 
 14. EARL PRESTON JONES died of natural causes on 
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reviewed, based on errors it found in convictions or sentences. 24 
Mr. Post died before the California Supreme Court had the 
opportunity to determine whether the evidence in his case was 
legally sufficient to demonstrate that he was guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt or whether his death sentence was erroneous 
because of procedural error or whether his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failure to discover or present proof of mitigating 
circumstances. Additionally, Mr. Post was never appointed habeas 
corpus counsel to investigate whether evidence that did not appear 
in the transcript of his trial court proceedings, and therefore could 
not be reviewed in his direct appeal, demonstrated that his federal 
constitutional rights had been violated by the conduct of the police, 
the prosecution, the trial court, or his trial counsel. 
The long wait for the appointment of state habeas corpus 
counsel may also give rise to due process concerns because it 
prevents the timely presentation by capital prisoners of their claims 
of federal constitutional violations in federal court. Of the 78 
prisoners who have died awaiting execution, 32 prisoners died 
while their petitions for habeas corpus relief were still pending in 
federal court. 25 
Of the California death row inmates whose petitions for 
federal habeas corpus relief have been reviewed, nearly 70 percent 
have been granted relief, in the form of either a new trial on the 
question of guilt or a new penalty proceeding. 26  It is therefore 
 
 24. CAL. DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, PROSECUTOR’S PERSPECTIVE ON CALIFORNIA’S DEATH  
PENALTY app. A (2003), available at http://www.cdaa.org/WhitePapers/DPPaper.pdf (finding 95 
capital judgments reversed in whole or in part, by the California Supreme Court between 1977 
and 2002). We have counted six more reversals from March 2003 to December 2005. This data is 
on file with the authors. 
 25. The Sidebar includes the information regarding these prisoners and their deaths. 
 26. The Final Report indicated that “federal courts have rendered final judgment in 54 
habeas corpus challenges to California death penalty judgments” and that “[r]elief in the form of a 
new guilt trial or a new penalty hearing was granted in 38 of the cases, or 70%.” FINAL REPORT, 
supra note 4, at 115. Since publication of the Final Report, federal habeas corpus relief has been 
granted in five additional cases, and denied in four additional cases, all of which are final 
judgments, making the rate at which relief has been granted 68.25%. Our research indicates that 
in 25 of the 43 cases, relief was granted on the ground that the condemned prisoner’s appointed 
trial counsel was ineffective—in six cases during the guilt phase and in 19 cases during the 
penalty phase—typically for counsel’s failure to investigate mitigating evidence. Other grounds 
included: constitutionally infirm jury instructions (six cases); improper conduct by the prosecutor 
(five cases); due process violations in connection with the defendants’ mental competence (two 
cases); other due process violations (two cases); violation of the Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation (one case); and, juror bias (two cases). None were granted based on newly  
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February 3, 2006. He had been on death row since his 
conviction for a 1982 double murder in Los Angeles. When he 
died, his § 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—which 
was filed in 1994—had been pending in the Central District of 
California for 12 years. 
 15.   DONALD MILLER died of natural causes on October 14, 
2005. At the time of his death, his § 2254 Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 1991—had been pending 
in the Central District of California for 14 years. 
 16.   LARRY DAVIS JR. died on September 2, 2005, of what 
the coroner determined was acute drug toxicity; however, 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 
spokeswoman Terry Thornton said it was unclear whether the 
drugs were prescription or illicit. At the time of his death, his 
§ 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 
1996—had been pending in the Central District of California 
for nine years. 
 17. ROBERT GARCEAU died of natural causes on 
December 29, 2004. He had been on death row since 1985 for 
killing his girlfriend and her son. At the time of his death, his 
§ 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 
1995—had been pending in the Eastern District of California 
for nine years. 
 18.   CHARLES WHITT died of natural causes on November 7, 
2004. At the time of his death, his § 2254 Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 1994—had been pending 
in the Central District of California for 10 years.  
 19.   ROBERT STANSBURY died of natural causes at the age of 
66 on December 12, 2003. Stansbury had been on death row 
since his convictions for the kidnapping, rape, and murder of a 
10-year-old girl in 1982. At the time of his death, his § 2254 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 
1995—had been pending in the Central District of California 
for eight years. 
 20.   ROBERT NICOLAUS died of natural causes on April 12, 
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reasonable to conclude that the federal courts may well have 
determined that a significant number of those prisoners who spent 
many years on death row and died while their federal habeas 
corpus petitions were pending had meritorious claims that required 
a new trial or a new sentencing proceeding. 
That prisoners are dying of natural causes, including advanced 
age, before their convictions and sentences have been reviewed on 
direct appeal or before their claims of state and federal 
constitutional violations have been adequately investigated, 
articulated, and reviewed seriously undermines the integrity of the 
administration of capital punishment in California. It also creates 
disrespect for our system of justice. In the case of Mr. Post, there is 
no justification for a practice that allows a prisoner to spend nine 
years on death row, only to die before the California Supreme 
Court has ruled on his direct appeal. 
Indeed, the continued funding of this broken system in 
California is occurring at the expense of other important criminal 
justice and public safety considerations. For example, a lack of 
resources was the excuse offered by the Legislature for its failure to 
fund enough trial judges to handle the state’s prosecution of 
criminal defendants in noncapital felony cases, which recently 
resulted in the release of several Riverside County criminal 
defendants who had been apprehended but not prosecuted due to 
the state’s inability to comply with the constitutional requirement 
for a speedy trial. 27 This is not a new phenomenon. In 1989, “Yolo 
County [was] struggling to keep its courts open because of the 
financial strain created by death penalty cases.” 28 “California 
taxpayers   legitimately  can  ask  what  return  they  are   getting  in  
 
discovered evidence that the inmate was innocent. Additionally, our research indicates that state 
habeas corpus relief has been granted in seven cases: in five cases for ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel, in one case for juror misconduct, and in one case for constitutional error during the 
penalty phase during voir dire (peremptory challenges based on race). (Data on file with authors.) 
 27. See People v. Engram, 240 P.3d 237, 242–44 (Cal. 2010) (explaining that the 
Legislature’s chronic failure to fund the criminal courts recently resulted in the dismissal of 18 
misdemeanor and felony criminal cases, including the release of one defendant who was charged 
with first degree burglary, due to a lack of courtroom space and available judges to hear the 
cases). 
 28. DAVID ERICKSON, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AT WHAT PRICE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE COST 
ISSUE IN A STRATEGY TO ABOLISH THE DEATH PENALTY 5 (1993), available at 
http://www.deathpenalty.org/downloads/Erickson1993COSTSTUDY.pdf (citing Lorena Natt, 
Yolo Scrambles to Cope with Strained Courts, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 22, 1989, at B4). 
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2003. At the time of his death, his § 2254 Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 1992—had been pending 
in the Northern District of California for 11 years.  
 21.   GERALD GALLEGO died of natural causes at the age of 
56 on July 18, 2002. Gallego had been on death row since 
1984, when he was convicted of murdering 10 victims. At the 
time of his death, his § 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus—which was filed in 1992—had been pending in the 
Northern District of California for 10 years.  
 22.   STEPHEN DESANTIS died on March 2, 2002, of natural 
causes. He was convicted and sentenced to death for his role in 
the 1981 robbery-slaying of a 71-year-old man, and for the 
attempted murder of that man’s wife. At the time of his death, 
his § 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—which was 
filed in 1993—had been pending in the Eastern District of 
California for nine years. 
 23. GEORGE MARSHALL died of natural causes on 
October 14, 2001. He had been on death row since 1983. At the 
time of his death, his § 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus—which was filed in 1997—had been pending in the 
Eastern District of California for four years.  
 24.   THEODORE FRANK died on September 5, 2001, at the age 
of 66, of an apparent heart attack in his cell at San Quentin 
State Prison. He was convicted for the 1978 torture-murder of a 
two-and-a-half-year-old child. At the time of his death, his 
§ 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 
1991—had been pending in the Central District of California 
for 10 years.  
 25.   BRONTE WRIGHT died of natural causes on February 5, 
2000. He had been on death row since 1982. At the time of his 
death, his § 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—which 
was filed in 1992—had been pending in the Central District of 
California for eight years. 
 26.   ANDREW ROBERTSON, JR. died of natural causes on 
August 22, 1998. He had been on death row since 1978. At the 
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increased public safety and question the trade-offs the State 
implicitly makes in spending an increasing portion of its general 
fund dollars on corrections.” 29 
Ronald M. George, the former Chief Justice of the California 
Supreme Court, has concluded that the death penalty in California 
is “dysfunctional.” 30 Former California Attorney General John Van 
de Kamp has come to a similar conclusion: California’s death 
penalty “system simply isn’t working. No one is being 
executed. . . . Yet death penalty cases are being prosecuted at great 
expense. . . . [M]illions of dollars [are] being wasted on a system 
that does not do what it is supposed to do.” 31 Self-proclaimed white 
supremacist Billy Joe Johnson, after being convicted of killing a 
fellow gang member for divulging gang secrets, told his defense 
attorney to try to get him sentenced to death, because, as his 
attorney explained, “living conditions at San Quentin prison’s 
death row will be better than if he serves a life term at Pelican Bay 
State  Prison.” 32  By  any  measure,  it  is  beyond  dispute that  “the  
 
 29. Letter from Michael Alpert, Chairman, Little Hoover Comm’n, to Governor 
Schwarzenegger and others (Jan. 25, 2007), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/185/ 
Report185.pdf (noting that between 2002 and 2007 the budget for the CDCR surged by 52%). 
 30. David Kravets, Top Judge Calls Death Penalty “Dysfunctional”: Legislature Blamed for 
Inadequate Funding, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 1, 2006, at B4. 
 31. John Van de Kamp, Op-Ed, We Can’t Afford the Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 
2009, at A23; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 116 (concluding that California’s death 
penalty “system is broken”). 
 32. Dennis Lovelace, White Supremacist Sentenced to Death, MYFOXLA.COM (Nov. 23, 
2009, 6:24 PM), http://www.myfoxla.com/dpp/news/local/white_supremacist_sentenced_to_ 
death_20091123; see also Carol J. Williams, When Death Penalty Means a Better Life: The 
State’s Condemned Have Privileges, and Executions Are on Hold, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2009, at 
A1 (describing conditions in death row prison facilities as “more comfortable than . . . other 
maximum security prisons”). Professor Laurie Levenson, a former prosecutor who teaches 
criminal law at Loyola Law School Los Angeles, commented to the Los Angeles Times recently 
that Billy Joe Johnson, who asked to be sentenced to death rather than life without parole because 
conditions on death row are more comfortable than they are in the general prison population, was 
probably correct in gauging that he would be better off on death row. “We have a perverse 
system, given that we have a death row but we don’t really have executions,” she said. 
Defendants who tell jurors to return a death sentence “don’t really feel like they are making life-
and-death decisions.” Id. As the same feature story in the Los Angeles Times explained: 
  Though death row inmates at San Quentin State Prison are far from coddled, they 
live in single cells that are slightly larger than the two-bunk, maximum-security 
confines elsewhere, they have better access to telephones and they have “contact 
visits” in plexiglass booths by themselves rather than in communal halls as in other 
institutions. They have about the only private accommodations in the state’s 33-prison 
network, which is crammed with 160,000-plus convicts. 
  Death row prisoners are served breakfast and dinner in their cells, can usually 
mingle with others in the outdoor exercise yards while eating their sack lunches, and  
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time of his death, his § 2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus—which was filed in 1990—had been pending in the 
Central District of California for eight years. 
 27.   MICHAEL WADER died of natural causes on May 11, 
1997. At the time of his death, his § 2254 Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 1996—had been pending 
in the Central District of California for one year. 
 28.  JEFFREY WASH committed suicide on September 12, 
1996. At the time of his death, his § 2254 Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 1995—had been pending 
in the Northern District of California for one year. 
 29.   ROBERT DANIELSON committed suicide on September 7, 
1995. At the time of his death, his § 2254 Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 1994—had been pending 
in the Northern District of California for one year. 
 30.   TIMOTHY PRICE PRIDE was fatally shot in the chest by a 
corrections officer during a fistfight on September 30, 1994. At 
the time of his death, his application for appointment of counsel 
to file his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus had been pending 
in the Eastern District of California for one-and-a-half years.  
 31.  JAY KAURISH died of natural causes on November 6, 
1992. He was sentenced to death for the 1982 murder of his 12-
year-old stepdaughter with the special circumstance allegation 
of murder in the commission of lewd and lascivious acts and 
oral copulation. At the time of his death, his § 2254 Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 1992—had been 
pending in the Central District of California for one year. 
 32.   GARY GUZMAN died of natural causes on February 7, 
1991. At the time of his death, his § 2254 Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus—which was filed in 1989—had been pending 
in the Eastern District of California for two years.  
 
(Case numbers on file with authors.) 
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strongest, most effective death penalty law in the nation” that was 
promised to California voters in 1978 has not been realized. 
Instead, California has the most expensive and least effective death 
penalty law in the nation. 33 
In this Article, we examine the costs incurred to date in 
carrying out California’s capital punishment scheme since 1978. In 
so doing, we look to the numerous death penalty initiatives passed 
by a majority of the voters who have turned out to vote at given 
elections, 34 and we ask whether the current costly and inefficient 
death penalty scheme is what the voters anticipated when they cast 
their ballots in favor of these initiatives. Our goal is to expose, with 
as much precision as possible, how much taxpayers are spending 
on the administration of California’s broken death penalty system 
and to explain how the system became so dysfunctional. 
Part I examines the toll the current system is taking on state 
and federal taxpayers, including never-before-published data 
concerning the millions of dollars in federal funds expended to 
process California’s condemned inmates’ federal habeas corpus 
petitions due to the Legislature’s failure to provide adequate state 
funds for appointed counsel to investigate federal constitutional 
claims. We also discuss the added costs incurred due to the 
constitutional requirement that the California Supreme Court 
review all direct appeals. Part II looks at the role voter initiatives 
passed by California voters over the last 40 years have played in 
shaping the current system of capital punishment in California. We 
discuss the Legislature’s utter failure to respond to the repeated 
warnings of former Chief Justice Ronald M. George that the system 
of reviewing death penalty convictions and sentences is totally 
ineffective. Part III forecasts potential constitutional issues that 
may arise if the state Legislature persists in its refusal to address 
the collapse of the administration of capital punishment in 
California. Part IV summarizes and reviews the problems identified 
 
have exclusive control over the television, CD player or other diversions in their cells. 
Id. 
 33. See Williams, supra note 32 (describing the high cost and lack of efficiency of 
California’s administration of the death penalty). 
 34. While the “electorate” is defined as “a body of people entitled to vote,” MERRIAM-
WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 400 (11th ed. 2008), in California it is not the majority of 
the electorate—or eligible voters—that is required to pass an initiative, but a simple majority of 
those voters who turn out at a given election. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10. 
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and the corrective measures proposed in our earlier article 
Remedies for California’s Death Row Deadlock 35 (“Remedies”) 
and in the Commission’s Final Report. It also looks at the 
Legislature’s failure to conduct hearings and vote on whether those 
recommendations would be cost-effective. 
Finally, in Part V we suggest several ballot initiatives California 
voters may wish to consider if the Legislature continues to ignore its 
duty to address the demonstrably flawed aspects of the 
administration of California’s death penalty laws. 
I.  BULLDOZING BARRIERS AND UNEARTHING HIDDEN COSTS: 
HOW MUCH ARE CALIFORNIA TAXPAYERS REALLY PAYING 
FOR THE STATE’S ILLUSORY DEATH PENALTY? 36 
While California spends more on staffing the California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) than any of 
the state’s other 150 departments—$4.78 billion in 2009 37—
obtaining data concerning how much the administration of 
California’s death penalty actually costs state and federal taxpayers 
has not been easy. 38 In our earlier article Remedies, which discussed 
the cumulative delays inherent in both automatic appeals and post-
conviction proceedings in death penalty cases, we identified some of 
the costs associated with death penalty litigation in California’s state 
and federal courts. 39 While researching and writing Remedies, we 
 
 35. Alarcón, supra note 3. 
 36. See Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995) (“[W]e have little more than an illusion of a death penalty in this 
country.”). 
 37. Brian Joseph, State Prison System Lucrative for Corrections Workers, ORANGE COUNTY 
REGISTER (Jan. 9, 2011 3:18PM), http://www.ocregister.com/news/-283117--.html (“The next 
closest department was Transportation, better known as CalTrans, which employed more than 
23,000 people and paid them more than $1.49 billion in salary, overtime and other wages.”); see 
also PEW CTR. OF THE STATES & THE PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., FACING FACTS: PUBLIC 
ATTITUDES AND FISCAL REALITIES IN FIVE STRESSED STATES 43 (2010) (explaining that 
Governor Schwarzenegger kicked off this year’s legislative session by calling for a constitutional 
amendment to limit spending on prisons and guarantee funding for higher education as follows: 
“‘The priorities have become out of whack over the years,’ Schwarzenegger told lawmakers in his 
State of the State address. ‘What does it say about our state? What does it say about any state that 
focuses more on prison uniforms than on caps and gowns? It simply is not healthy.’”). 
 38. As the Commission concluded in the Final Report, “[I]t is impossible to ascertain the 
precise costs of the administration of California’s death penalty law at this time. But the choices 
that California faces require some comparison of projected costs; for this purpose, rough 
estimates will have to do.” FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 144 (emphasis added). 
 39. Alarcón, supra note 3, at 709–10. 
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were unable to find a single state or federal official willing to go on 
the record concerning the cost of implementing the death penalty in 
California. As a result, we were forced to rely on various sources, 
such as the media and anecdotal reports, that attempted to estimate 
those overall costs. We noted that, with respect to expenses incurred 
in litigating capital habeas corpus petitions in federal court, those 
amounts are “not made public.” 40 
A year after the publication of Remedies, the Commission issued 
its Final Report. 41 The Commission was created on August 24, 2004, 
by Senate Resolution No. 44 of the 2003–2004 Session of the 
California State Senate. 42 
The Final Report relates a grim tale of numerous procedural 
infirmities in California’s administration of the death penalty. After 
conducting a thorough review of the implementation of the death 
penalty by the executive and legislative branches of California’s 
government, the Commission gave those branches a failing grade. It 
concluded that 
[t]he failures in the administration of California’s death 
penalty law create cynicism and disrespect for the rule of 
law, increase the duration and costs of confining death row 
inmates, weaken any possible deterrent benefits of capital 
punishment, increase the emotional trauma experienced by 
murder victims’ families and delay the resolution of 
meritorious capital appeals. 43 
The Commission was unable to locate any reliable sources 
within the state or federal governments willing or able to discuss on 
the record what the death penalty costs taxpayers. 44 The Commission 
retained the RAND Corporation to determine the feasibility of a 
major study of the overall costs incurred for the administration of the 
death penalty in California. 45 The RAND representatives assigned to 
 
 40. Id. at 710. 
 41. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4. 
 42. Charge, CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, http://www.ccfaj.org/ 
charge.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2011) (“Thorough, unbiased study and review in other states 
has resulted in recommendations for significant reforms to the criminal justice system in order to 
avoid wrongful convictions and executions, and California has not engaged in any such review of 
the state’s criminal justice system.” (quoting S. Res. 44, 2003–2004 Sess. (Cal. 2004))). 
 43. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 115 (footnote omitted). 
 44. Id. at 144, 152–53. 
 45. Id. at 153. 
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interview state officials as part of the study reported that 
many (if not most) of the participants in the death penalty 
process have strongly held views about the death penalty, 
and . . . those views have implications for [their] ability to 
gather the necessary data for the proposed study. . . . 
[M]any of the stakeholders in the current death penalty 
process are wary of the kind of independent study [RAND] 
proposed, for fear that it could end up swaying opinion in a 
direction contrary to their own convictions. This wariness 
was expressed . . . [directly and indirectly] (e.g., difficulties 
we encountered getting connected in a timely fashion to the 
right people). In our experience, such ambivalence about a 
study can make data collection extremely difficult—if not 
effectively impossible. 46 
The Commission abandoned its effort to determine with 
precision what the cumulative costs are to administer the state’s 
death penalty. 47 We encountered similar resistance in our attempts to 
gather data for this Article, and we agree entirely with the 
Commission’s conclusion that “[p]roviding the public with reliable 
information about how the death penalty is being administered in 
California should not depend upon the discretion of those who are 
charged with its administration.” 48 
The Commission recommended to the Legislature that there be 
more comprehensive collection of data and the continual 
monitoring and analysis of that data, to identify and address 
the problems of delay, chronic under-funding, and the 
potential risk of wrongful convictions and executions, and 
to assure ourselves that racial and geographic variations do 
not reflect the inappropriate exercise of discretion. 49 
The Commission majority recommended that a panel be appointed 
by the Governor and the Legislature and charged with the duty 
to issue an annual report to the Legislature, the Governor 
and the courts, gauging the progress of the courts in 
 
 46. Id. (quoting EVERINGHAM ET AL., FEASIBILITY STUDY: CHARACTERIZING THE 
ADMINISTRATION AND ASSESSING THE ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
CALIFORNIA 11 (2007)). 
 47. Id. at 154–55. 
 48. Id. at 153. 
 49. Id. at 154. 
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reducing delays in death penalty cases, analyzing the costs 
of and monitoring the implementation of the 
recommendations of this Commission, and examining ways 
of providing safeguards and making improvements in the 
way the California death penalty law functions. 50 
In the three years that have passed since the Commission issued its 
Final Report, the California Legislature has not acted on its 
recommendations. 51 
A.  Cost Study: California’s Death Penalty Is a 
$4 Billion Capital Blunder 
The growing concern over the cost of implementing the death 
penalty in California and the lack of publically available information 
about these taxpayer-funded expenditures—matters of particular 
concern in view of California’s developing budget crisis 52—
prompted us to undertake a study of our own. Over a two-year 
period, we requested death penalty cost data and related information 
from various state and federal agencies. We have reviewed the data 
 
 50. Id. at 154–55. 
The Legislature should impose a requirement upon courts, prosecutors and defense 
counsel to collect and report any data other than privileged material designated by the 
California Death Penalty Review Panel which may be necessary: (1) to determine 
whether demographics affect decisions to implement the death penalty, and if so, how; 
(2) to determine what impact decisions to seek the death penalty have upon the costs of 
trials and postconviction review; and (3) to track the progress of potential and pending 
death penalty cases to predict the future impact upon the courts and correctional needs. 
The information should be reported to the California Department of Justice and the 
California Death Penalty Review Panel. The information reported should be fully 
accessible to the public and to researchers. 
Id. at 154 (emphasis added). 
 51. In a recent survey by the PEW Center of the States and Public Policy Institute of 
California (PPIC), it is reported that “[o]nly 9 percent of respondents give the California 
legislature positive marks for its work on fiscal issues.” PEW CTR. OF THE STATES & THE PUB. 
POLICY INST. OF CAL., supra note 37, at 39. 
 52. Marc Lifsher, State Jobless Benefit Fund Overdrawn; California Is Forced to Borrow 
Billions to Provide Assistance to Unemployed Workers, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2010, at A1 
(“California’s fund for paying unemployment insurance is broke. With one in every eight workers 
out of a job, the state is borrowing billions of dollars from the federal government to pay benefits 
at the rate of $40 million a day. The debt, now at $8.6 billion, is expected to reach $10.3 billion 
for the year, two-thirds greater than last year. Worse, the deficit is projected to hit $13.4 billion by 
the end of next year and $16 billion in 2012, according to the California Employment 
Development Department, which runs the program. Interest on that debt will soon start piling up, 
forcing the state to come up with a $362-million payment to Washington by the end of next 
September. That’s money that otherwise would go into the state’s general fund, where it could be 
spent to hire new teachers, provide healthcare to children and beef up law enforcement.”). 
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we were able to obtain, and other data gathered from published 
studies that offer some degree of reliability, in an effort to determine 
what California is spending in taxpayer dollars on the administration 
of the death penalty. 
Most of our inquiries were not well received; the responses we 
were able to get were typically laden with caveats, disclaimers, or 
other explanations as to why the data may or may not be reliable. 
When data was unavailable, the excuse most commonly offered for 
the lack of cost information was that government entities do not 
collect or maintain such data or that they have not begun to do so 
until very recently. The CDCR, for example, does not track or report 
what funds are expended on any costs associated with administration 
of the death penalty, including the costs associated with housing 
inmates on death row in California. 53 Concerning executions, 
according to the CDCR, 
[t]he cost of carrying out an execution in California is 
difficult to assess. . . . Staff assigned to the execution team 
receive their regular, budgeted salaries. The cost of the 
execution procedure, including the chemicals utilized, is 
minimal. 
 The real cost involved in the capital punishment 
procedure is related to the court reviews, both those 
mandated by the Legislature as well as the appeal 
procedures initiated by the convicted inmates’ legal staff. 
These costs vary depending upon the resources of the 
convicted inmate and the length of the court procedures 
involved. 54 
Until 1998, the federal government did not track how many federal 
tax dollars were being spent to compensate appointed defense 
counsel either to investigate capital state prisoners’ federal 
 
 53. Terry Thornton, spokeswoman for the California Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation, stated that “her department has never put a figure on the cost for ‘more staff-
intensive’ death row housing.” Williams, supra note 32, at A1. The authors attempted to contact 
Terry Thornton by e-mail and voicemail but received no response. See E-mail from Honorable 
Arthur L. Alarcón, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, to Terry Thornton, Spokeswoman for the Cal. 
Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab. (Nov. 5, 2010, 8:32AM) (on file with authors). 
 54. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, History of Capital Punishment 
in California, in BILL LOCKYER, OFFICE OF VICTIMS SERVICES, PEOPLE V. MICHAEL ANGELO 
MORALES: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 44–45, available at http://ag.ca.gov/victimservices/pdf/ 
aamorales_presspack.pdf. 
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constitutional claims or to represent them in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings. 55 
Concerns have been expressed that releasing data about costs 
incurred for publically funded, court-appointed defense attorneys 
could be taken out of context and might “inflame the body politic.” 56 
Both federal judges and defense counsel have expressed concerns 
over the potential negative reaction if the public knew about the 
sums of taxpayer dollars expended on legal representation for 
prisoners who have been sentenced to death. 57 They feared that 
voters would demand an end to these expenditures if they learned the 
truth and were concerned that reducing or eliminating public funding 
would deprive California’s condemned inmates of qualified legal 
representation. Concern was also expressed that such a lack of 
funding would deprive death row prisoners of procedural due 
process. While understandable, these concerns do not appear to be 
well founded. 58 The due process provisions of both the California 
Constitution and the U.S. Constitution require that prisoners who are 
sentenced to death be provided with qualified counsel during their 
 
 55. E-mail from George Drakulich, Chief Info. Tech. Div., to Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (July 15, 2009, 5:59AM) (on file with authors) (indicating that 
Statistics Division of the Administrative Office began tracking data related to capital habeas 
filings in federal court by state prisoners in 1998). 
 56. Martha K. Harrison, Claims for Compensation: The Implications of Getting Paid When 
Appointed Under the Criminal Justice Act, 79 B.U. L. REV. 553, 575 (1999) (“While the public 
has a legitimate interest in the expenditure of public funds for court appointed defense attorneys, 
even the disclosure of just the amounts paid would ‘distort the public perception about the 
fairness of the process because the expenditures, out of context, would emphasize costs without 
any information about benefits obtained.’ Even such a limited disclosure might ‘inflame the body 
politic’ against the defendant, thereby depriving him of a fair trial.” (emphasis added) (quoting 
United States v. Suarez, 880 F.2d 626, 633 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. 
Supp. 1452, 1465 (W.D. Okla. 1996))). 
 57. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. at 1465 (noting the media’s argument “that the public is 
interested in the amount spent for the defense during the course of the case because the funds are 
public and the taxpayers may question both the reasonableness and the appropriateness of the 
expenditures[,]” but concluding that “any ‘robust debate’ about expenditures for the defense of 
the accused at this stage would be counter-productive to the process of adjudication by diverting 
counsel from proceeding with the task of preparing for trial.”). But see Suarez, 880 F.2d at 630, 
633 (rejecting defendant’s concerns that disclosure of information on CJA forms related to 
remuneration of defense counsel and experts would “chill the willingness of defendants to apply 
for funds necessary for the preparation and presentation of a defense[,]” and, in light of the 
“obvious legitimate public interest in how taxpayers’ money is being spent, particularly when the 
amount is large[,]” permitting disclosure with “some modest redaction.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 58. Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 2003) (“In capital cases, 
prisoners challenging their convictions or sentences in federal court have a right to assistance of 
counsel.” (citing 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B))). 
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direct appeals. 59 Additionally, both the California Constitution and 
the U.S. Constitution guarantee the right to seek a writ of habeas 
corpus, a form of review that extends as far back as the English 
common law and the Magna Carta. 60 Both federal and state law 
provide for the appointment of counsel for indigent condemned 
inmates seeking review of alleged violations of rights guaranteed by 
the state or federal constitution. 61 
We believe it is highly improper to subvert the important public 
interest in transparency in governmental conduct, including the 
public’s right to know how many tax dollars are being wasted 
because the death penalty system in California has broken down. It is 
 
 59. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963) (holding that there is a right to counsel 
on appeal); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932) (holding that defendants subject to the 
death penalty are entitled to counsel). In California, a condemned inmate is entitled to an 
automatic appeal directly to the California Supreme Court to seek review of legal errors that may 
have occurred prior to or during trial. The right to automatic appeal is guaranteed in CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 1239 (West 2004). Section 1239(b) provides: “When upon any plea a judgment of death 
is rendered, an appeal is automatically taken by the defendant without any action by him or her or 
his or her counsel.” Id. 
 60. After an automatic appeal is decided, a condemned inmate may file a state habeas corpus 
petition with the California Supreme Court, in which he or she may seek review only of errors 
that amount to a violation of rights guaranteed by the state or federal constitution and may rely on 
evidence not available or introduced at trial. 
  An effective capital punishment system necessarily involves post-conviction 
proceedings, which come at an enormous additional cost to taxpayers. After conviction and 
sentencing, a condemned inmate has lost the presumption of innocence. In all subsequent 
proceedings (collectively referred to as “post-conviction proceedings”), the burden shifts to the 
inmate to show that a significant error was made in the process that convicted him. State and 
federal law guarantee condemned inmates representation by qualified counsel in all post-
conviction proceedings. A state prisoner who does not obtain relief through a state habeas petition 
is guaranteed the opportunity to challenge his or her conviction and sentence in federal court by 
filing a federal habeas corpus petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), and seeking federal court 
review of any claims of federal constitutional error that were considered and rejected by state 
court. 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B), repealed by Pub. L. 109–177, 120 Stat. 231, 232 (2006) 
(discussing circumstances under which a defendant can obtain federal habeas counsel in a post-
conviction proceeding). 
 61. Capital prisoners have a right per se to habeas counsel, under both federal and California 
law, by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3599 (2006) (“[Any] defendant who is or becomes financially 
unable to obtain adequate representation or investigative, expert, or other reasonably necessary 
services . . . shall be entitled to the appointment of one or more attorneys and the furnishing of 
such other services” for purposes of federal habeas proceedings); PENAL § 1239 (stating that 
prisoners sentenced to death are entitled to counsel in state and federal habeas proceedings). See 
In re Anderson, 447 P.2d 117, 131 (1968) (holding that “as a matter of policy, and upon 
application of the defendant,” a court will appoint counsel “to represent indigent defendants in 
capital cases in the following proceedings undertaken between the termination of their state 
appeals and their execution: (a) Proceedings in this court for post-conviction review; (b) 
Proceedings for appellate or other post-conviction review of state court judgments in the United 
States Supreme Court, subject however to the power of that court to appoint counsel therein; (c) 
Applications for executive clemency, and the conduct of sanity hearings where indicated.”). 
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deceitful and unethical to withhold the truth out of fear that the 
public may demand that the death penalty system be properly funded 
or that it be abolished if it cannot be properly implemented. 
Despite the many obstacles we encountered in our efforts to 
gather data for this Article, we believe we have collected enough 
information to calculate with some precision what it has cost the 
state of California and the federal government to maintain 
California’s death penalty system. Our study has revealed that years 
of keeping the public in the dark about the cost of the death penalty 
in California has resulted in billions of tax dollars quietly being 
wasted on a system of capital punishment in which very few are 
executed. The categories of costs associated with California’s capital 
punishment system can be broken down as follows: (1) pre-trial and 
trial costs, (2) costs related to direct appeals and state habeas corpus 
petitions, (3) costs related to federal habeas corpus petitions, and 
(4) costs of incarceration. 62 
1.  Death Penalty Pre-Trial and Trial Costs: $1.94 Billion 
For purposes of calculating a figure for the overall total costs 
incurred to administer the death penalty in California, we have 
attempted to calculate the state funds expended during the pre-trial 
and trial phases of capital litigation. 63 As with the other data 
concerning the cost of the death penalty in California, published cost 
 
 62. We have not included in our calculation the costs incurred—which are, to be sure, 
significant—for the litigation of the civil rights suits brought by inmates on California’s death 
row who are challenging the standards by which lethal injection is carried out in the state. We 
have also not included the added costs to the state of actually carrying out the thirteen executions 
which have been performed since 1978. 
 63. We note that expenses related to death penalty trials are funded by the counties in 
California, rather than by the state of California. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Can California Confront 
Costs of the Death Penalty?, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 10, 2010, at 1E (“Among California’s 58 
elected district attorneys, many choose to pursue politically popular death sentences with 
extravagant frequency. Why not? Most of the $54.4 million we spend each year for capital 
appeals and habeas reviews comes out of the state budget, not county coffers.”). 
  Once a defendant is convicted and sentenced to death, however, the expenses associated 
with the prisoner’s appeals and state and federal habeas corpus proceedings, as well as the costs 
of incarceration, are borne by the state of California. The California Department of Corrections 
reports that three counties account for nearly half (48.39%) of all the inmates sentenced to death 
in the state: Los Angeles County (218 death sentences for 30.4% of the statewide total), Riverside 
County (69 death sentences for 9.62% of the statewide total), and Orange County (60 death 
sentences for 8.37% of the statewide total). No death sentences have been imposed in 21 of 
California’s 58 counties, and only one death sentence has been imposed in another four counties. 
CONDEMNED INMATE SUMMARY LIST, supra note 17, at 3–4. 
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data relating to the pre-trial and trial phases is scant. We have 
calculated that the California taxpayers have spent approximately 
$1.94 billion on pre-trial and trial costs associated with the 
prosecution of an estimated 1,940 death penalty trials conducted 
since 1978. 
We have found no data published by any California state 
governmental entity indicating how many death penalty trials take 
place each year in California. Nor have we discovered any state 
governmental entity responsible for officially auditing or reporting 
how much more it costs to prosecute a death penalty case than a 
noncapital murder case. 64 We know that there have been at least 970 
capital trials, because that is how many death penalty judgments 
have been rendered in California since 1978; an average of about 30 
per year. 65 Based on testimony and other objectively verifiable 
 
 64. Unlike the centralized system in place in the federal system, California has no system for 
overseeing that the death penalty is sought evenly throughout the state. Instead, the state has 
“fifty-eight locally elected county prosecutors [with] complete discretion to determine which 
murders should be prosecuted as death penalty cases.” Gerald F. Uelmen, Death Penalty Appeals 
and Habeas Proceedings: The California Experience, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 495, 497 (2009). This 
system has given rise to numerous potential claims of discrimination. See ROMY GANSCHOW, 
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N. CAL., DEATH BY GEOGRAPHY: A COUNTY BY COUNTY 
ANALYSIS OF THE ROAD TO EXECUTION IN CALIFORNIA 3 (Elise Banducci et al. eds., 2008), 
available at http://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/death_penalty/death_by_geography/ 
death_by_geography.pdf. 
  In Los Angeles County, which typically has more death penalty trials than any other 
county in California, there is a review system in place whereby death penalty cases “shall not be 
filed by other than a Deputy District Attorney IV or higher.” Los Angeles County District 
Attorney’s Office, Chapter 7: Special Circumstances Cases (on file with authors). 
  “The Department of Justice does not permit a federal prosecutor to seek the death 
penalty for a defendant unless specifically authorized to do so by the Attorney General of the 
United States.” JON B. GOULD & LISA GREENMAN, UPDATE ON THE COST AND QUALITY OF 
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION IN FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY CASES 6 (2010), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/AppointmentOfCounsel/Viewer.aspx?dox=/uscourts/ 
FederalCourts/AppointmentOfCounsel/FDPC2010.pdf&page=1. “[T]he goal of the Department’s 
death penalty review and decision-making process is nationwide consistency in the fair and even-
handed application of federal capital sentencing laws in appropriate cases, irrespective of 
geography or local predisposition for or against the death penalty.” Id. at 12 n.18 (citing 
Statement of Barry Sabin, Dep. Ass’t Att’y Gen. of the United States, Oversight of the Federal 
Death Penalty: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007)). 
 65. The Commission based the projected cost calculations published in its Final Report on 
the average number of death sentences imposed between 2000 and 2007, which averaged 20 per 
year. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 120. Because our study is seeking to calculate funds already 
spent, rather than predict how many future death sentences will be imposed for future cost-
projection purposes, we rely on the average figure of 30 per year, based on the average of all 
death sentences actually pronounced between 1978 and 2010. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 
121 (2005: 22; 2006: 22; 2007: 20); BARRY LATZER & JAMES N.G. CAUTHEN, JUSTICE 
DELAYED? TIME CONSUMPTION IN CAPITAL APPEALS: A MULTISTATE STUDY 26 n.38 (2007), 
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/217555.pdf (citing Bureau of Justice 
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evidence, such as data collected by the Office of the State Public 
Defender over a five-year period in the 1980s, the Commission 
concluded that juries recommend the death penalty in 50 percent of 
the cases in which charges for murder committed under special 
circumstances are filed. 66 This means that approximately 1,940 death 
penalty trials have taken place in California between 1978 and 2010. 
Though it was unable to state with precision what the total 
expenses associated with a typical death penalty trial are, the 
Commission concluded that “[i]t can certainly be said that death 
penalty trials take longer and cost considerably more than non-death 
[penalty] murder trials.” 67 The Commission also determined that 
“[t]he records reviewed . . . confirm that it is feasible to track the trial 
level costs in death penalty cases, if a uniform system of reporting 
data is imposed.” 68 In other words, the Legislature’s failure to track 
and report these trial costs is not a matter of a lack of ability, rather, 
it appears to be a lack of political will. 
The few studies that have attempted to address the cost of a 
death penalty trial indicate that those trials cost significantly more 
than noncapital murder trials. The Legislature’s Joint Committee on 
Prison Construction and Operations reported in 1992 that “an 
average death-penalty murder trial can cost more than six times the 
$93,000 spent on non-capital murder cases.” 69 Another estimate 
made in 1993 was higher: “[C]apital cases often cost 10 to 20 times 
more than murder trials that don’t involve the death penalty.” 70 
 
Statistics—828 judgments of death in California between 1973 and 2004); NATASHA MINSKER 
ET AL., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N. CAL., DEATH IN DECLINE ’09 1 (Miriam Gerace ed., 
2010), available at http://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/death_penalty/death_in_decline_ 
09.pdf (2008: 21; 2009: 29); see Carol J. Williams, Crowd Grows on Death Row; the State 
Executes None But Adds 28 to the Queue in 2010, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2010, at AA1; see also E-
mail from Robert Reichman, Automatic Appeals Monitor for the Cal. Supreme Court, to Paula 
Mitchell, Career Clerk to the Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
(Feb. 3, 2011, 3:26PM) (on file with authors) (reporting that automatic appeals from the judgment 
of death have been filed in 961 cases). 
 66. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 128. 
 67. Id. at 129. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Marc Lifsher, Is Gas Chamber Door Closing?: The Cost: ‘Life’ Would Have Been 
Cheaper, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Apr. 22, 1992, at A1, A4 (citing the Legislature’s Joint 
Committee on Prison Construction and Operations and estimating that Robert Alton Harris’s 
1979 murder trial cost $600,000). 
 70. Alina Tugend, News Focus: Death Penalty’s High Cost; Courts: The State No Longer 
Reimburses Orange and Other Counties for Capital-Punishment Defense Expenses. Can O.C. 
Afford the Tab?, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Aug. 9, 1993, at B1. 
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News accounts reporting the costs of 15 capital murder trials in 
California since 1983 support the higher estimate: 
(1) The 23-month trial of Angelo Buono Jr. in 1983 “cost 
taxpayers an estimated $2 million” ($4.49 million in 2011 dollars 
after adjusting for inflation). 71 
(2) The 1988 trial of David Carpenter cost taxpayers “between 
$2 million and $3 million,” even though Carpenter was already on 
death row when he was tried in 1988, because he had been convicted 
of two other murders and sentenced to death in 1984. 72 
(3) The defense costs alone for Ronaldo Ayala, who was 
convicted and sentenced to death for the 1985 execution-style 
murders of three men in a Logan Heights garage, were 
$1.4 million. 73 
(4) The defense costs for Stacy Butler, whose “death penalty 
case ended in a mistrial when jurors deadlocked 6–6 over whether 
Butler murdered a San Diego police officer in 1988,” were 
$1.36 million. 74 
(5) “It cost taxpayers $2.7 million in 1989 to defend serial killer 
David Lucas in an eight-month trial that resulted in three murder 
convictions and a death sentence.” That figure apparently does not 
include costs of prosecution or court costs; it translates into 
$4.87 million in 2011 dollars, after adjusting for inflation. 75 
(6) The 1995 trial of Johnny Avila and his two co-defendants 
cost $1.6 million in defense attorney fees, investigators, and experts 
alone (excluding costs incurred for prosecuting the case and related 
court costs). 76 
 
 71. Linda Deutsch, One Guilty Verdict in ‘Hillside Strangler’ Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Nov. 1, 1983, available at 1983 WLNR 122315; see U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, 
http://www.usinflationcalculator.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2011) (calculating inflation rates based 
on year and amount entered by user). 
 72. Bill Callahan, New Trial Ordered in ‘Trailside Killings’; Juror Misconduct Cited by San 
Diego Judge, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 14, 1989, at A1. He remains on death row today. He 
is 80 years old. 
 73. Bill Callahan, Lawyers No Longer Get Millions in Capital Cases, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., June 26, 1994, at A1. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (comparing the cost of the Lucas trial to what it cost to defend “armed robber Darnell 
Jones, who was convicted in a three-week trial of murdering a Tierrasanta man and sentenced to 
spend the rest of his life in prison”—about $150,000); U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, 
http://www.usinflationcalculator.com (last visited Mar. 9, 2011) (calculating inflation rates based 
on year and amount entered by user). 
 76. Tom Kertscher, Killers’ Defense Sets High of $ 1.6m: Death Penalty Blamed for Cost of 
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(7) The capital trial defense costs for Joselito Cinco were 
$1.1 million. 77 
(8) The capital trial defense costs for Billy Ray Waldon were 
$1.1 million. 78 
(9) Dean Carter’s defense costs for his trial on the 1984 murder 
of a Pacific Beach woman were over $1 million. In the same year he 
was also convicted and sentenced to death in another trial for the 
murders of three women in Los Angeles. 79 
(10) The defense costs for Willie Ray Roberts, who “[p]leaded 
guilty to the 1988 murder of a 16-year-old schoolgirl and was 
sentenced to a prison term of life without the possibility of parole 
after a jury deadlocked 9–3 in favor of acquitting him,” were over 
$1 million. 80 
(11) The defense costs for Jessie Moffett, who was “[c]onvicted 
and sentenced to death for the 1979 rape-murder of a San Diego 
woman and the 1987 murder of a hotel security guard,” were over 
$1 million. 81 
(12) The costs were also over $1 million for Terry Bemore, who 
was “[c]onvicted and sentenced to death for the 1985 torture-murder 
of an East San Diego liquor store clerk.” 82 
(13) More recently, the 2002 trial of Cary Stayner, who was 
already serving a life sentence without parole in federal prison, cost 
$2.4 million. 83 
(14) The 2003 capital trial of David Westerfield reportedly cost 
in excess of $1.3 million. 84 
(15) Although he ultimately pleaded guilty, 85 the 2010 death 
 
Fresno Trial, FRESNO BEE (California), June 16, 1995, at A1. 
 77. Callahan, supra note 73, at A1. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. NATASHA MINSKER, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N. CAL., THE HIDDEN DEATH 
TAX: THE SECRET COSTS OF SEEKING EXECUTION IN CALIFORNIA 20 (Claire Cooper & Elise 
Banducci eds., 2008), available at http://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/death_penalty/ 
the_hidden_death_tax.pdf; Brian Bergstein, Yosemite Killer Going on Trial in State Court, Only 
Issue Is the Death Penalty, ASSOCIATED PRESS WORLDSTREAM, July 13, 2002. 
 84. Greg Moran, Westerfield’s Attorneys Were Paid $304,500; Fees Only Part of County’s 
Costs in Death-Penalty Trial, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 17, 2003, at NC-1, NI-1. 
 85. Kurt Streeter, Convicted Murderer Pleads Guilty to Killing 10-Year-Old Riverside 
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penalty trial of Joseph Edward Duncan III was estimated to cost 
“several million dollars by the time it’s completed.” 86 
A study conducted in 1993, which the Commission considered 
and included in its Final Report, looked at death penalty trial costs in 
California cases completed between 1989 and 1992. 87 That study 
concluded that at that time the “cost of a death penalty [trial was] at 
least $1.2 million more than a comparable murder trial pursuing the 
alternative of life in prison without parole.” 88 This calculation is 
supported by a review of death penalty trial cost information 
obtained by the San Diego Union-Tribune (“Union-Tribune”) in 
1994. 89 The Union-Tribune examined information it obtained about 
18 local death penalty trials occurring between 1984 and 1994, some 
of which are referenced above. The Union-Tribune determined that 
“[t]he defense costs [alone] in half of the 18 cases—including [court-
appointed] attorneys’ fees and costs for expert witnesses, 
investigators and other related expenses—were $1 million or 
more.” 90 The District Attorney’s Office “released estimated figures 
in most of the 18 cases at the request of the Union-Tribune.” 91 It 
reported that the prosecution had incurred additional trial costs of 
between $255,000 and $979,000 per case. 92 
The Commission also reviewed a study of the costs of death 
penalty trials published by the ACLU of Northern California. 93 The 
 
County Boy, L.A. NOW (Mar. 15, 2011, 1:45 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/ 
03/convicted-killer-pleads-guilty-to-killing-10-year-old-riverside-county-boy.html. 
 86. John Asbury, Mounting Costs to Try Killer, PRESS ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), 
Apr. 20, 2010, at A1 (reporting that “[t]he average death penalty trial can cost $3 million to $7 
million, said Michael Radelet, a University of Colorado sociology professor and death penalty 
expert”). 
 87. ERICKSON, supra note 28, at 20. Erickson’s study was based on data “from a variety of 
sources including the Los Angeles County Auditor-Controller, Los Angeles County Superior 
Court, Los Angeles prosecuting and defense attorneys, the Los Angeles County Jail and the 
Judicial Council of California.” Id. at 19. “All the cases [in Erickson’s study] were completed 
between 1989 and 1992.” Id. at 20. 
 88. Id. at 3. 
 89. Callahan, supra note 73, at A1. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 145 (“For comparative purposes, the Commission 
adopted a very conservative estimate that seeking the death penalty adds $500,000 to the cost of a 
murder trial in California.”); see MINSKER, supra note 83, at 32 (“Because there is no consistent 
or comprehensive tracking of trial level costs across the state and so many costs are hidden, it is 
impossible to say for certain how much more counties are spending in pursuit of execution.”). 
  
SPECIAL ISSUE]       EXECUTING THE WILL OF THE VOTERS? S75 
authors of the ACLU study collected data pursuant to a series of 
Public Records Act requests concerning reimbursements by the state 
to smaller counties for homicide trials between 1996 and 2005. 94 The 
study surveyed 10 capital cases and found that the trial costs ranged 
from $454,000 in the case of Robert Allen Wigley, to $10.9 million 
in the case of Charles Ng. 95 “Comparing the least expensive death 
penalty trial to the most expensive noncapital trial yielded a 
difference of $1.1 million more for the death case, but it is 
impossible to project this difference to all death penalty trials.” 96 
In the absence of any data provided by state or local 
governmental entities indicating what the actual costs of death 
penalty trials are, we are left to estimate those costs based on 
information obtained from other sources. The findings of the studies 
cited above, combined with available news accounts and other 
anecdotal evidence, support the conclusion that the costs associated 
with death penalty trials that took place between 1983 and 2006 
averaged about $1 million more per trial than the costs of average 
non–death penalty homicide trials. 97 
This conclusion is also supported by the fact that there are 
several significant, easily identifiable costs incurred in every death 
penalty trial that are not incurred in non–death penalty homicide 
 
 94. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 129; see also CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 15200–04 (West 
2009) (making available reimbursement for costs incurred by counties in murder trials “if such 
costs will seriously impair the finances of the county”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9 (West 2007) 
(permitting defense counsel to “request the court for funds for the specific payment of 
investigators, experts, and others for the preparation or presentation of the defense” in death 
penalty cases). 
 95. MINSKER, supra note 83, at 20. 
 96. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 129 (emphasis added) (noting that records from some 
trials indicate costs can be as high as $10.9 million). For example, the trial of Charles Ng cost 
approximately $10.9 million, of which $6.42 million was solely related to costs of defense, 
Donald Bowcutt’s trial cost approximately $5 million, and Scott Peterson’s trial cost 
approximately $3.2 million, excluding the costs for his defense, since he retained private counsel. 
Id. 
 97. See id. at 145. While acknowledging that both the Erickson study and the ACLU study 
calculated the cost of a capital murder trial to be between $1.27 million and $1.1 million more 
(respectively), on average, than the costliest noncapital felony trials, “the Commission adopted a 
very conservative estimate that seeking the death penalty adds $500,000 to the cost of a murder 
trial in California.” Id. We are persuaded, based upon our review of all available data, that a more 
accurate estimate is that the death penalty adds, on average, $1 million to the cost of a murder 
trial in California. Notwithstanding our use of the higher figure for our calculations, it should be 
noted that even if we were to use the lower $500,000 figure employed by the Commission, the 
pre-trial and trial costs for death penalty trials would still be nearly $1 billion over and above 
what the taxpayers would have paid for non-death penalty trials. 
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trials. 98 First, there typically are two death penalty–qualified 
attorneys per side (prosecution and defense), rather than one. 
Because most capital defendants are indigent, 99 this means that 
taxpayers fund all of the attorneys involved in death penalty trials. 
Second, death penalty trials usually require that the defendant’s 
counsel employ the services of multiple investigators. Three of the 
10 death penalty cases studied in the ACLU’s report indicate that the 
prosecution also employed numerous investigators in some cases: 
Scott Peterson—seven investigators; Rex Allen Krebs—eight 
investigators; and Robert Wigley—three investigators. 100 
Third, the defense typically employs the services of multiple 
experts, particularly in connection with the penalty phase of the 
trial. 101 The prosecution similarly retains experts to rebut the theories 
 
 98. In his testimony before the Nevada Advisory Commission on the Administration of 
Justice on July 7, 2008, Richard C. Dieter, Executive Director of Death Penalty Information 
Center summarized the difference between death penalty trials and non–death penalty trials as 
follows: 
Death penalty cases are clearly more expensive at every stage of the judicial process 
than similar non-death cases. Everything that is needed for an ordinary trial is needed 
for a death penalty case, only more so: 
• more pre-trial time will be needed to prepare: cases typically take a year to 
come to trial 
• more pre-trial motions will be filed and answered 
• more experts will be hired 
• twice as many attorneys will be appointed for the defense, and a comparable 
team for the prosecution 
• jurors will have to be individually quizzed on their views about the death 
penalty, and they are more likely to be sequestered 
• two trials instead of one will be conducted: one for guilt and one for 
punishment; in the state of Washington, the EXTRA costs associated with the 
death penalty cases amounted to $463,000 per trial; in California, the extra 
trials costs in capital cases was about $1.2 million per trial. 
• the trial will be longer: a cost study at Duke University estimated that death 
penalty trials take three to five times longer than typical murder trials 
• and then will come a series of appeals during which the inmates are held in the 
high security of death row. 
Richard C. Dieter, Exec. Dir., Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Testimony Before the Nevada Advisory 
Commission on the Administration of Justice (July 7, 2008), available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/NVTestimony08.pdf. 
 99. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 121 (“All of the 670 inmates on California’s death row 
qualify as indigents.”). 
 100. MINSKER, supra note 83, at 6, 23, 27, 29 (additional costs incurred for prosecuting death 
penalty trials include two death penalty–qualified prosecutors who devote enormous resources to 
these cases (e.g., Scott Peterson trial consumed 20,000 hours of prosecutor staff time; Krebs 8700 
hours)). 
 101. American Bar Association (ABA) Guideline 10.7 (A) provides: “Counsel at every stage 
have an obligation to conduct thorough and independent investigations relating to the issues of 
both guilt and penalty.” Am. Bar Ass’n, American Bar Association Guidelines for the 
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presented by the defense. There are numerous areas in which the 
services of an expert may be required in a capital trial, including: 
mitigation specialists, social historians, child abuse experts, 
addiction experts, institutional adjustment experts, psychol-
ogists, psychiatrists, neuropsychologists, neuropsychiatrists, 
toxicologists, pathologists, ballistics experts, fingerprint 
analysts, criminologists, mental health experts, atomic ab-
sorption experts, statisticians, criminalists, fair cross-sec-
tions experts, trial experts, fetal alcohol experts, hypnosis 
experts, sociological experts, gunshot residue experts, 
human vision experts, DNA experts, forensic serologists, 
eyewitness/memory experts, correctional consultants, jury 
selection experts, psychopharmacologists, serology experts, 
polygraph experts, blood spatter experts, social anthropolo-
gists, and rape experts. 102 
Because almost all capital defense is publically funded, the fees 
paid to these experts come out of the public coffers as well. In cases 
in which a defendant faces a maximum penalty of life without the 
possibility of parole, rather than the death penalty, there is no penalty 
phase trial at all. Thus, the government would not incur these costly 
expenditures if the death penalty were abolished. 
Fourth, the jury selection process in a capital trial takes much 
longer than it does in a murder case in which the prosecutor does not 
seek the death penalty. 103 The Legislative Analyst estimated in 1999 
that if the death penalty were abolished “jury selection [in murder 
cases] could be shortened by as much as three or four weeks.” 104 Jury 
selection in capital trials takes longer because (1) each side is 
allowed more peremptory challenges, which requires that more 
 
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
913, 1015 (2003). The commentary to the Guidelines lists all of the elements of an appropriate 
investigation. Id. at 1016–27. 
 102. Alarcón, supra note 3, at 748 n.300 (listing the types of experts frequently retained by 
federal habeas corpus counsel). 
 103. Margot Garey, The Cost of Taking a Life: Dollars and Sense of the Death Penalty, 18 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1257 (1985) (estimating that jury selection in a death penalty trial took 
5.3 times longer than a non–death penalty murder trial). 
 104. Letter from Elizabeth G. Hill, Legislative Analyst, Cal. Legislative Analyst’s Office, and 
B. Timothy Gage, Dir. of Fin., Cal. Legislative Analyst’s Office, to Bill Lockyer, Cal. Attorney 
Gen. (Sept. 9, 1999) [hereinafter Letter from Elizabeth G. Hill to Bill Lockyer], available at 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/1999/990670_INT.html. 
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jurors be screened; 105 (2) the prosecution excuses more jurors than in 
a noncapital trial due to jurors’ opposition to capital punishment; 106 
and (3) the court excuses roughly 75% of the jurors for financial 
hardship due to the extended length of capital trials. 107 “[A]s public 
opinion against the death penalty has grown,” increasing numbers of 
jurors have been excused. 108 By one estimate, “jury selection alone 
has been known to add $200,000 to the cost” of a death penalty 
trial. 109 
Fifth, California death penalty trials cost more because they are 
conducted in two phases: a guilt phase trial and a separate penalty 
phase trial to determine punishment—either execution or life without 
parole. One study estimated that the guilt phase of a capital case 
takes about 30 more courtroom days than does a non–death penalty 
murder trial. 110 Additionally, the Legislative Analyst found that death 
penalty trials are costly to “state and local law enforcement 
agencies . . . because law enforcement personnel are often key 
witnesses in [those] murder trials.” 111 
Sixth, California Penal Code section 190.9 requires that in death 
penalty cases “[t]he court reporter shall prepare and certify a daily 
transcript of all proceedings commencing with the preliminary 
hearing.” 112 The rate charged for a daily copy of trial transcripts is 
significant, especially when the average death penalty trial transcript 
runs in excess of 9,000 pages. 113 
 
 105. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 143 (“In Los Angeles County, 800 potential jurors may 
be summoned for a death penalty case.”). 
 106. Id. (“While a jury is normally selected in one or two days in most felony cases, the 
selection of a death-qualified jury normally takes 8–10 days of court time.”); see also Uelmen, 
supra note 64, at 512 (“[J]urors must undergo individual questioning to determine whether they 
have opinions about the death penalty that would preclude their serving in a death case. This 
process of ‘death qualification’ has resulted in larger numbers of potential jurors being excused as 
public opinion against the death penalty has grown.”). 
 107. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 143. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Gerald F. Uelmen, The Death Penalty Costs Too Much: Life Imprisonment Without 
Parole Is Only One-Third the Price, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 1983, at II5. 
 110. Garey, supra note 103, at 1258–59. 
 111. Letter from Elizabeth G. Hill to Bill Lockyer, supra note 104. 
 112. CAL. PENAL CODE §190.9(a) (West 2003) (“Upon receiving notification from the 
prosecution that the death penalty is being sought, the clerk shall order the transcription and 
preparation of the record of all proceedings prior to and including the preliminary hearing in the 
manner prescribed by the Judicial Council in the rules of court.”). 
 113. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 131. 
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Finally, the extended length of capital trials consumes the state 
criminal court system’s valuable resources, leaving courts 
unavailable to handle other cases. This issue is of considerable 
importance as the shortage of available criminal court judges has 
now become acute in some counties. 114 The California Supreme 
Court upheld the dismissals of 18 criminal cases in Riverside County 
based, in part, on its conclusion that no exception to the speedy-trial 
requirement was applicable because “the state’s failure, over a 
considerable period of time, to provide a number of judges sufficient 
to meet the needs of the Riverside County’s rapidly growing 
population and caseload [was a] circumstance fairly attributable to 
the fault or neglect of the state.” 115 
Based on the foregoing, we have calculated that an average 
death penalty trial consumes approximately $1 million in publically 
funded resources, resulting in the expenditure of $1.94 billion for the 
prosecution of the estimated 1,940 death penalty trials conducted 
since 1978. 
2.  Automatic Appeals and State Habeas Corpus Petitions: 
$925 Million 
Our research has shown that California taxpayers have spent 
approximately $925 million to fund the litigation of the automatic 
appeals and state habeas corpus petitions filed by capital prisoners 
since 1985. This figure is based on our review of the 2008–2009 
 
 114. For example, as mentioned supra, the Riverside Superior Court was required to dismiss 
18 misdemeanor and felony criminal cases, including the release of one defendant who was 
charged with first degree burglary, due to a lack of courtroom space and judges to hear those 
cases. See Richard K. DeAtley, High Court Shuns DA’s Bid, PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Oct. 26, 2010, 
at A1 (“From January 2007 through June 2009, about 350 cases were thrown out because of 
speedy trial limits, and no judge was available to hear them.”); see also People v. Engram, 240 
P.3d 237, 259 n.13 (Cal. 2010) (“Cognizant of the state’s difficult financial situation, the Judicial 
Council requested only that the Legislature create the 150 most urgently needed new judgeships 
over a three-year period. In 2006, the Legislature authorized the creation of the first 50 new 
judgeships to be allocated to the various superior courts according to the council’s uniform-need 
criteria, and in 2007 the Legislature authorized the creation of 50 additional new judgeships to be 
similarly allocated pursuant to the council’s criteria. Although a total of 14 of the 100 new 
judicial positions authorized under the 2006 and 2007 legislation have been allocated to the 
Riverside Superior Court, only seven of those positions have been funded to date due to state 
budget constraints, and the growth in workload in the Riverside Superior Court between 2004 and 
2008 ‘largely overwhelmed’ even the significant allocation of new judgeships to that court. In the 
Judicial Council’s 2008 report to the Legislature regarding the need for new superior court 
judgeships, the Riverside Superior Court was ranked first in unmet judicial needs.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 115. Engram, 240 P.3d at 241. 
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published annual budgets of the (a) California Supreme Court, (b) 
Habeas Corpus Resource Center, (c) Office of the State Public 
Defender, and (d) California Attorney General. It does not include 
funds spent litigating petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed in 
federal court by death row prisoners. 116 Relying on these budget 
allocations, we have extrapolated backward in time to come up with 
a total cost estimate for these categories of expenditures. 
a.  California Supreme Court 
The California Supreme Court automatically considers the 
appeal from every judgment of death rendered against a defendant. 117 
Death row inmates have a constitutional right to be represented by 
counsel in their automatic appeals. 118 The right to file a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus is also provided for by statute, as well as by the 
California Constitution. 119 The California Supreme Court must 
appoint counsel to represent all state capital prisoners in their direct 
appeals and state post-conviction proceedings. 120 An attorney who 
wishes to take on representation of a capital prisoner in an automatic 
appeal or state habeas corpus matter must submit an application for 
appointment to the California Supreme Court. 121 Dual appointments 
are extremely rare. 122 Appointed counsel is compensated “on either a 
 
 116. The costs incurred to litigate petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed in federal court are 
addressed separately below. 
 117. Alarcón, supra note 3, at 715. 
 118. Id. at 716 (citing Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963) (holding that there is a 
right to counsel on appeal); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932) (holding that 
defendants subject to the death penalty are entitled to counsel)). 
 119. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473 (West 2000); CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 5. Furthermore, 
to file an application for federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), a prisoner must 
first file a state petition and exhaust all claims before the California Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(b)(1) (2006). 
 120. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68662 (West 2009); GOVERNOR’S BUDGET 2011–12, DEP’T OF 
FIN., ST. OF CAL., PROPOSED BUDGET DETAIL: LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, AND EXECUTIVE 8 
(2001), available at http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/GovernorsBudget/0010.pdf (“Article VI of 
the Constitution creates the Supreme Court of California and the Courts of Appeal to exercise the 
judicial power of the state at the appellate level. Article VI also creates the Judicial Council of 
California to administer the state’s judicial system. Chapter 869, Statutes of 1997, created the 
California Habeas Corpus Resource Center to represent any person financially unable to employ 
appellate counsel in capital cases.”). 
 121. See Telephone Interview with Robert Reichman, Automatic Appeals Monitor for the 
Cal. Supreme Court (Aug. 5, 2009) (on file with authors). Attorneys who are not yet qualified are 
redirected to noncapital work to gain more experience. 
 122. Id. A dual appointment occurs when an attorney is appointed to represent a condemned 
prisoner in both the automatic appeal and the state habeas corpus proceeding. FREDERICK K. 
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time-and-costs or a fixed fee basis. Compensation for time-and-costs 
appointments is $145 per allowable hour plus specified incidental 
expenses.” 123 
The Legislature has failed to provide adequate funding for those 
public agencies charged with providing counsel to represent capital 
prisoners. This lack of funding has forced the California Supreme 
Court to rely heavily on the appointment of private counsel. 
California, however, does not have enough attorneys qualified to 
represent death row inmates in their appellate and post-conviction 
proceedings. 124 As of November 2010, there were 99 prisoners on 
death row awaiting the appointment of counsel for their automatic 
appeals. 125 The shortage of available, qualified counsel grows worse 
each year. 126 The average time expended before the California 
Supreme Court appoints counsel for a direct appeal in a capital case 
is now about five years, 127 while the wait for state habeas counsel can 
be as long as 13 years. 128 
 
OHLRICH, CAL. SUPREME COURT, APPOINTMENTS IN CAPITAL CASES IN THE CALIFORNIA 
SUPREME COURT (2009), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/supreme/documents/ 
supremebroch.pdf. 
 123. OHLRICH, supra note 122 (“Compensation for fixed fee appointments is determined by 
case length and complexity. There are five fixed fee categories for appeal and dual appointments, 
and three fixed fee categories for habeas corpus appointments. Dual fixed fee categories range 
from $160,000 for the least complex cases to a $368,000 base fee for the most complex cases, and 
contain 11 junctures for progress payments.”). 
 124. Telephone Interview with Robert Reichman, supra note 121. Mr. Reichman indicated 
that since 1998, the California Supreme Court has made only 127 separate appointments of 
private counsel for capital direct appeals and habeas corpus proceedings. Mr. Reichman explained 
that of the 127 appointments, some have been the same counsel, handling more than one case, and 
some have been cases where a prisoner has to get new counsel. So the figure of 127 is not very 
helpful in terms of quantifying the number of qualified counsel at any given time. 
 125. E-mail from Michael Laurence, Exec. Dir., Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr., to Honorable 
Arthur L. Alarcón, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and Paula Mitchell, Career Clerk to the 
Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón (Nov. 3, 2010, 11:34AM) [hereinafter E-mail from Michael 
Laurence to Authors] (on file with authors) (stating that there are currently 324 inmates on death 
row without counsel and 99 inmates on death row awaiting counsel to represent them in their 
automatic appeals). 
 126. Year: Number of Inmates Awaiting Appointment of State Habeas Counsel: 2006: 156; 
2008: 291; 2009: 303; 2010: 324. See Table, infra note 563. See also Uelmen, supra note 63, at 
1E (estimating that “[m]ore than 40 percent of the 713 inmates on California’s death row are still 
waiting for the appointment of a lawyer to handle the habeas corpus reviews to which they are 
constitutionally entitled”). 
 127. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 122. 
 128. E.g., In re Jimenez, 237 P.3d 1004, 1005 (Cal. 2010) (describing how petitioner had to 
wait eight-and-a-half years for counsel’s appointment); In re Morgan, 237 P.3d 993, 994 (Cal. 
2010) (describing how petitioner had to wait 13 years for appointment of habeas corpus counsel 
to challenge his conviction and his death sentence). 
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Even if a sufficient number of qualified attorneys were available 
to represent death row inmates in their appeals and they were 
appointed in a timely manner, it would still be years before those 
cases could be heard because the California Supreme Court simply 
does not have sufficient judicial resources to handle the number of 
cases awaiting review. As of October 26, 2010, there were 356 direct 
appeals from judgments of death pending before the California 
Supreme Court. 129 Approximately 80 of these cases have been fully 
briefed and are awaiting oral argument. 130 In 2010, the court issued 
final opinions in 23 such cases. 131 
Similarly, 324 prisoners await the appointment of counsel in 
order to file their state habeas corpus petitions. 132 Meanwhile, 89 
fully briefed state habeas corpus petitions await review by the 
California Supreme Court. 133 
It is difficult for the California Supreme Court to attract 
qualified counsel to represent capital inmates because funds are not 
available to adequately compensate them. 134 Additionally, private 
counsel shy away from accepting appointments because they are 
provided with a budget of only $50,000 to investigate federal 
constitutional claims raised in capital state habeas petitions. 135 This 
amount is insufficient for such investigations because many claims 
arise outside the trial court record and, as such, require extensive 
investigation to locate witnesses and track down evidence many 
years after the crimes were committed. 136 This amount is insufficient, 
 
 129. Summary of Post-Conviction Capital Litigation in the California Supreme Court, 
Oct. 26, 2010 (on file with authors). 
 130. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 131, 147 (stating that “80 direct appeals” are fully 
briefed and awaiting oral argument as of June 1, 2008); Uelmen, supra note 63, at 1E (noting that 
“77 fully briefed death penalty appeals and 89 fully briefed habeas corpus petitions await 
decision”). Gerald F. Uelmen served as executive director of the CCFAJ, which undertook a 
comprehensive review of California’s death penalty law. Gerald F. Uelmen is also a professor of 
law at Santa Clara University School of Law. 
 131. E-mail from Robert Reichman to Paula Mitchell, supra note 65. 
 132. E-mail from Michael Laurence to Authors, supra note 125. 
 133. Uelmen, supra note 63. 
 134. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 135. 
 135. Id. 
 136. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, LAO ANALYSIS OF THE 1997–98 BUDGET BILL: 
JUDICIARY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CROSSCUTTING ISSUES, PART B: THE BACKLOG OF DEATH 
PENALTY APPEALS, http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_1997/crim_justice_crosscutting-b_anal97. 
html#_1_29 (last visited Apr. 20, 2011) (“Habeas corpus claims concern issues of whether the 
defendant received a fair trial. These claims often include matters which are not necessarily 
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by any measure, to fund a thorough investigation into a condemned 
inmate’s constitutional claims. 137 Additionally, in seeking to attract 
private counsel to handle capital habeas corpus cases, the California 
Supreme Court must compete for qualified counsel with the federal 
government, which appoints private counsel, known as Criminal 
Justice Act (CJA) Panel attorneys, 138 at $178 per hour and offers 
significantly greater funding for investigation of claims and expert 
fees. 139 
Michael Millman, Executive Director of the California 
Appellate Project (CAP), 140 explained that the shortage of available, 
qualified private counsel to represent condemned prisoners in their 
state habeas corpus proceedings is due in part to the fact that there is 
no logical pool from which qualified attorneys may be drawn. 141 
Appellate lawyers are not typically trained as “investigators” the way 
trial lawyers are, and criminal trial lawyers, who are the most 
obvious candidates because they do understand “investigations,” 
often find that there is not enough time to handle habeas corpus cases 
because of their trial schedules, which can be juggled but only to a 
certain extent. 142 To be presumptively timely, a state habeas corpus 
 
reflected in any of the trial court records, and require independent investigation.”). 
 137. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 135. 
 138. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (2006) (Criminal Justice Act of 1964 (“CJA”), as amended, 
providing that “[e]ach United States district court, with the approval of the judicial council of the 
circuit, shall place in operation throughout the district a plan for furnishing representation for any 
person financially unable to obtain adequate representation in accordance with this section.”); 18 
U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) (2006) (providing for the appointment of CJA counsel for state 
prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus relief). 
 139. Telephone Interview with Robert Reichman, supra note 121; see U.S. COURTS, GUIDE 
TO JUDICIARY POLICY Vol. 7, Part A, Chapter 6 (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
FederalCourts/AppointmentOfCounsel/CJAGuidelinesForms/vol7PartA/vol7PartAChapter6.aspx 
(“Under 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(10)(A), recodified in 18 U.S.C. § 3599(g)(1), [as of January 2, 2010,] 
the presiding judicial officer [sets] the hourly compensation at a rate not to exceed [$178] per 
hour for appointed counsel in federal death penalty cases and federal capital habeas corpus 
proceedings commenced, and appellate proceedings in which an appeal was perfected, on or after 
April 24, 1996.”). 
 140. “The California Appellate Project (‘CAP’) is a non-profit law firm established in 1983 
by the State Bar of California at the request of the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court. 
Its Board of Directors is made up of former State Bar officials. Its original mandate was to recruit 
and assist private attorneys who would be appointed to represent indigent persons in death 
penalty appeals and other criminal appeals and writs before the California Supreme Court.” 
CALIFORNIA APPELLATE PROJECT LOS ANGELES, http://www.lacap.com/About_Cap/about_ 
cap.asp#history (last visited Mar. 24, 2011). 
 141. Telephone Interview with Michael Millman, Exec. Dir. of the S.F. Office of the Cal. 
Appellate Project (CAP) (Aug. 4, 2009) (on file with authors). 
 142. Id. 
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petition must be filed within three years of the condemned inmate’s 
conviction and sentencing becoming final. 143 If a capital state habeas 
corpus petition is filed more than three years after an inmate’s 
conviction is final, the prisoner runs afoul of the one-year statute of 
limitations prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), foreclosing federal review of any 
federal constitutional claims. 144 Mr. Millman explained that most 
attorneys are not willing to take state capital habeas corpus cases for 
fear of blowing a deadline that would mean the loss of the 
condemned inmate’s opportunity to present his claims in federal 
court. 145 Mr. Millman also confirmed that inadequate funding for 
investigations discourages private counsel from seeking 
appointments. 146 
Robert Reichman, Automatic Appeals Monitor for the California 
Supreme Court, indicated that the system currently in place, which is 
heavily dependent on the appointment of private counsel, is 
enormously inefficient and costly. 147 On average, the cost to 
California taxpayers for legal representation in each case in which 
private counsel is appointed to represent a condemned inmate in state 
habeas corpus proceedings is between $200,000 and $300,000. 148 
 
 143. SUPREME COURT POLICIES REGARDING CASES ARISING FROM JUDGMENTS OF DEATH, 
policy 3, std. 1-1.1 (Cal. Supreme Court 2008), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/ 
supreme/aa02f.pdf (“A petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be presumed to be filed without 
substantial delay if it is filed within 180 days after the final due date for the filing of appellant’s 
reply brief on the direct appeal or within 36 months after appointment of habeas corpus counsel, 
whichever is later.”). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Telephone Interview with Michael Millman, supra note 141. 
 146. Id. Mr. Millman indicated that if we were to ask a seasoned criminal defense attorney 
like Judy Clarke what the average figure is for how much is needed to do a capital state habeas 
investigation right, the answer would probably be $250,000–$300,000. According to the 
Associated Press, Judy Clarke “is one of the top lawyers in the country for defendants facing 
prominent death penalty cases, having represented clients such ‘Unabomber’ Ted Kaczynski and 
Olympic bomber Eric Rudolph. She has a reputation for working out plea deals that spare 
defendants the death penalty, as was the case for Rudolph and Kaczynski.” Clarke has also 
represented convicted Islamic terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui and child murderer Susan Smith, 
among others. She represents Jared L. Loughner who is charged with the killing of Judge Roll 
and others in Tucson in early 2011. William Glaberson, Defense Lawyer Is Known as a Master of 
Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2011, at A17. 
 147. Telephone Interview with Robert Reichman, supra note 121. 
 148. Beth Jay, principal attorney to the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, stated 
that the court pays a lawyer $200,000 to $300,000 on average for a post-conviction challenge, 
which can take years. Maura Dolan, Inmates on Death Row Wait Years for Lawyers, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 27, 2010, at AA1, AA6. This figure includes attorney’s fees and investigation costs. 
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Public attorneys earn fixed salaries and specialize in capital 
litigation, which allows them to develop the skills and experience 
necessary to effectively manage their capital litigation practices over 
many years. By contrast, most private attorneys typically do not 
specialize in complicated habeas corpus matters and thus require 
more learning time on the front end. 149 Once a matter is completed 
and an attorney has developed the necessary skills and experience to 
handle these complicated cases, he or she may decline to accept 
additional appointments. Thus, the institutional knowledge acquired 
and paid for by public funds is lost. 150 
Even when a private attorney seeks reappointment on future 
cases, that attorney must be re-evaluated each time he or she wants to 
work on a capital habeas case. 151 Due to advanced age, or because 
they have not had enough recent criminal experience, formerly 
qualified counsel are sometimes determined to no longer be 
qualified. 152 
Despite the best efforts of the California Supreme Court, there is 
no indication that it will see an end to the backlog in post-conviction 
proceedings in capital cases in the near future. The influx of new 
death sentences handed down each year outpaces the rate at which 
appellate counsel is appointed to represent inmates already on death 
row. For example, “[i]n 2009, 21 inmates were appointed new 
appellate attorneys, while 29 were sentenced to death” and added to 
death row to begin their long waits for the appointment of their 
appellate counsel. 153 “According to [former] Chief Justice Ronald M. 
George, the Court now faces a crisis, in which the death penalty 
backlog is threatening the Court’s ability to resolve other statewide 
issues of law and settle conflicts at the appellate level, which is its 
primary duty and responsibility.” 154 
In 2009, the California Supreme Court had an annual capital 
 
 149. Telephone Interview with Robert Reichman, supra note 121; Telephone Interview with 
Robert Reichman, Automatic Appeals Monitor for the Cal. Supreme Court (Feb. 2, 2011). 
 150. Telephone Interview with Robert Reichman, supra note 121. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. (noting that similarly, sometimes previously unqualified counsel later become 
qualified after they have more experience). 
 153. MINSKER ET AL., supra note 65, at 7. 
 154. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 147. Automatic appeals from convictions and judgments 
of death constituted 20% to 25% of the Supreme Court’s docket as of January 2008. Testimony of 
Chief Justice Ronald M. George, supra note 8, at 7. 
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case budget of $15,406,000 to compensate and reimburse expenses 
for lawyers appointed to represent condemned prisoners in both their 
direct appeals and habeas corpus proceedings. 155 Out of that budget, 
the court funds CAP through a contract with the Judicial Council of 
California. CAP has an annual budget of $5,955,781. 156 Additionally, 
the California Supreme Court has added attorneys to the staff of each 
justice’s chambers and has created a central staff of 10 attorneys 
assigned to review death penalty motions, appeals, and state habeas 
corpus proceedings. 157 
b.  Habeas Corpus Resource Center 
The California Legislature created the Habeas Corpus Resource 
Center (HCRC) in 1998. 158 HCRC attorneys “may be appointed by 
the Supreme Court to represent any person convicted and sentenced 
to death in this state who is without counsel, and who is determined 
by a court . . . to be indigent, for the purpose of instituting and 
prosecuting postconviction actions in the state and federal 
courts . . . .” 159 “While the HCRC is available to take appointments 
in capital habeas corpus proceedings, the number of cases the HCRC 
can accept is limited both by a statutory cap on the number of 
attorneys it may hire and by available fiscal resources.” 160 
In 2008–2009, the HCRC had an annual budget of $13,857,000, 
with up to $1 million in additional funding from the federal 
government in reimbursements for work done in federal court. 161 Our 
research indicates that the HCRC’s budget has remained somewhat 
 
 155. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 135 (“Currently, the State Supreme Court allocates 
approximately half of its $15.4 million annual capital defense budget to habeas counsel.”). 
 156. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., FISCAL YEAR 2008–2009 EXPENDITURE INFORMATION 6 
(2009), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/jc/documents/reports/JCReporton08-
09BranchExpenditures.pdf. 
 157. Testimony of Chief Justice Ronald M. George, supra note 8, at 7. 
 158. Habeas Corpus Resource Center: About HCRC, http://www.hcrc.ca.gov/about.php (last 
visited May 2, 2011) (“The Habeas Corpus Resource Center (HCRC) was established in 1998 to 
accept appointments in state and federal habeas corpus proceedings and to provide training and 
support for private attorneys who take on these cases. The HCRC was created as a part of the 
judicial branch of the State of California, effective January 1, 1998, by Senate Bill (S.B.) 513 
(Ch. 869, 1998 Stats.).”) 
 159. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68661(a) (West 2009). 
 160. Alarcón, supra note 3, at 739. 
 161. CAL. GOVERNOR’S BUDGET 2010–11, DEP’T. OF FIN., 3-YR EXPENDITURES & 
PERSONNEL YEARS (2010) (on file with authors); see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 134 
n.68 (stating that the 2008 annual budget was $14.9 million). 
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steady since 2000 (the earliest year for which budget information has 
been verified), when it received $11,002,000. 162 
c.  Office of the State Public Defender 
The Office of the State Public Defender (OSPD) was created in 
1976 to represent indigent appellants in all criminal cases. 163 “Over 
the years, the mission of the agency has changed. Now, the OSPD 
focuses its resources on post-conviction appellate representation in 
death penalty cases. The agency currently represents more than 130 
men and women on death row in California.” 164 The OSPD is funded 
by the State’s General Fund and had an annual budget of 
approximately $12 million in 2008–2009. 165 The OSPD’s budget has 
also remained approximately the same since 2000 (the earliest year 
for which budget information has been verified). 166 
d.  Office of the California Attorney General 
The Office of the California Attorney General’s Criminal Law 
Division represents the state of California in automatic appeals and 
capital (state and federal) habeas corpus proceedings. 167 In 2009–
2010, the Criminal Law Division had an annual budget of 
$115,200,000. 168 Then–Attorney General Bill Lockyer estimated in 
2005 that 15% of the criminal division budget was devoted to capital 
cases. 169 Fifteen percent of the Criminal Law Division’s 2009–2010 
 
 162. DEP’T OF FIN., ST. OF CAL., 2000–01 FINAL BUDGET SUMMARY 76 (2001), available at 
http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/osp/GovernorsBudget/pdf/2000-01budsum.pdf. 
 163. Welcome, OFF. OF THE ST. PUB. DEFENDER, http://www.ospd.ca.gov/ (last visited May 
16, 2011). 
 164. Id. 
 165. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 132. 
 166. See DEP’T OF FIN., supra note 162, at 779. 
 167. GOVERNOR’S BUDGET 2011–12, supra note 120, at 99 (“[The] Criminal Law [division] 
represents the state in criminal matters before the Appellate and Supreme courts. Criminal Law 
[division] also . . . defends state and federal habeas corpus matters.”). 
 168. Id. at 101. 
 169. Rone Tempest, Death Row Often Means a Long Life: California Condemns Many 
Murderers, But Few Are Ever Executed, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at B1 (“Atty. Gen. Bill 
Lockyer, whose deputies represent the counties during appeals, estimates that he devotes about 
15% of his criminal division budget to capital cases, or about $11 million annually.”); see also E-
mail from Ronald S. Matthias, Senior Assistant Attorney Gen., Cal. Dep’t of Justice, to authors 
(Jan. 27, 2011, 9:46AM) (on file with authors) (confirming that between 2004 and 2010 an annual 
average of 14.36% of the hours and costs of the Appeals, Writs and Trial Section with in the 
criminal division of the state AG’s office was devoted to “capital case litigation”). 
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annual budget totaled approximately $17,280,000. 
 
Current Annual Costs Associated with  
Automatic Appeals and Capital State Habeas Proceedings 
California Supreme Court $15,406,000 
Habeas Corpus Resource Center (HCRC) $13,857,000 
Office of the State Public Defender  $12,000,000 
California Attorney General $17,280,000 
TOTAL $58,543,000 
 
We have calculated that the approximate annual expense 
incurred by the state of California in 2009 to compensate counsel 
engaged in litigating direct appeals from convictions and judgments 
of death and state capital habeas corpus cases was $58,543,000. 170 
We estimate that by the end of 2010, the state of California had spent 
a total of approximately $925 million on direct appeals from capital 
convictions and capital state habeas proceedings since 1985. 
This $925 million figure is based on (1) an estimated average of 
$50 million per year, for each year between the creation of the 
HCRC and 2010 (1999 through 2010, or 12 years), totaling 
$600 million; and (2) an estimated average of half that amount, or an 
average of $25 million per year, between 1985 and 1998 (13 years), 
totaling $325 million. These estimates are intended to be 
conservative and are based on both our review of prior state annual 
budgets and the increase in the number of death row inmates. This 
data indicates that from 1985 to 1998, when the HCRC was created, 
the California state budget more than doubled from $35 billion to 
$71.9 billion and the number of inmates more than tripled from 159 
to 518. 171 This estimate does not include estimated costs for any 
automatic appeals or state habeas corpus petitions filed prior to 1985. 
3.  Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions: $775 Million 
Under federal law, a California prisoner on death row may file 
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court “on the 
 
 170. This figure also includes costs incurred by the Office of the Attorney General for the 
State of California to litigate condemned inmates claims of federal constitutional violations in 
federal courts. 
 171. See SEN. COMM. ON BUDGET AND FISCAL REVIEW, CALIFORNIA STATE BUDGET 
HISTORY, at iii (2010), available at http://www.sen.ca.gov/budget/budgethistory.pdf. 
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ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws 
or treaties of the United States.” 172 Almost without exception, every 
capital prisoner seeks habeas corpus relief in federal court after the 
California Supreme Court has rejected his or her federal 
constitutional claims. The expense incurred for the provision of 
counsel to represent death row inmates who seek federal habeas 
corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) is borne by federal 
taxpayers rather than by state taxpayers. This expense is increased 
significantly because of the limitations that inadequate funding 
imposes on the investigations conducted by state habeas corpus 
lawyers who are appointed by the California Supreme Court. Thus, 
the cost of further investigating the claims exhausted in state court 
habeas corpus proceedings, and of any additional investigation of 
federal constitutional claims not asserted by state habeas counsel in 
state court, are paid for by federal taxpayers. 
Additionally, the delay in appointing state appellate and habeas 
corpus counsel, combined with the state Legislature’s chronic 
underfunding of the investigations into the merits of a petitioner’s 
state habeas corpus claims, postpones a proper and complete 
investigation for many years. “Inevitably, records are lost, witnesses 
become unavailable, and memories fade.” 173 Accordingly, in most 
cases, a full investigation into the inmate’s alleged federal 
constitutional violations does not occur until many years after the 
judgment of death was imposed, when the petitioner’s claims are 
presented in a federal habeas corpus petition. Almost without 
exception, in the course of their investigations, counsel representing 
condemned state prisoners in federal court discover claims of federal 
constitutional violations that have not yet been reviewed by the 
California Supreme Court. Under AEDPA, 174 which created the 
current federal version of the traditional writ of habeas corpus, these 
claims must be exhausted in the state’s highest court before they can 
be considered in federal court. 175 Federal proceedings are typically 
stayed while the newly discovered claims are filed in state court for 
 
 172. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006). 
 173. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 134. 
 174. Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254–
2255). 
 175. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). 
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exhaustion purposes. 176 
In the case of Richard Ramirez, who was convicted in 1989, 
federal habeas corpus counsel was appointed on February 1, 2008. 177 
 
 176. Id. § 2254(d); see also Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 657 (9th Cir. 2005) (“For reasons 
of comity and federalism, the Supreme Court required exhaustion of state remedies long before 
Congress included the requirement in the statute governing federal habeas corpus review of state 
court convictions.”). 
 177. In Remedies, we discussed the astonishing delays in the review of Richard Ramirez’s 
automatic appeal. See Alarcón, supra note 3, at 700–01. Set forth below is the history of Mr. 
Ramirez’s case and an update as to what has transpired in People v. Ramirez since Remedies was 
published: 
TRIAL AND CONVICTION 
1984: Mr. Ramirez was arrested for multiple murders. 
1989: Judgment of Death was entered. 
DIRECT APPEAL 
11/5/1992: The California Supreme Court appointed counsel for his automatic direct appeal. 
10/4/1999: After eleven requests for an extension of time to correct the record, the record on 
appeal was filed. 
3/1/2002: After eleven requests for an extension of time to file an opening brief, Mr. Ramirez’s 
counsel filed a 413-page opening brief. 
8/8/2002: The California Attorney General’s Office filed a 338-page responsive brief. 
12/31/2003: After eight requests for an extension of time, Mr. Ramirez’s counsel filed a 171-page 
reply brief. 
6/6/2006–8/7/2006: Mr. Ramirez’s direct appeal was argued and submitted; the California 
Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Ramirez’s conviction and sentence. 
For Mr. Ramirez’s direct appeal, see People v. Ramirez, No. S012944 (Cal. Nov. 7, 1989), 
available at http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/mainCaseScreen.cfm?dist=0&doc_ 
id=1744755&doc_no=S012944&search=party&start=1&query_partyLastNameOrOrg=ramirez&
query_partyFirstName=richard. 
FIRST STATE HABEAS PETITION 
6/21/2004: Mr. Ramirez filed a related habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme Court. 
11/22/2004: After four requests for an extension of time, the Attorney General filed an informal 
response. 
11/30/2005: After eleven requests for an extension of time, Mr. Ramirez’s counsel filed a reply to 
the informal response. 
2007: Mr. Ramirez’s petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied by the California Supreme 
Court. 
For Mr. Ramirez’s first state habeas petition, see People v. Ramirez, No. S125755 (Cal. June 21, 
2004), available at http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/mainCaseScreen.cfm?dist= 
0&doc_id=1857434&doc_no=S125755. 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PETITION 
12/26/2007: Request for appointment of counsel filed in the Central District of California. 
2/1/2008: Federal Public Defender appointed as counsel. 
6/12/2008: Protective Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner Richard Ramirez. 
12/17/2008: Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed. 
1/15/2009: Stipulation to Stay Case pending Filing and Exhaustion of State Habeas Petition filed 
by Respondent. 
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A petition for a writ of habeas corpus identifying unexhausted claims 
was filed in federal court on December 17, 2008. 178 Ramirez’s 
federally funded counsel has been representing him before the 
California Supreme Court in his state court exhaustion proceedings 
for the last two years. 179 
As they do in state habeas proceedings, both public and private 
attorneys represent capital prisoners in federal court habeas 
proceedings. The Federal Public Defender Capital Habeas Units 
(FPD CHUs) for the Central and Eastern Districts of California 
represent many of California’s capital prisoners in federal court. The 
HCRC also represents prisoners in federal capital habeas corpus 
proceedings, but only in a small number of cases. 180 When federal 
public defenders in the Central and Eastern Districts of California are 
unable to represent a California death row inmate in federal court, 
the district court has the jurisdiction to grant the inmate’s request for 
the appointment of private counsel to prepare an application for a 
 
For Mr. Ramirez’s Federal Habeas Corpus Petition, see Ramirez v. Ayers, No. 2:07-cv-08310 (on 
file with authors). 
SECOND STATE HABEAS PETITION 
3/16/2009: Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court. 
12/23/2009: Respondent filed his informal response. 
1/22/2010: Petitioner’s first request for extension to file reply to informal response. 
1/29/2010: Extension granted. 
4/07/2010: Petitioner’s second request for extension to file reply to informal response; extension 
of time granted to May 21, 2010. 
5/28/2010: Petitioner’s third request for extension of time filed to file reply to informal response; 
extension of time granted to July 20, 2010. 
8/2/2010: Petitioner’s fourth request for extension of time filed to file reply to informal response; 
extension of time granted to September 20, 2010. 
9/15/2010: Petitioner’s fifth request for extension of time filed to file reply to informal response. 
9/21/2010: Extension of time granted to October 27, 2010. 
10/26/2010: Petitioner’s sixth request for extension of time filed to file reply to informal 
response. 
11/3/2010: Petitioner’s amended sixth request for extension of time filed to file reply to informal 
response. 
For Mr. Ramirez’s second state habeas petition, see People v. Ramirez, No. S171312, (Cal. Mar. 
16, 2009), available at http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/mainCaseScreen.cfm? 
dist=0&doc_id=1902990. 
 178. Ramirez, No. 2:07-cv-08310, supra note 177. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Federal district courts in California have appointed HCRC as counsel in only three cases. 
Letter from Michael Laurence, Exec. Dir., Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr., to Honorable Arthur L. 
Alarcón, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Aug. 4, 2009). 
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writ of habeas corpus. 181 Court-appointed counsel must possess the 
qualifications set forth in the CJA Panel Guidelines and by the 
Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit. 182 Private attorneys must apply 
for approval to serve as a CJA Panel attorney. Applications are 
reviewed by various methods, depending on the district. 
Once appointed, CJA Panel attorneys must submit a capital 
habeas corpus case budget to the presiding judge of the district court 
in which the case is being heard, indicating expenses likely to be 
incurred in the litigation and seeking authorization to incur the costs 
associated with investigating and litigating the claims in a given 
petition. 183 “The budgets are reviewed and approved by the Judicial 
Council of the Ninth Circuit based on recommendations from the 
Capital Case Committee.” 184 The membership of the Capital Case 
Committee includes federal judges and court administrators. The 
committee oversees the budgeting for all federal habeas corpus 
petitions seeking review of death sentences imposed in California 
state courts. 185 Unlike the FPD CHUs, which can determine, without 
review by the Capital Case Committee, when and how its resources 
are allocated, CJA Panel attorneys receive only those portions of 
their payment requests that are approved by the Judicial Council of 
the Ninth Circuit. After a budget has been approved, CJA Panel 
attorneys must submit vouchers for payment of fees and expenses 
incurred. These vouchers are reviewed by CJA staff, and payments to 
CJA Panel attorneys are reconciled with the budgeted amounts. 186 
These procedures were put in place because “[c]apital habeas 
corpus petitions, in which a death penalty defendant claims a 
violation of constitutional rights, are extremely complex and often 
 
 181. Alarcón, supra note 3, at 745. 
 182. U.S. COURTS, supra note 139. In 1964, Congress passed the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 
which established a federal indigent defense system intended to ensure that every defendant had 
representation to ensure a fair trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2010); CATHY A. CATTERSON, 
OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE, NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES COURTS 2008 ANNUAL 
REPORT 27 (2008), available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/publications/AnnualReport2008. 
pdf. 
 183. Courts Focus on Capital Habeas Management, in CATTERSON, supra note 182, at 27. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See Voucher Review Guidelines for Capital Habeas and Capital Prosecution Cases, U.S. 
DIST. COURT FOR THE CENT. DIST. OF CAL. (Mar. 2, 1998), available at 
http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/cacd/AttyAsst.nsf/23b71cb60036042a882574ab005dcf3a/3e52439
53eeac671882567c80059dc6a?OpenDocument (last updated Mar. 28, 2010). 
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quite costly to adjudicate. Through its Capital Case Committee, the 
Ninth Circuit seeks to manage capital habeas corpus cases better, 
thereby containing costs without compromising legal 
representation.” 187 
Despite the considerable challenges presented to counsel 
charged with representing and investigating these petitioners’ federal 
constitutional claims, federal courts have granted relief in the form of 
a new guilt trial or a new penalty hearing in roughly 70% of the 100 
cases that federal courts have disposed of thus far. 188 
For more than a year, we attempted—unsuccessfully—to obtain 
specific cost information from federal governmental entities 
disclosing the costs incurred by the federal government to provide 
counsel to litigate petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed by 
California death row inmates in federal court. We were finally able 
to obtain data, which allowed us to calculate what the average costs 
are to federal taxpayers to fund the legal representation of California 
death row inmates in federal habeas corpus proceedings. We have 
extrapolated from these estimates that the total cost to fund 
representation for 700 capital habeas corpus prisoners’ petitions in 
federal court (there are currently 714 prisoners on California’s death 
row) will be $775 million. 189 
a.  Data from district court closed cases: CJA Panel attorney 
representation costs $635,000 per case on average 
By narrowing our request for cost information to closed cases, in 
order to avoid prejudice or invade the attorney-client privilege in 
ongoing federal habeas corpus proceedings, we obtained data from 
all federal district courts in California for the fees and costs, 
including the costs of investigation and travel in those closed cases in 
 
 187. Courts Focus on Capital Habeas Management, in CATTERSON, supra note 182, at 27 
(“In 2008, the [Capital Case] [C]ommittee also evaluated whether there was a need to increase the 
maximum hourly rates charged by investigators and paralegals involved in capital habeas cases. 
[It] recommended increasing the maximum hourly rates that can be charged by investigators and 
paralegals to $75 per hour from $55–$65 per hour, and paralegal rates to $45 per hour from $35 
per hour, respectively. The higher rates were approved in October by the Judicial Council of the 
Ninth Circuit. It was the first increase in rates for investigators and paralegals since 2002.”). 
 188. Supra text accompanying note 26; see FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 115. 
 189. Because the vast majority of condemned inmates on California’s death row have not yet 
completed their direct appeals and state habeas corpus proceedings, they have not yet filed federal 
habeas corpus petitions. Therefore, the federal government can expect to incur substantial costs in 
the future in connection with litigating these federal habeas corpus petitions. 
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which petitioners were represented by CJA Panel attorneys. 190 
Approximately 194 federal habeas corpus cases that have been 
filed by California death row inmates since 1988 are now closed for 
various reasons. 191 Thirty-two cases were closed because the 
petitioners died while their cases were pending. As of mid-2010, 37 
cases had been decided in the district courts, and any appeals 
concluded. Of those, 24 were handled exclusively by CJA counsel. 192 
The cost to federal taxpayers in those cases staffed entirely by court-
appointed CJA counsel averaged a total of $635,000 per case, 
including appeals. 193 We did not obtain a comparable cost-per-case 
figure for cases handled solely by the FPD CHUs from the district 
courts because the FPD does not submit itemized billing and expense 
reimbursement vouchers to the district court like CJA Panel 
attorneys do. 
b.  Data from the Office of Defender Services: FPD CHU 
representations cost $1.58 million per case on average 
We also obtained a second set of data from the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts, indicating the expenditures 
incurred by the federal government in the FPD CHUs for the Central 
and Eastern Districts of California and in the CJA Panel attorney 
cases. 194 The data provided by Defender Services tracked costs 
 
 190. See Letter from Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, to Chief 
Judges of District Courts in California (June 9, 2010) [hereinafter Letter from Honorable Arthur 
L. Alarcón to Chief Judges] (on file with authors). Some of the cases we requested were closed 
due to the petitioners’ deaths of the petitioner while the petition was still pending in federal court; 
thus, the overall costs in some of those cases are not representative of what the total costs would 
be to litigate a case to completion. We attempted to account for this and other types of 
discrepancies in our cost calculations. 
 191. Id. (listing closed cases for which we requested CJA voucher payment information); see 
PACER, http://www.pacer.gov/cmecf/ (last visited June 1, 2011) (select “Civil”; then select 
“California”; then select “Nature of Suit: 535 Death Penalty—Habeas Corpus”). Seventy-four of 
the 194 cases were filed and closed within two years, which typically indicates a dismissal on 
procedural grounds prior to the expenditure of significant public funds. As such, these closed 
cases were not considered for purposes of our study. 
 192. In some cases, a petitioner may be represented by both a federal public defender and 
court appointed counsel. We did not include any such cases in our study. See Letter from 
Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón to Chief Judges, supra note 190. 
 193. We checked our data with the Circuit Executive for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
who confirmed the accuracy of the data we had received from the district courts as to these cases. 
 194. The data reported in this article is on file with the authors. While the specific data sets 
obtained by the authors will not be released to the public, the authors are pleased to respond to 
inquiries about the nature of the data generally, and/or how the calculations reported herein were 
made. 
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incurred by the federal government to litigate California death row 
inmates’ habeas corpus petitions in federal court for 11 years: 1998–
2008. 195 In those 11 years, the federal government spent a total of 
$141,318,909 on expenditures associated with FPD CHUs and CJA 
Panel legal representation of California’s state prisoners on death 
row who were seeking habeas relief in federal courts. 196 Of these 
funds, CJA Panel attorneys received $53,702,609: $46, 542,115 for 
attorney’s fees; and, $7,160,494 for investigators, experts and other 
ancillary costs associated with legal representation. 197 The FPD 
CHUs in the Central and Eastern Districts of California received 
$87,616,300, of which $4,299,700 was spent on outside experts. 198 
Similar data was captured for the year 1994, in a report prepared 
by the Committee on Defender Services and the Subcommittee on 
Death Penalty Representation. 199 A separate Defender Services 
report published in 1995 reported that the total amount of federal 
funds expended on legal representation of California’s death row 
prisoners seeking habeas relief in federal courts in 1994 was 
$14,712,766. 200 This resulted in a total expenditure of $156,031,675 
in federal funds over twelve years (1994, and, 1998–2008), or an 
average annual expenditure of $13,002,639. 201 
The 1998–2008 data indicate that CJA Panel attorneys 
represented 98 clients per year on average, while the FPD CHUs in 
 
 195. See E-mail from George Drakulich to Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, supra note 55. “The 
information on filings was obtained from the Statistics Division of the AO. They indicated that 
tracking of capital habeas filings was not initiated until 1998. The data they provided reflects 
national filings and breakouts by district in California.” Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. COMM. ON DEFENDER SERVS. & SUBCOMM. ON DEATH PENALTY REPRESENTATION, 
REPORT ON DEATH PENALTY REPRESENTATION , app. A (Sept. 19, 1995) (on file with authors) 
(listing data for 1994). 
 200. See id. at 3–4. In 1994, prior to the creation of the Capital Habeas Units in the Federal 
Public Defender offices, 
[t]he federal courts provide[d] counsel in one of three ways. They . . . appoint[ed] an 
attorney from the private bar, a Post-Conviction Defender Organization (PCDO), or a 
federal defender organization. . . . In fiscal year 1994, Criminal Justice Act payments 
to attorneys in capital habeas cases amounted to $15,115,636, of which $10,167,026 
was for California alone. . . . In fiscal year 1994, PCDO grants totaled $19,589,304 and 
ranged from a low of $188,235 for Nevada to a high of $4,545,740 for California. 
Id. ($10,167,026 + $4,545,740 = $14,712,766). 
 201. $141,318,909 (1998–2008) + $14,712,766 (1994) = $156,031,675. E-mail from George 
Drakulich to Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, supra note 55; see supra note 200. 
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the Central and Eastern Districts of California combined represented 
64 clients per year on average. 202 Extrapolating more precise cost 
data from these calculated “averages” is somewhat problematic 
because the number of representations varies from year to year. 
Additionally, the nature of these cases is such that there may be one 
year in which numerous cases handled by the FPD suddenly become 
very active, and thus costly, while during that same year, cases being 
litigated by CJA Panel attorneys may be particularly inactive. Thus, 
it is difficult to make an apples-to-apples comparison of the cost of a 
typical case handled by a CJA Panel attorney and the cost of one 
involving representation by the FPD CHUs. Based on the data 
provided over the 11-year period between 1998 and 2008, however, 
it appears that the FPD CHUs are provided with significantly more 
funding than are CJA Panel attorneys. 203 The average annual funding 
per client received by a CJA Panel attorney between 1998 and 2008 
was $47,915, while the average funding per year per client 
represented by FPD CHUs between 1998 and 2008 was $125,565. 
Thus, the data indicate that FPD CHU representations received more 
than two-and-a-half times the funding that CJA Panel attorney 
representations received. 204 This estimate is supported by data for the 
year 2007, a year in which CJA Panel attorneys represented 85 
clients in federal court and the FPD represented 87 clients in federal 
court. Though they represented an almost equal number of clients, 
the FPD CHUs for the Central and Eastern Districts of California 
received funding in the amount of $10,754,300 from Defender 
Services, while court-appointed CJA Panel attorneys received 
$3,113,713—less than one-third of the funding provided to the FPD 
 
 202. E-mail from George Drakulich to Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, supra note 55. 
 203. The average funds expended per client for those petitioners represented by CJA Panel 
attorneys was as follows: 1998: $64,870; 1999: $60,224; 2000: $48,733; 2001: $66,924; 2002: 
$59,712; 2003: $44,776; 2004: $41,831; 2005: $33,312; 2006: $38,166; 2007: $36,632; 2008: 
$31,895. 
  The same figures for the FPD CHUs are as follows: 1998: $129,089; 1999: $145,990; 
2000: $136,826; 2001: $121,964; 2002: $105,572; 2003: $127,197; 2004: $125,943; 2005: 
$125,042; 2006: $117,042; 2007: $123,613; 2008: $122,944. Thus, the average per client, per 
year expense for cases involving representation by a CJA Panel attorney was $47,915; the same 
figure for cases involving FPD CHU representation was $125,565. 
 204. The average annual funding received by a CJA Panel attorney between 1998 and 2008 
was $47,915 x 2.6 = $124,579 (average funding per year per client represented by FPD CHUs 
1998–2008 was $125,565). 
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CHUs that year for virtually the same number of representations. 205 
The disparity in funding between a representation by a CJA 
Panel attorney and one by a Federal Public Defender is due in large 
part to the strict constraints placed on the budgets with which CJA 
Panel attorneys must comply. The federal government typically 
reimburses CJA Panel attorneys for less than the full amount of the 
expenses that they have incurred in representing a capital prisoner in 
federal court, e.g., conducting investigations, interviewing witnesses, 
hiring experts. 206 
Based on (1) our calculation that CJA Panel representations 
average a total of $635,000 per case, and (2) our calculation that 
cases litigated by the FPD CHUs in the Central and Eastern Districts 
of California cost approximately two-and-a-half times more than an 
average CJA Panel representation, we have concluded that an 
average case litigated by the FPD CHUs in the Central and Eastern 
Districts of California costs approximately $1.58 million. 207 
The data for 1998–2008 indicate that CJA Panel attorneys and 
FPD CHUs have handled similar shares of the federal habeas 
petitions filed in California: CJA Panel attorneys: 60%, FPD CHUs: 
40%. 208 Assuming all representations are equally split, and assuming 
costs remain steady and do not increase, we estimate that the total 
bill to the federal government to investigate, review, and litigate 
federal petitions for all of the inmates currently on death row will be 
$775,250,000: 
 350 CJA cases x $635,000 per case = $222,250,000 
+ 350 FPD CHU cases x $1.58 million per case = $553,000,000 
 $775,250,000 
 
 205. See E-mail from George Drakulich to Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, supra note 55. 
 206. U.S. COURTS, Compensation and Expenses of Appointed Counsel, NAT’L CJA VOUCHER 
REFERENCE TOOL, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/cjaort/compensation_expenses.html (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2011) (providing information on reimbursable expenses for attorneys). This 
assessment is corroborated by a report we obtained that was generated by the Judicial Council of 
the Ninth Circuit on May 25, 2006, and which indicates that only about 50% of the amounts 
requested by CJA Panel attorneys were approved for budgeting purposes by the Capital Case 
Committee. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT, CAPITAL HABEAS CASES (2006) (on file 
with authors). More recent data obtained from the Ninth Circuit Office of the Circuit Executive 
indicates that the current figure is higher: 61% for the Central District of California; 75% for the 
Eastern District of California; 74% for the Northern District of California; and 69% for the 
Southern District of California. This data is on file with the authors. 
 207. $635,000 x 2.5 = $1,587,500. 
 208. CJA Panel attorneys represented 1,081 federal habeas petitions, while FPD CHUs 
handled 706. 
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That will be the amount owed to petitioners’ counsel alone and 
does not include costs to the state Attorney General’s Office to 
respond to these challenges in federal court. 
This figure is a conservative estimate insofar as the data we 
received from the Office of Defender Services indicate a trend 
toward the representation of condemned inmates by FPD CHUs in an 
increasing number of federal habeas corpus proceedings, while CJA 
Panel attorney appointments are on the decline. For example, in 
1998, CJA Panel attorneys represented 78% of California capital 
prisoners with petitions pending in federal court, while the FPD 
CHUs represented 22%. By 2008, CJA Panel attorneys represented 
44% of California capital prisoners with petitions pending in federal 
court, while the FPD CHUs represented 56%. If these trends 
continue, the cost to federal taxpayers for these representations will 
be even greater because the FPD CHUs have more resources at their 
disposal than do CJA Panel attorneys. Either way, the federal 
government is set to incur substantial costs in the future to litigate 
these petitioners’ claims, as the vast majority of inmates on 
California’s death row have yet to file their habeas corpus petitions 
in federal court. 
This $775,250,000 figure also does not account for the 
substantial administrative costs associated with federal habeas corpus 
petitions filed by state-condemned inmates. The time district court 
judges and their staffs spend reviewing these capital habeas cases 
cannot be overstated. Law clerks routinely report spending 
significant amounts of time processing these cases. Additionally, the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts has authorized 
funding for the district courts to employ one death penalty law clerk 
for every 15 capital habeas corpus cases filed. 209 There are 
approximately 200 capital habeas corpus cases currently pending in 
 
 209. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., DESKBOOK FOR CHIEF JUDGES OF U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 59 (3d 
ed. 2003), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Deskbook.pdf/$file/ 
Deskbook.pdf. Death penalty law clerks assist the court in the management of death penalty 
cases. Id. In 1998, the Conference agreed to provide funding on a national basis for death penalty 
law clerks in the district courts at the rate of one law clerk for each fifteen capital habeas corpus 
cases, if requested by the circuit judicial council. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT 
OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 24 (1999), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Proceedings/ 
Proceedings.aspx?doc=/uscourts/FederalCourts/judconf/proceedings/1999-03.pdf. The chief 
district judge appoints and supervises the death penalty law clerks under 28 U.S.C. § 752. FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., supra, at 59. 
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the district courts in California. 210 They are being processed by 
approximately 13 death penalty law clerks with the federal district 
courts in California at a cost of roughly $1 million per year. 211 The 
federal courts also employ a staff of clerical workers in each of the 
four districts in California who are supervised by attorneys and 
responsible for reviewing and processing CJA Panel attorney 
requests for payment. 212 We have not included cost calculations 
concerning the total amounts paid to the death penalty law clerks, 
court accountants, and clerical workers. 
Thus, the bill paid by federal taxpayers—which represents in 
some large part the cost of ameliorating the California Legislature’s 
failure to provide funding for the proper administration of the death 
penalty in California—comes to over $775 million, a figure that does 
not include projections for expenses that will be incurred as new 
inmates continue to enter the system. 
4.  Costs of Incarceration: $70 Million Per Year; 
$1 Billion Since 1978 
To provide some context for our inquiry into incarceration costs, 
we begin by noting that in the 1980s the budget for California’s 
prison system represented about 4% of the state’s General Fund, 213 
while the budget for the University of California system accounted 
for 5%. 214 By 2009, the budget for California’s prison system had 
nearly tripled to 11% of the state’s General Fund, or about 
 
 210. See PACER, http://www.pacer.gov/cmecf/ (last visited June 1, 2011) (select “Civil”; 
then select “California”; then select “Nature of Suit: 535 Death Penalty—Habeas Corpus”). 
 211. This figure assumes annual salaries for 13 death penalty law clerks of approximately 
$76,000 per law clerk. 
 212. Supra note 206. 
 213. See California Budget Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., 
http://www.dof.ca.gov/budgeting/budget_faqs/#1 (last visited Apr. 9, 2011). The General Fund is 
[u]sed to account for all revenues and activities financed therefrom which are not 
required by law to be accounted by any other fund. Most state expenditures are 
financed from the General Fund. Normally, the only difference between the General 
Fund and the other governmental costs funds is the restriction placed on the use of the 
other governmental cost funds. 
CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., Description of Fund Classifications in the Treasury, available at 
http://www.dof.ca.gov/budgeting/budget_faqs/documents/FundClassifications.pdf. 
 214. See Henry E. Brady, Dean, Goldman Sch. of Pub. Policy, Univ. of Cal.Berkeley, 
Moderator of Panel Discussion: What Can You Get for $10 Billion? Prison Spending and the 
California Budget Crisis (Apr. 15, 2010), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zRWtk-
xz9eo. 
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$10 billion, while the budget for the University of California system 
has been reduced by half to about 2.5% of the General Fund, or 
$2.6 billion. Additionally, tuition for in-state students has been 
increased by 40% in the last two years alone. 215 Governor Brown’s 
proposed budget for 2011–2012 would cut an additional $500 
million in state funding for the University of California. 216 
By contrast, the enacted 2009–2010 budget for the CDCR was 
nearly $13 billion ($12,986,397,000). 217 The CDCR is now planning 
construction of a complex solely for the purpose of housing 
condemned inmates, which is expected to cost an additional nearly 
$2 billion to build and operate over the first 20 years. 218 
a.  Construction of a new Condemned Inmate Complex (CIC): 
$1.66 billion for first 20 years 
 
Despite the Commission’s request in its Final Report that the 
Governor and the Legislature authorize further study of costs 
associated with the administration of the death penalty in California, 
including costs for incarcerating inmates on death row, no action has 
been forthcoming, except for legislative inquiries made in connection 
with construction of the new CIC. 219 
On July 29, 2008, the California State Auditor was asked by the 
 
 215. Id. 
 216. Nicholas Greitzer, Governor Brown’s Proposed 2011–2012 Budget Cuts $500 Million in 
State Funding for the University of California; Gov. Brown’s Proposed Reduction Would Make 
Student Fees the Largest Contributor of Funds, DAILY BRUIN (Jan. 11, 2011), 
http://www.dailybruin.com/index.php/article/2011/01/governor_browns_proposed_20112012_ 
budget_cuts_500_million_in_state_funding_for_the_university_of_cal. 
 217. Corrections and Rehabilitation, GOVERNOR’S BUDGET 2009–2010 (July 28, 2009), 
http://2009-10.archives.ebudget.ca.gov/Enacted/StateAgencyBudgets/5210/5225/ 
department.html. 
 218. CAL. STATE AUDITOR, supra note 15, at 23, 29. 
 219. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 10–21 (summarizing recommendations for the 
Legislature). 
Cost to Construct: over $395.5 million 
Cost to Activate: $7.3 million 
Cost to Operate: $58.8 million per year 
Additional Staffing Costs for First 20 Years 
in Operation: $1.2 billion 
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Joint Legislative Audit Committee to present an “audit report 
concerning [the CDCR’s] efforts to build a new condemned inmate 
complex (CIC) and the projected costs of building a new CIC” at San 
Quentin State Prison. 220 The State Auditor estimated that the cost of 
constructing a new CIC had increased 61.9% over the original 
budget of $220 million. The Auditor explained that 
 The [CDCR] houses inmates who have been 
condemned to death (condemned inmates) in three separate 
housing units at San Quentin State Prison (San Quentin). 
However, these units do not meet many of [CDCR’s] 
design standards for maximum-security facilities, 
increasing the escape risk for inmates and posing potential 
safety concerns for inmates, staff, and the general public. 
Accordingly, in 2003 the Legislature approved [CDCR’s] 
request for $220 million to build a new condemned inmate 
complex (CIC) at San Quentin. However, . . . before 
construction could begin, the cost of the project increased 
significantly [which caused CDCR to] reduce[] the capacity 
of the complex from eight housing units to six and from 
1,024 cells to 768 cells. Despite the 25 percent reduction in 
the capacity of the CIC, [CDCR] now estimates the cost of 
the project at $356 million, an increase of $136 million, or 
62 percent in the five years since 2003. 
 However, . . . the cost to construct the CIC will be 
more than $395.5 million[,] . . . the additional cost to 
activate the new CIC will reach $7.3 million[,] . . . [and] the 
average net new staffing costs to operate the new CIC will 
be $58.8 million per year. . . . San Quentin will spend 
$39.5 million more in staffing costs in the first full year 
after the facility opens than it would spend if the new CIC 
were not built. Overall, . . . San Quentin will incur 
additional staffing costs of approximately $1.2 billion 
during the first 20 years the facility is in operation. 221 
 
 220. Letter from Elaine M. Howle, State Auditor, to Governor of Cal. & Legislative Leaders 
(July 29, 2008), in CAL. STATE AUDITOR, supra note 15, at iii. 
 221. CAL. STATE AUDITOR, supra note 15, at 1, 23 (emphasis added). “In the capital outlay 
budget change proposal submitted to Finance for fiscal year 2008–09, [CDCR] indicated that it 
would need a total of 505 staff to operate the CIC, consisting of 158 existing San Quentin 
employees and 347 new staff.” Id. at 26. 
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b.  Incarcerating inmates on death row: $1 billion since 1978 
To date, the Legislature has failed to follow the recommendation 
of the Commission that the Legislature order the State Auditor to 
study the cumulative costs associated with the administration of the 
death penalty in California. The Legislature did ask the California 
State Auditor to “present[] [an] audit report concerning [CDCR] 
impact on the state budget.” 222 The Auditor’s 112-page report, 
however, does not contain a single mention of any of the costs 
associated with the death penalty in California. 223 
The State Auditor concluded as follows: 
[CDCR] fails to track, maintain, and use data that would 
allow it to more effectively monitor and manage its 
operations. Specifically, [CDCR’s] expenditures increased 
by 32 percent in the past three years to $10 billion; 
however, its ability to determine the impact various factors 
such as overcrowding, the transition of the health care 
function to a federal court-appointed receiver, escalating 
overtime costs, and the presence of aging inmates have on 
the cost of its operations is limited by a lack of information. 
Furthermore, despite rising costs for incarcerating inmates, 
[CDCR] does not have sufficient information to identify 
how much specific inmate characteristics contribute to 
these costs and how changes in [CDCR’s] operations 
would affect expenditures. For example, housing, security, 
and support are the largest contributors to the cost of 
incarceration, but the number of custody staff associated 
with specific populations of inmates—which are not 
 
To maximize the CIC’s capacity, [CDCR] plans to double-cell certain condemned 
inmates; however, experts we spoke with and our consultant expressed legal 
confidentiality and safety concerns with double-celling. If double-celling occurs as 
planned, we estimate the CIC will reach capacity in 2035; however, if the plan to 
double-cell is not a feasible approach, the CIC will reach capacity in 2014, less than 
three years after it is expected to open. 
Letter from Elaine M. Howle, State Auditor, to Governor of Cal. & Legislative Leaders, supra 
note 220. 
 222. Letter from Elaine M. Howle, State Auditor, to Governor of Cal. and Legislative Leaders 
(Sept. 8, 2009), in CAL. STATE AUDITOR, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND 
REHABILITATION: IT FAILS TO TRACK AND USE DATA THAT WOULD ALLOW IT TO MORE 
EFFECTIVELY MONITOR AND MANAGE ITS OPERATIONS, at iii (2009), available at 
http://www.bsa.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2009-107.1.pdf. 
 223. Id. 
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tracked by [CDCR]—depends on the security and custody 
levels of the inmates as well as various institutional 
considerations. Custody staff costs include $431 million 
paid in overtime during fiscal year 2007–08; however the 
cost to recruit and train new correctional officers, combined 
with the significant increases in the cost of benefits in 
recent years makes hiring a new correctional officer slightly 
more expensive than paying overtime to those currently 
employed by [CDCR]. 224 
The State Auditor concluded that the CDCR’s budget comprises 
10 percent of the State’s General Fund budget, with expenditures of 
roughly $10 billion in fiscal year 2007–2008. 225 The CDCR spent 
“80 percent of its $10 billion on adult operations, making the average 
annual cost to incarcerate an adult inmate $49,300.” 226 The State 
Auditor’s results refer only to “inmates” and do not separately 
address the cost of housing inmates on death row. 
The cost-per-inmate figure does not include expenditures of 
$221 million related to the Corrections Standards Authority or to 
capital outlay of $150 million because the CDCR’s accounting 
records do not indicate allocation of those costs to specific 
institutions. 227 Additionally, it is important to note that this average-
annual-cost-per-inmate figure of $49,300 includes an additional 
$6,000 to $7,000 per inmate because there are additional 
expenditures totaling $1.1 billion within the other cost areas that are 
spent in support of adult operations, but which the State Auditor was 
unable to attribute to specific institutions. 228 Thus, to calculate the 
annual cost per inmate, we have divided $1.1 billion by the total 
number of adult inmates, resulting in the $49,300 figure. 229 
 
 224. Id. (emphasis added). 
 225. CAL. STATE AUDITOR, supra note 222, at 77 app. A. 
 226. Id. (listing expenditures in Table A). 
 227. Id. at 9 & n.1 (“The Corrections Standards Authority works in partnership with city and 
county officials to, among other things, develop and maintain standards for the construction, 
operation, and staffing of state and local jails and juvenile detention facilities.”). 
 228. Id. at 27. 
 229. Id. According to the State Auditor, some of the $1.1 billion of “additional expenditures” 
is charged as follows: $145 million in support of inmate health care; $137 million for office 
support for the federally appointed receiver; and $329 million for facilities planning, design, and 
construction management. Id. In addition, some institution support costs are included in this 
amount, including $154 million for substance abuse programs provided at some institutions, 
$12 million for inmate classification services, and $38 million for CDCR’s transportation unit. Id. 
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We are left to wonder, given the complete absence of any 
mention in the State Auditor’s report of the annual cost of housing 
condemned inmates—a report that was issued more than one year 
after the Commission recommended collecting data associated with 
housing inmates on death row—whether any of the hundreds of 
millions of dollars that are unaccounted for are attributable to costs 
related to housing condemned inmates. 
In May 2010, the State Auditor “present[ed an] audit report 
concerning the effect of the [CDCR’s] operations on the state 
budget,” as requested by the Legislature. 230 Once again, there was no 
mention of any costs associated with funding the state’s death 
penalty system or the cost of housing condemned inmates on death 
row. 231 
While the State Auditor is capable of undertaking the type of 
complex analysis involved in answering questions such as whether 
“inmates sentenced under the three strikes law, and . . . inmates 
receiving specialty health care,” 232 represent significant costs, the 
Legislature has failed to request that the State Auditor answer the 
question of whether housing California’s condemned inmates 
represents significant costs. For its part, the CDCR continues to 
suppress the costs to state taxpayers of incarcerating prisoners on 
death row. 
In attempting to determine the cost of incarcerating prisoners on 
California’s death row for its Final Report, the Commission was 
forced to rely on “rough estimates,” including a figure from an article 
published in the Los Angeles Times in March 2005, which stated that 
the cost was an additional $90,000 per year per inmate for housing 
on death row. 233 
 
The remainder of the additional expenditures is charged to CDCR’s headquarters, as unallocated 
support and administration expenditures. CDCR does not attribute these costs to any specific unit 
or institution. Id. at 77 app. A. 
 230. Letter from Elaine M. Howle, State Auditor, to Governor of Cal. & Legislative Leaders 
(May 18, 2010), in CAL. STATE AUDITOR, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND 
REHABILITATION: INMATES SENTENCED UNDER THE THREE STRIKES LAW AND A SMALL 
NUMBER OF INMATES RECEIVING SPECIALTY HEALTH CARE REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT COSTS 
(2010), available at http://www.bsa.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2009-107.2.pdf. 
 231. See CAL. STATE AUDITOR, supra note 230, at 8 (emphasis added). 
 232. Letter from Elaine M. Howle, supra note 230. 
 233. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 141 n.94 (citing Tempest, supra note 169, at B1). The 
Tempest article quoted CDCR Spokeswoman Margot Bach, who reportedly stated that the 
additional cost of confining an inmate to death row, as compared to the maximum security 
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As part of our study, we contacted Dr. Steven Chapman, the 
Assistant Secretary in the CDCR Office of Research, to verify the 
accuracy of the cost estimates relied on by the Commission. We 
asked Dr. Chapman: (1) to confirm that the average yearly cost per 
inmate to the State of California is $49,000; (2) to tell us what the 
“average annual cost of incarcerating a condemned inmate on death 
row in California [was] as of year end 2008”; and (3) given that 
Margot Bach reported in 2005 that housing on death row costs an 
additional $90,000 per inmate per year, to tell us what the current 
figure is for additional costs the state of California incurs to house an 
inmate on death row rather than housing the inmate with the general 
population, as of year end 2008. 234 
Dr. Chapman confirmed that the average yearly cost per inmate 
to the state of California is $49,000. 235 Dr. Chapman indicated, 
“[h]owever, [that the CDCR] cannot determine how this figure was 
calculated based on information provided by the Office of Fiscal 
Services.” 236 Dr. Chapman also stated that 
our Office of Fiscal Services determined that CDCR does 
not compute an average cost specifically for condemned 
inmates separate from the general population. There are 
many expenses uniquely associated with managing a 
condemned inmate, but some are borne by other agencies, 
such as the Attorney General’s Office or the Public 
Defender’s Office, etc. 237 
With regard to Margot Bach’s reported statement that the cost to 
house a death row inmate is approximately $90,000 more than the 
cost to maintain an inmate in the general population, Dr. Chapman 
indicated that “[t]his amount cannot be verified by the Office of 
 
prisons where those sentenced to life without possibility of parole ordinarily serve their sentences, 
is $90,000 per year per inmate. Tempest, supra note 169, at B1. 
 234. Letter from Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, to Dr. Steven 
Chapman, Assistant Sec’y, Office of Research, Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab. (Sept. 3, 2009) (on 
file with authors). 
 235. Letter from Dr. Steven Chapman, Assistant Sec’y, Office of Research, Cal. Dep’t of 
Corr. & Rehab., to Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Dec. 16, 2009) 
(on file with authors). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. On October 4, 2010, the authors wrote to Attorney General Edmund G. Brown, Jr., to 
seek clarification about the issue of the cost of incarcerating inmates on California’s death row 
and are awaiting a reply. 
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Fiscal Services.” 238 
Because the $90,000 figure came from a public information 
officer within the CDCR, and because that department, while stating 
it cannot confirm the accuracy of Ms. Bach’s estimate, has also not 
disavowed its accuracy, we have been forced to rely on this figure in 
calculating how much more it costs to house a prisoner on death row 
in California than elsewhere in the prison system. Adjusting for 
yearly inflation rates, as well as for the increase in the number of 
condemned inmates added to death row each year, we have 
calculated that since 1978, California taxpayers have spent over 
$1 billion ($1,021,653,767) incarcerating inmates on death row. 239 
 
 238. Id. We attempted to contact Margot Bach at the CDCR by e-mail on November 5, 2010, 
and learned that she had retired in June 2010. We attempted to contact Terry Thornton, Deputy 
Press Secretary for the CDCR, by both e-mail and telephone on November 5, 2010, to inquire 
about the basis for Ms. Bach’s $90,000 estimate. To date, Terry Thornton has not responded to 
our inquiries. 
 239. This figure is calculated based on the CDCR figure of $90,000 in additional costs 
provided in 2005. The inflation rate is based on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Inflation 
Calculator. U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2011). We have summarized the calculation in the following table. 
 
 
 
Death Row 
Population 
by Year 
Additional Death Row 
Incarceration Costs 
Per Inmate, in Dollars 
Total Annual Costs for 
Incarceration on Death Row 
1978–2010, in Dollars 
1978 7 30,046 210,322 
1979 25 33,456 836,400 
1980 42 37,972 1,594,824 
1981 80 41,889 3,351,120 
1982 113 44,470 5,025,110 
1983 143 45,898 6,563,414 
1984 161 47,880 7,708,680 
1985 159 49,585 7,884,015 
1986 179 50,506 9,040,574 
1987 203 52,350 10,627,050 
1988 223 54,516 12,157,068 
1989 247 57,142 14,114,074 
1990 279 60,230 16,804,170 
1991 305 62,764 19,143,020 
1992 345 64,654 22,305,630 
1993 374 66,589 24,904,286 
1994 391 68,294 26,702,954 
1995 426 70,230 29,917,980 
1996 461 72,304 33,332,144 
1997 493 73,963 36,463,759 
1998 518 75,115 38,909,570 
1999 558 76,774 42,839,892 
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The cost of incarcerating those inmates on death row whose 
convictions or sentences were later reversed on direct appeal or who 
were later granted state habeas corpus relief by the California 
Supreme Court and then removed from death row (and not 
subsequently returned following a retrial or resentencing) is an 
estimated $30 million. 240 That sum is in addition to funds that were 
expended in their state appellate and habeas corpus proceedings, 
including payment of counsel. The cost of incarcerating on death row 
those inmates who were later granted federal habeas corpus relief 
and removed from death row (and were not subsequently returned 
following a retrial or resentencing) is an estimated $24 million. 241 
That sum is in addition to those funds expended for their automatic 
appeals and state and federal habeas proceedings, including 
representation and investigation by counsel. 
The cost of incarcerating on death row inmates who died of 
natural causes—either while their petitions for habeas corpus relief 
were still pending, or who had exhausted all of their post-conviction 
relief proceedings and were awaiting execution—is an estimated 
$58.3 million. That sum is in addition to funds that were expended to 
compensate their post-conviction counsel. That figure also does not 
 
2000 589 79,354 46,739,506 
2001 610 81,566 49,755,260 
2002 618 82,903 51,234,054 
2003 639 84,792 54,182,088 
2004 642 87,050 55,886,100 
2005 654 90,000 58,860,000 
2006 662 92,903 61,501,786 
2007 670 95,549 64,017,830 
2008 688 99,217 68,261,296 
2009 698 98,864 69,007,072 
2010 713 100,663 71,772,719 
TOTAL   $1,021,653,767 
 
 240. See supra note 24 (indicating that the California Supreme Court has vacated the 
sentences or reversed the convictions in 101 death penalty cases). We have calculated the cost of 
incarcerating those prisoners on death row for the years they spent on death row (adjusted for 
inflation) awaiting appointment of counsel and the outcome of their automatic appeals. We have 
also included four cases in which condemned inmates were granted relief in their state habeas 
corpus proceedings. 
 241. The cost to incarcerate those condemned inmates who were removed from death row 
based upon the grant of their petitions for a writ of habeas corpus is approximately $23,913,056 
(adjusted for inflation). 
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include the medical expenses incurred in connection with specialty 
health care services provided in connection with terminal illnesses. 
For example, the State Auditor reported: 
Each of the 72 inmates who died during the last quarter of 
fiscal year 2007–08 incurred, on average, $122,300 for 
specialty health care services for that fiscal year. Ranging 
from $150 for one inmate to more than $1 million for 
another, these 72 inmates accounted for $8.8 million in 
specialty health care costs during fiscal year 2007–08. 242 
Thus, of the estimated total of $1.02 billion in taxpayer dollars 
spent on housing inmates on death row, an estimated total of 
$112.3 million—over 10% of the total housing costs—was spent 
housing inmates on death row who would never face execution, 
either because their sentences were later vacated on appeal (or in 
post-conviction proceedings) or because they died of natural causes. 
Many of those condemned inmates who died were still awaiting the 
outcomes of their petitions for federal habeas corpus relief. 
In any event, it is quite disturbing that neither the CDCR nor any 
other agency in the state of California has attempted to calculate the 
extra cost of incarcerating condemned prisoners on death row, 
especially given that this question has been the subject of tremendous 
concern by researchers and the media. It is highly troubling that 
billions of taxpayer dollars have been allocated to the CDCR without 
any statutory requirement that it account to the electorate regarding 
the expense of housing death row inmates. 243 
 
 242. CAL. STATE AUDITOR, supra note 230, at 39. While the report does not indicate whether 
any of these medical expenses were for death row prisoners, it is safe to assume that there are 
prisoners on death row with health issues, particularly in view of the fact that there are 85 
prisoners on death row aged 60–69, and 10 prisoners aged 70–89. DIV. OF ADULT OPERATIONS, 
supra note 17, at 1. 
 243. CAL. STATE AUDITOR, supra note 222, at 27 (stating there are “additional expenditures 
totaling $1.1 billion within the other cost areas that [the State Auditor] was unable to attribute to 
specific institutions,” but which are spent in support of adult operations). 
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5.  The Present Administration of California’s Death Penalty: 
A Complete Failure 
Our research has revealed that $4 billion of state and federal 
taxpayer money has been expended administering the death penalty 
in California since 1978, with a cost in 2009 of approximately 
$184 million above what taxpayers would have spent without the 
death penalty. 244 While the cost data supporting our calculations are 
of varying degrees of reliability because state agencies have failed to 
report the costs of housing condemned state prisoners, our estimates 
are consistent with those published in the Commission’s Final 
Report. The Commission estimated in 2008 that the annual costs of 
the present system were $137 million per year. 245 The Commission 
did not incorporate the costs associated with federal habeas litigation. 
It also used a more conservative estimate of the cost of death penalty 
trials, and it calculated the cost of incarceration based on 2007 
figures. 246 
 
 244. This figure does not include funds expended defending the death penalty in federal court 
in actions based on civil rights violations pursuant to § 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging methods used 
in carrying out execution or related delays in violation of the Eighth Amendments. 
 245. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 117. 
 246. Id. at 146–47. The Commission based its projected cost calculations published in its 
Final Report on the average number of death sentences imposed between 2000 and 2007, which 
averaged 20 per year. Id. at 120. Because our study is seeking to calculate funds already spent, 
rather than predict how many future death sentences will be imposed for future cost projection 
purposes, we will rely on the average figure of 30 direct appeals decided per year, based on the 
calculated average of all death sentences actually imposed between 1978 and 2010. 
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Expense Commission’s 
Final Report 
Annual Costs 
(2008) 
Estimated 
Annual Cost 
for 2009 
Estimated 
Total Cost 
1978–2010 
Pre-Trial 
Investigation 
and Trial Costs 
$20 million 247 $40 million 248 $1.94 billion 
Direct Appeal 
and State 
Habeas 
$54.4 million $58.5 million $925 million 
Federal Habeas $0 $14 million 249 $156 million 250 
Costs of 
Incarceration 
$63.3 million $71.7 million 251 $1.02 billion 
TOTAL $137.7 million $184.2 million $4.04 billion 
 
These totals do not include the additional funds the state is 
poised to spend to maintain the current broken system, including an 
additional $400 million to build and activate a new CIC to house 
more than 1,000 prisoners, which will cost an additional 
$58.8 million per year to operate and will be the nation’s most 
populous death row. The State Auditor estimates that San Quentin 
will incur additional staffing costs of approximately $1.2 billion 
during the first 20 years that the new CIC facility is in operation. The 
$4.04 billion total includes only a fraction of the total cost to federal 
taxpayers to fund representation to litigate the federal habeas corpus 
petitions of approximately 700 California death row prisoners, which 
will total about $775,250,000 by the time those cases are resolved. 
 
 247. While acknowledging that two studies calculated the cost of a capital murder trial to be 
between $1.1 million and $1.27 million more, on average, than the costliest noncapital felony 
trials, “the Commission adopted a very conservative estimate that seeking the death penalty adds 
$500,000 to the cost of a murder trial in California.” Id. at 145. 
 248. This figure is based on the Commission’s statement in its Final Report that the average 
number of death sentences imposed between 2000 and 2007 was 20 per year. Id. at 120. Because 
of an estimate of 20 death penalty convictions and estimates of approximately 40 death penalty 
trials, the conviction rate is an estimated 50%. Id. at 28. 
 249. As of 2008, average annual expenditures for federal habeas corpus proceedings was 
$13,002,639. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 250. This figure only includes costs incurred in 1994 and 1998–2008. 
 251. For the estimated costs for 2010, see supra note 239. 
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II.  PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: 
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA 
Having established that, since 1978, California taxpayers have 
spent billions of dollars to fund the administration of a dysfunctional 
death penalty system, we next look at California’s voter initiative 
process and consider how the state’s death penalty scheme 
developed. Since 1978, all of the state’s death penalty legislation has 
been adopted through the passage of initiatives by a majority of those 
citizens who voted. We have examined what California voters were 
told about the effect of and potential costs of the death penalty in 
those initiatives that called for extending capital sentencing to reach 
conduct that had not been previously punishable by death. Based on 
our study of the legislative history of the current death penalty 
scheme in California, it is clear to us that the voters were not 
informed before they cast their ballots that these initiatives would 
result in the expenditure of $4 billion over 32 years to fund a failed 
system that includes the nation’s most populous death row—housing 
more than 700 condemned inmates, only 13 of whom have been 
executed since 1978. 
A.  Direct Democracy 
In discussing the merits of a representative form of government, 
John Adams explained that “[i]n a large society, inhabiting an 
extensive country, it is impossible that the whole should assemble to 
make laws. The first necessary step, then, is to delegate power from 
the many to a few of the most wise and good.” 252 The Framers 
created a republic with a system of checks and balances “that could 
temper human imperfection and protect the people from one 
another. . . . They refused to include provisions in the Constitution 
allowing voters to bind their representatives with instructions and 
were eventually successful in eliminating this direct democracy 
device.” 253 Article IV, section 4, of the U.S. Constitution 
“guarantee[s] to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government . . . .” 254 Since the Continental Congress and ratification 
 
 252. PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS 
AND COMPARISONS 15 (1998). 
 253. Id. at 16. 
 254. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §4. 
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of the U.S. Constitution, many of the states have opted to incorporate 
some form of direct democracy into their governing processes. The 
states’ movement toward direct democracy began in the late 1800s 
and gained momentum after the turn of the 20th century. 255 
The initiative process has been criticized as not sufficiently 
deliberative to be compatible with the republican form of 
government enshrined in the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution. 
“[T]he United States Supreme Court has refused to rule on the 
general question of the compatibility of the initiative and the 
Guarantee Clause.” 256 
 The cry for adoption of the initiative, the referendum, 
and the recall in the late 1800s came not from theorists 
seeking to develop some abstract concept of better 
government but from citizens with major problems, 
particularly farmers who found it difficult to live with 
prices below the cost of production. By the time they paid 
the banks and the railroads, they had nothing left for their 
families. 
 Because the railroads, the trusts, and the monopolies so 
often dominated both the legislatures and the two main 
political parties, farmers and other outcast groups came 
together to form a new party—the People’s or Populist 
party. Although the initiative, the referendum, and the recall 
formed only one part of this new party’s platform, these 
direct democracy devices were nonetheless a very 
important part, because they provided a means for 
“temporarily bypassing their legislatures and enacting 
needed laws on behalf of the downtrodden farmer, debtor, 
or laborer.” 
 Woodrow Wilson, a leading scholar of government 
before he became a governor and a president, explained the 
movement. The reformers, he said, were not bent upon any 
radical transformation. They had no intention of 
undermining legislative or representative processes, but 
 
 255. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 252, at 8–14. 
 256. Id. at 16 n.6 (quoting Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 118 (1912)) 
(“The enforcement of the provision in § 4 of Art. IV of the Constitution that the United States 
shall guarantee to every State a republican form of government is of a political character and 
exclusively committed to Congress, and as such is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts.”). 
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rather sought to redeem them. . . . 
 The reformers believed that the populace as a whole 
could not be corrupted in the way that the legislatures had 
been corrupted, and that the initiative would help to make 
all governmental processes more honest and responsive. 
 Around the turn of the century the torch passed from 
the Populists to the Progressives, a more establishment 
group but in many respects the spiritual heirs of the 
Populists. 257 
Hiram Johnson, the leader of California’s movement for the use 
of the initiative, referendum, and recall process, said that while those 
devices would not be “a miracle cure or a ‘panacea for all our 
ills,’ . . . ‘they do give to the electorate the power of action when 
desired, and they do place in the hands of the people the means by 
which they may protect themselves.’” 258 
B.  Understanding the Voter Initiative Process in California 
One hundred years ago, in 1911, the California Constitution was 
amended to give voters the right to enact legislation and amend the 
constitution through the initiative process. 259 
 
 257. Id. at 16–17 (footnotes omitted). 
 258. Id. at 17 (quoting EUGENE LEE & LARRY BERG, THE CHALLENGE OF CALIFORNIA 98 
(2d ed. 1976) (1970)). 
 259. California Constitution, article II, section 8, provides: 
(a) The initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the 
Constitution and to adopt or reject them. 
(b) An initiative measure may be proposed by presenting to the Secretary of State a 
petition that sets forth the text of the proposed statute or amendment to the Constitution 
and is certified to have been signed by electors equal in number to 5 percent in the case 
of a statute, and 8 percent in the case of an amendment to the Constitution, of the votes 
for all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial election. 
(c) The Secretary of State shall then submit the measure at the next general election 
held at least 131 days after it qualifies or at any special statewide election held prior to 
that general election. The Governor may call a special statewide election for the 
measure. 
(d) An initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be submitted to the 
electors or have any effect. 
(e) An initiative measure may not include or exclude any political subdivision of the 
State from the application or effect of its provisions based upon approval or 
disapproval of the initiative measure, or based upon the casting of a specified 
percentage of votes in favor of the measure, by the electors of that political 
subdivision. 
(f) An initiative measure shall not contain alternative or cumulative provisions wherein 
one or more of those provisions would become law depending upon the casting of a 
specified percentage of votes for or against the measure. 
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 As originally instituted in California, there were two 
initiative processes available: the direct initiative and the 
indirect initiative. The direct initiative process allows voters 
to place a proposed statute or an amendment to the 
Constitution directly on the ballot. If a majority of the 
voters approve the measure, it becomes law. The direct 
initiative as practiced in California is designed to bypass the 
legislative process . . . [T]he legislature’s only role in the 
direct initiative is to hold a legislative committee hearing 30 
days prior to the election. 
 The indirect initiative allows the proponent of a 
statutory initiative to gather signatures and present the 
measure to the legislature for enactment. If the measure is 
enacted, it becomes law and the measure is not placed on 
the ballot. 260 . . . In the early 1960s, the California 
Constitution Revision Commission recommended that the 
[indirect initiative] provision be deleted from the 
Constitution due to lack of use. It was repealed in 1966. 261 
For some, 
the initiative [process has become] the very essence of 
democracy, an opportunity for citizens to participate 
directly in making the laws under which they live. . . . In 
their view, the initiative increases interest and participation 
in government, reduces citizen alienation, and serves as an 
antidote for declining voter turnout in elections. . . . Others 
question the wisdom of the initiative. In their view, societal 
problems have become much too complicated for the black 
 
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8. Article XVIII, section 3, provides: “The electors may amend the 
Constitution by initiative.” Id. art. XVIII, § 3. 
 260. J. FRED SILVA, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS: 
BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE 1–2 (2010), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/op/ 
OP_1100FSOP.pdf (“This process was in effect from 1912 to 1966. However, this parallel 
process was seldom used. One of the reasons for its lack of use was the legislative schedule. Prior 
to 1964, the legislature met in biennium session: The first year was devoted solely to the budget 
and the second year devoted to legislation. This gave proponents a short period of time every two 
years to use the indirect process.”). 
 261. Id. at 2, 7 (“The indirect initiative process was used only four times in the state’s history. 
Only once was a measure approved by the legislature. The three measures that the legislature 
reviewed but did not approve were submitted to the voters. The voters defeated all three 
measures. The Constitution Revision Commission impaneled in the 1960s reviewed the use of the 
indirect initiative and recommended its repeal. The voters agreed and the measure was deleted 
from the Constitution in 1966.”). 
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and white kind of solutions they believe possible through 
use of the initiative process. Detractors are also appalled by 
the demagoguery and simple-minded campaigns that 
characterize many initiative elections. 262 
Historically, initiatives placed on ballots in California have 
addressed a broad spectrum of issues affecting fundamental rights. 
Some noteworthy examples include “[a] 1914 initiative [that] 
abolished the poll tax in California, . . . a 1918 initiative [that] 
created the state’s first usury law[,] . . . [and a] 1920 initiative [that] 
strengthened the alien land law that restricted ownership of land by 
persons not eligible for naturalization, principally Japanese 
immigrants.” 263 More recently, “[i]n the 1970s California voters used 
the initiative to reinstitute the death penalty, create environmental 
protections for the coastal area, enact stiff new campaign finance and 
political ethics legislation, and reduce property taxes.” 264 Although 
there is some appeal to a system that allows citizens to weigh the 
pros and cons of a policy or legal issue and to vote “yes” or “no” on 
a proposed law, administration of the system of direct democracy in 
California has not provided voters with the type of information that 
is fundamental to making educated decisions regarding the merits of 
changes to the state’s capital punishment system. 
1.  Distinguishing Features of California’s Initiative Process 
“[N]owhere is the practice of government by voter 
initiative as extreme as it is in California.” 265 
Several features of California’s initiative process work together 
to create a systematic destabilization of the state’s constitutional law 
and a disruption of the state’s legislative process. These features 
include (a) the unusual ease with which voters are able to amend the 
state’s constitution as compared to the amendment process employed 
in other states; (b) the voters’ ability to use the initiative process to 
appropriate state funds for any cause without apparent regard for the 
budgetary impact; (c) the voters’ ability to prevent the legislature 
 
 262. Id. at 2. 
 263. Id. at 13. 
 264. Id. at 14. 
 265. Honorable Ronald M. George, Chief Justice Cal. Supreme Court, Keynote Address at 
Stanford Law Review Symposium: State Constitutions (Feb. 19, 2010), in 62 STAN. L. REV. 
1515, 1516 (2010). 
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from amending or repealing a voter-initiated law, even when a law is 
not performing as anticipated or has become unworkable; and (d) the 
sheer number of voter initiatives that California voters are asked to 
consider. 
a.  Frequent amendment of the California Constitution through the 
initiative process creates “perpetual instability” 266 
When the Framers drafted the U.S. Constitution, they devised a 
brief document that was primarily limited to setting forth the 
framework of the system of government. Amending the Constitution 
was only possible through a showing of overwhelming popular 
support as demonstrated by three-fourths of the states ratifying the 
amendment. “Amendments were deliberately made difficult in order 
to discourage changes that were not themselves fundamental. In over 
200 years there have been only 27 amendments, and only 17 since 
the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791.” 267 
As one scholar explained: 
 The very idea of a Constitution turns on the separation 
of the legal and the political realms. The Constitution sets 
up the framework of government. It also sets forth a few 
fundamental political ideals—equality, representation, 
individual liberties—that place limits on how far any short-
term majority may go. This is our higher law. All the rest is 
left to politics. Those who lose in the short run of ordinary 
politics obey the winners out of respect for the long-run 
rules and boundaries set forth in the Constitution. Without 
such respect for the constitutional framework, the peaceful 
operation of ordinary politics would degenerate into 
 
 266. Id. (“[T]he ease with which California’s Constitution can be―and regularly is—
amended, [has] result[ed] in the perpetual instability of California’s state constitutional law.”). 
 267. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 252, at 71. The U.S. Constitution, Article V, provides for 
two methods of proposing a constitutional amendment, empowering both Congress and the states 
to propose amendments to the Constitution: 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of 
two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, 
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this 
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States or 
by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification 
may be proposed by the Congress. 
U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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fractious war. 
 Frequent constitutional amendment can be expected to 
undermine this respect by breaking down the boundary 
between law and politics. The more you amend the 
Constitution, the more it seems like ordinary legislation. 
And the more the Constitution is cluttered up with specific 
regulatory directives, the less it looks like a fundamental 
charter of government. Picture the Ten Commandments 
with a few parking regulations thrown in. 
 This is why opponents of new amendments often argue 
that they would tend to trivialize or politicize the 
Constitution. They trivialize it in the sense that they clutter 
it up and diminish its fundamentality. Consider the 
experience of the state constitutions. Most state 
constitutions are amendable by simple majority, including 
by popular initiative and referendum. . . . [M]any of these 
state constitutional amendments are products of pure 
interest group politics. State constitutions thus are difficult 
to distinguish from general state legislation, and they water 
down the notion of fundamental rights in the process: the 
California constitution, for example, protects not only the 
right to speak but also the right to fish. 
 Amendments politicize a constitution to the extent that 
they embed in it a controversial substantive choice. Here 
the experience of Prohibition is instructive: the only modern 
amendment to enact a social policy into the Constitution, it 
is also the only modern amendment to have been repealed. 
Amendments that embody a specific and controversial 
social or economic policy allow one generation to tie the 
hands of another, entrenching approaches that ought to be 
revisable in the crucible of ordinary politics. 268 
California’s Constitution is six times longer than the federal 
Constitution. Amending the California Constitution by means of the 
initiative process is relatively easy, compared to the process the 
Legislature must comply with if it wishes to propose a constitutional 
 
 268. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself of 
Amendment Fever, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 691, 695–96 (1996). 
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amendment. 269 While all 50 states allow their legislatures to amend 
their constitutions, only 17 states allow voters to amend their 
constitutions through the initiative process. 270 In most of these states, 
it is at least as easy for the legislature to propose a constitutional 
amendment as it is for the voters to amend by initiative. Only in 
California and Colorado is it harder to amend the state’s constitution 
through legislative action than to amend by direct voter initiative. 271 
Most states that allow constitutional amendments through a 
voter initiative process have ballot-qualification standards that are 
more onerous than California’s, which is relatively straightforward 
and unrestricted. 272 For example, in Illinois, a proposed amendment 
must “be limited to structural and procedural subjects contained in 
Article IV,” which establishes the rights and responsibilities of the 
Illinois General Assembly. 273 In Nevada, if an initiative amending 
the constitution receives a majority vote, it must be approved again at 
the next general election for it to become part of the constitution. 274 
In Mississippi, which has adopted the indirect initiative process, to 
get on the ballot the initiative must receive 12% of the total vote cast 
for governor in the last gubernatorial election, with one-fifth (1/5) of 
the signatures from each of Mississippi’s five congressional 
districts. 275 Massachusetts has a similar requirement. 276 In Florida, 
 
 269. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 252, at 76 (“In California it is harder for the legislature to 
propose a constitutional amendment than for many initiative proponents to do so. The legislature 
must achieve a two-thirds vote, a difficult, if not impossible, task on any hotly disputed matter. 
Initiative sponsors, however, can propose constitutional amendments by obtaining signatures 
equal to 8% of the last gubernatorial vote, a task that sponsors who have enough money to pay 
signature gatherers generally have no trouble publishing.”). 
 270. Id. at 73–75. These states are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota. 
 271. Id. at 74 (California and Colorado “have difficult legislative procedures for amending 
their constitutions but relatively easy initiative procedures.”). 
 272. California Constitution, article II, section 8(b), provides: 
An initiative measure may be proposed by presenting to the Secretary of State a 
petition that sets forth the text of the proposed statute or amendment to the Constitution 
and is certified to have been signed by electors equal in number to 5 percent in the case 
of a statute, and 8 percent in the case of an amendment to the Constitution, of the votes 
for all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial election. 
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b). 
 273. ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3; id. at art. IV. 
 274. NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2; Supermajority Vote Requirements, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16584 (last visited Mar. 3, 2011). 
 275. Mississippi, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST. AT THE UNIV. OF S. CAL., 
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voters have the right to initiate constitutional amendments. 277 A 
proposed initiative, however, must be approved by a supermajority 
equal to 60% or more of the votes cast. 278 In Montana, to be placed 
on the ballot, an initiative proposal must be signed by at least 10% of 
the state’s qualified electors, including at least 10% of the qualified 
electors in each of at least one-half of the counties. 279 In Nebraska, 
the rules have changed to make the process more difficult; 
specifically, the number of signatures required to qualify an 
amendment for the ballot has gone from 10% of those who voted in 
the last gubernatorial election to 10% of the state’s registered 
voters. 280 
In California, however, 
[i]t is almost as easy for proponents with money to pay for 
gathering signatures to propose constitutional amendments 
through the initiative process as to propose statutes. The 
only difference is that an initiative to amend the 
Constitution requires the gathering of signatures equal to 
8 percent of the previous votes whereas initiative[s 
proposing] statutes require 5 percent. 281 
“If approved by a simple majority of those voting at the next 
election, the initiative measure goes into effect on the following 
day.” 282 Thus, California’s Constitution can be—and has been—
amended at the request of a relatively small percentage of the state’s 
populace and an even smaller percentage of its eligible voters. For 
 
http://iandrinstitute.org/Mississippi.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2011). Qualifying requirements are 
so onerous that only two initiatives have qualified for the ballot in the two decades since adoption 
and both were defeated. Id. 
 276. The Basic Steps to Do an Initiative in Massachusetts: Statutes and Amendments—
Indirect Initiative Process, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST. AT THE UNIV. OF S. CAL., 
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/I&R%20Research%20and%20Hi
story/I&R%20at%20the%20Statewide%20Level/Basic%20steps/Massachusetts.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2011) (requiring one-fourth (1/4) of the total number of signatures). 
 277. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3. 
 278. Supermajority Vote Requirements, supra note 274. 
 279. MONT. CONST. art. XIV, § 9. 
 280. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2; Duggan v. Beermann, 515 N.W.2d 788, 792 (Neb. 1994); The 
Basic Steps to Do an Initiative in Nebraska: Statutes and Amendments—Direct Initiative Process, 
INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST. AT THE UNIV. OF S. CAL., http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New% 
20IRI%20Website%20Info/I&R%20Research%20and%20History/I&R%20at%20the%20Statewi
de%20Level/Basic%20steps/Nebraska.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2011). 
 281. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 252, at 77. 
 282. George, supra note 265, at 1516. 
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example, after the California Supreme Court determined, in People v. 
Anderson, 283 that capital punishment violated the prohibition against 
cruel or unusual punishment in the California Constitution, voters 
overrode the California Supreme Court to make the constitutional 
infirmity disappear by passing Proposition 17—a constitutional 
amendment providing that capital punishment was not cruel or 
unusual punishment under the California Constitution. 284 When 
Proposition 17 passed, California had a population of approximately 
20 million people, with about 13.9 million eligible voters. 
Proposition 17 became part of California law because 5,447,165 
people voted in favor of it. Thus, the state’s constitution was 
amended by 39% of the state’s eligible voters, or about 27% of the 
state’s overall population. 285 Similarly, and more recently, in 2008, 
California had 22,153,555 eligible voters. In the November 2008 
election, Proposition 8 amended the California Constitution when 
7,001,084 voters—32% of the eligible voters—supported the 
initiative. 286 
Justice Mosk described California’s relatively unrestricted 
initiative process as follows: 
[I]nitiative promoters may obtain signatures for any 
proposal, however radical in concept and effect, and if they 
can persuade 51 percent of those who vote at an ensuing 
election to say “aye,” the measure becomes law regardless 
of how patently it may offend constitutional limitations. . . . 
[T]he fleeting whims of public opinion and prejudice are 
controlling over specific constitutional provisions. This 
seriously denigrates the Constitution as the foundation upon 
 
 283. 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972). 
 284. In People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972), the California Supreme Court held that 
the death penalty in California constituted cruel or unusual punishment under the state 
constitution. Later that year, the California electorate nullified the court’s ruling in Anderson 
when it passed an initiative that amended the California constitution to provide that the death 
penalty does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment in California. Infra note 333 and 
accompanying text. 
 285. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, POPULATION ESTIMATES AND 
PROJECTIONS 3 (1972), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/ 
publications/p25/z1972/p25-479.pdf. 
 286. DEBRA BOWEN, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 4, 2008, 
GENERAL ELECTION 62 (2008), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/ 
sov_complete.pdf; 2008 General Election Turnout Rates, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, 
http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_2008G.html (last updated Oct. 6, 2010). 
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which our governmental structure is based. 
 James Madison, in the Federalist Papers (No. 
LXXVIII), wrote, inter alia, “The interpretation of the laws 
is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A 
constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, 
as a fundamental law. It, therefore, belongs to them to 
ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any 
particular act proceeding from the legislative body [or the 
people acting in a legislative capacity]. 287 
The California Constitution has been amended 510 times since 
its 1879 ratification, frequently by voter initiative. 288 Former Chief 
Justice Ronald M. George has commented that, as a general matter, 
there is a disparity between the quality of laws enacted through the 
initiative process and those enacted through the legislative process. 289 
 
 287. Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 312 (Cal. 1982) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (“A 
democratic government must do more than serve the immediate needs of a majority of its 
constituency—it must respect the ‘enduring general values’ of the society. Somehow, a 
democracy must tenaciously cling to its long-term concepts of justice regardless of the vacillating 
feelings experienced by a majority of the electorate.” Id. at 313. (quoting Donald R. Wright, The 
Role of the Judiciary, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1262, 1267 (1972)). 
 288. George, supra note 265, at 1517 (“Only seventeen amendments to the United States 
Constitution (in addition to the Bill of Rights, ratified in 1791) have been adopted since that 
document was ratified in 1788. In contrast, more than five hundred amendments to the current 
California Constitution have been adopted since ratification of that document in 1879. Although 
the majority of these amendments were placed before voters by the legislature, many with the 
most severe impact on the operation of state and local government have been the product of the 
initiative process.”); see also Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 103 (Cal. 2009) (explaining that 
California voters have a long history of amending the state’s constitution to include provisions 
which discriminate against minority groups, such as “Proposition 14 (a state constitutional 
amendment, adopted in 1964, that repealed a statutory provision barring racial discrimination in 
the sale or rental of housing)”). 
 289. George, supra note 265, at 1518 (“Much of this constitutional and statutory structure has 
been brought about not by legislative fact-gathering and deliberation, but rather by the approval 
of voter initiative measures, often funded by special interests. These interests are allowed under 
the law to pay a bounty to signature-gatherers for each petition signer. Frequent amendments—
coupled with the implicit threat of more in the future—have rendered our state government 
dysfunctional, at least in times of severe economic decline.”); see also Brosnahan, 651 P.2d at 
305 (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (“It is the very essence of the legislative process to deal with and 
become immersed in laws, existing and proposed. A legislator’s professional life is one of passing 
and amending laws. This daily involvement with the law, combined with ready access to 
extensive professional research staffs and legal libraries, creates an expertise in the Legislature 
that is impossible to duplicate, or even approximate, among the electorate at large. As the late 
Justice Wiley Manuel noted, ‘Voters have neither the time nor the resources to mount an in depth 
investigation of a proposed initiative.’ This is not true of legislators. Thus, it makes eminently 
good sense to attribute to legislators knowledge of the primary purpose and effects of a proposed 
statutory amendment, even if not explicitly set forth. However, the same cannot be said for the 
voting public.” (citations omitted)). 
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Because the general public has no corollary to the legislative debate 
process, which typically includes legislative hearings or committee 
reports or both, citizens who propose initiatives do not have the 
benefit of hearing opposing or competing views that might inform 
their decisions about whether an initiative is necessary and 
appropriate. 290 Thus, when the constitutionality of a voter-initiated 
constitutional amendment or statute is challenged in the courts, the 
absence of any legislative record makes it difficult for courts to 
determine what the voters’ intent was in approving the new law. 291 If 
state or federal courts conclude that a voter-initiated constitutional 
amendment or statute violates one or more provisions of the U.S. 
Constitution, under the Supremacy Clause the law may not be 
enforced. 
The drafting of constitutional amendments or legislation 
affecting criminal justice policy or procedure requires an in-depth 
understanding of the impact of such a policy change and of any 
complex budgetary issues that may flow from that change, as well as 
an understanding of the importance of preserving the protections 
guaranteed to criminal defendants under state and federal 
constitutions. Nevertheless, in California “[w]ithout question, the 
initiative plays an important role in . . . setting criminal justice policy 
in particular.” 292 
 
 290. Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct 
Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 155 (1995) (“Voters often do not read proposed laws, but instead 
rely on media coverage that is frequently reductive. The laws and the ballot pamphlets explaining 
them are difficult to comprehend. The obscuring legal jargon in initiatives and the gaps in the 
public’s knowledge about the surrounding legal context hamper voters’ ability to weigh and 
assess proposals. Even when voters read and understand proposed laws, they may fail to 
anticipate or consider an issue that arises only when the initiative law is later applied to a 
particular set of facts. These factors leave citizen-lawmakers poorly situated to deliberate about 
proposed initiatives.”). 
 291. In People v. Bigelow, 691 P.2d 994 (Cal. 1984), the California Supreme Court was asked 
to interpret what the voters intended when they passed the 1978 Death Penalty initiative that 
included a “financial gain” special circumstance. The Court noted that “[n]o legislative history 
illumines the adoption of this special circumstance. The ballot arguments and other materials 
concerning the 1978 initiative do not address the subject.” Id. at 1006. 
 292. California Annual Review: Summary: 2008 California Criminal Law Ballot Initiatives, 
14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 173, 174 n.7 (2009) (citing CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, 
DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA’S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (2d 
ed. 2008), available at http://www.cgs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id= 
164:PUBLICATIONS&catid=39:all_pubs&a mp;Itemid=72). 
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b.  No subject-matter restrictions on California initiatives 
Voter-initiated constitutional amendments and statutes in 
California also create fiscal challenges for the Legislature because 
appropriations required to fund a voter initiative measure are not 
subject to the restrictions that apply to legislative appropriations, 
which must be passed by a two-thirds majority of each house 293 and 
are subject to veto by the governor. 294 Voters are not asked to 
determine how, or from what source, an initiative measure will be 
funded, or even whether there is any funding available in the state 
budget to pay for the costs associated with implementing a proposed 
new law. 295 Thus, the California process permits the adoption of 
initiatives that the state may not be able to afford and, at the same 
time, prohibits the Legislature and the Governor from amending, 
repealing, or vetoing a costly statute or constitutional change. 296 One 
California legislator has commented that “[t]he initiative process has 
become more powerful than the legislature in this state. A big part of 
what we do here is clean up after ballot initiatives. You begin to feel 
like the guy who follows the parade and sweeps up after the 
elephants!” 297 As another commentator expressed it: 
California’s problems are those of “direct democracy.” The 
 
 293. Proposition 13 amended the California Constitution to require a two-thirds majority vote 
in the Legislature to raise statewide taxes. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §3. However, Proposition 98 
mandates that a percent of the state’s General Fund be allocated for to K–14 schools. Christopher 
Witko, The California Legislature and the Decline of Majority Rule, in REMAKING CALIFORNIA: 
RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC GOOD 60, 66–67 (R. Jeffrey Lustig ed. 2010). 
 294. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 252, at 83. 
 295. Id. 
 296. In Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009), the California Supreme Court explained: 
As we have seen, when the initiative power was added to the California Constitution in 
1911, the relevant provision specified that the initiative afforded the people authority to 
propose and adopt statutes and “amendments to the constitution.” (Cal. Const., former 
art. IV, § 1, as adopted Oct. 10, 1911, now art. II, § 8, subd. (a), and art. XVIII, § 3.) 
The provision placed no subject-matter limitation on the initiative process and did not 
exempt any provision of the existing Constitution from amendment through the 
initiative process. During the nearly 100 years since adoption of the statewide initiative 
process in California, a number of constitutional amendments have been adopted that 
impose some restrictions on the initiative process in this state (see Cal. Const., art. II, 
§ 8, subds. (d), (e), (f)), but no provision purports to place any section or segment of 
the state Constitution off-limits to the initiative process or to preclude the use of the 
initiative with respect to specified subjects. 
Id. at 109–10. 
 297. KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS, at vii (2009), available at 
http://assets.cambridge.org/97805217/65640/frontmatter/9780521765640_frontmatter.pdf. 
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state’s laws are shaped by plebiscites to a degree 
unmatched outside of Venezuela. In voting on 
“propositions,” which sometimes touch on detailed 
budgetary matters, citizens of the Golden State have stood 
up consistently for two principles: the state should provide 
vastly more services to its citizens, and citizens should pay 
vastly less to the state. 298 
Indeed, “[a recent] survey by the Public Policy Institute of 
California found that, overwhelmingly, Californians want 
themselves—not the governor or the Legislature—to be in charge of 
big budget matters.” 299 Despite this strong sentiment, “[o]nly 6% of 
Californians [polled in the survey] could identify both the biggest 
revenue source and the biggest beneficiary of state money.” 300 
Perhaps, in part, because voters are not charged with or held directly 
accountable for determining how a proposed piece of legislation fits 
into a state’s overall budget, 10 of the 24 states with voter ballot 
initiatives “place restrictions on the extent to which taxes can be 
levied or appropriations made through the initiative process.” 301 
California has no such restrictions. 302 
c.  No amendment or repeal by Legislature 
Perhaps the most serious flaw in California’s initiative process is 
that it prohibits the Legislature from amending or repealing voter-
initiated legislation, even when the cost of funding a voter-initiated 
law far exceeds what the taxpayers were told in the Voter 
Information Guide before they cast their votes. 303 
 
 298. Christopher Caldwell, California’s Fiscal Charade, FIN. TIMES, July 24, 2009, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/27fc634c-7879-11de-bb06-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1GgSkEn8j. 
 299. Cathlene Decker, Public Ignorance Bites California in the Wallet, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 
2010, at A31. 
 300. Id. at A35. 
 301. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 252, at 81, tbl.25, 83, n.23 (listing the subject-matter 
restrictions other states have on the voter initiative processes). 
 302. Jessica A. Levinson & Robert M. Stern, Ballot Box Budgeting in California: The Bane of 
the Golden State or an Overstated Problem?, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689, 690 (2010) 
(proposing that “all [California] measures calling for increased funding identify funding 
sources, . . . measures that reduce revenue should identify which program(s) will be cut, . . . [and 
w]hen making fiscal policy, whether it is by initiative or by legislative measure, the consequences 
of those decisions must be made clear to the voters.”) 
 303. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 252, at 78–81. 
An important policy question is whether the initiative statutes should be tretated any 
differently than statutes adopted by the legislature. While it may be reasonable to 
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Of the 24 states that allow citizen initiatives to make law outside 
of the traditional legislative process, 304 only in California is the state 
Legislature expressly prohibited from amending a voter-initiated 
statute “unless the initiative establishing the law expressly provided 
for amendment by the legislature.” 305 This rule applies whether an 
initiative is statutory or is a constitutional amendment. 306 Unlike in 
California, 13 of the 24 states with initiative processes—Colorado, 
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and the District of 
Columbia—have a process whereby “the legislature is free to amend 
or repeal an initiated measure at any time.” 307 In nine states—Alaska, 
 
protect statutes enacted by the people through the initiative process from immediate 
change by the legislature, it seems highly undesirable to have a category of “super 
statutes” that are very difficult to change without a vote of the people. As the 
circumstances upon which statutes are based change, the legislature should have the 
power to make changes. Aside from the improvement that such power would bring in 
the legislature’s ability to manage the affairs of the state, giving the legislature this 
kind of authority would reduce the number of ballot measures by eliminating the need 
to have trivial changes in old initiatives approved by the people. 
Id. at 80 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 
 304. State-by-State List of Initiative and Referendum Provisions, INITIATIVE AND 
REFERENDUM INST. AT THE UNIV. OF S. CAL., http://www.iandrinstitute.org/statewide_i%26r.htm 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2011). 
 305. Limiting the Legislature’s Power to Amend and Repeal Initiated Statutes, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=16539 (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2011); CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 292, at 114 (“No other 
state in the nation carries the concept of initiatives as ‘written in stone’ to such lengths as to 
forbid their legislatures from updating or amending initiative legislation.”). 
  Article II, section 10, of the California Constitution provides: 
(a) An initiative statute or referendum approved by a majority of votes thereon takes 
effect the day after the election unless the measure provides otherwise. If a referendum 
petition is filed against a part of a statute the remainder shall not be delayed from going 
into effect. 
(b) If provisions of 2 or more measures approved at the same election conflict, those of 
the measure receiving the highest affirmative vote shall prevail. 
(c) The Legislature may amend or repeal referendum statutes. It may amend or repeal 
an initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved by 
the electors unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without their 
approval. 
(d) Prior to circulation of an initiative or referendum petition for signatures, a copy 
shall be submitted to the Attorney General who shall prepare a title and summary of 
the measure as provided by law. 
(e) The Legislature shall provide the manner in which petitions shall be circulated, 
presented, and certified, and measures submitted to the electors. 
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10 (emphasis added). 
 306. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 252, at 80. 
 307. Limiting the Legislature’s Power to Amend and Repeal Initiated Statutes, supra note 
305; see also State-by-State List of Initiative and Referendum Provisions, supra note 304. 
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Arizona, Arkansas, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, 
Washington, and Wyoming—the state legislature’s power to amend 
or repeal a statute passed by an initiative is subject to certain 
restrictions, such as waiting periods after passage of a voter initiative 
before legislative amendment, or the requirement that a legislative 
amendment be passed by a supermajority, or some combination of 
those limitations. 308 
The provision in the California Constitution that prohibits the 
Legislature from amending an initiative statute unless the initiative 
authorizes the amendment reflects the citizenry’s longstanding and 
“profound, deeply rooted historical distrust of statewide governing 
institutions.” 309 
 
 308. Limiting the Legislature’s Power to Amend and Repeal Initiated Statutes, supra note 
305. Alaska Constitution, article XI, section 6, provides that an initiated measure “may be 
amended at any time” by a majority vote of the legislature, but Alaska law prohibits repeal of 
initiated measures within two years. ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6. Arizona Constitution, article 
IV, part 1, section 1(6)(C) and section 1(14), provide that the legislature may amend an initiated 
measure by a vote of “at least three-fourths of the members of each house of the legislature, by a 
roll call of ayes and nays, vote to amend such measure” so long as “any measure that supersedes, 
in whole or in part, any initiative measure approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon or any 
referendum measure decided by a majority of the votes cast thereon . . . furthers the purposes of 
the initiative or referendum measure.” ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, part 1, §§ 1(6)(C), 1(14). Arkansas 
Constitution, amendment 7, provides that “[n]o measure approved by a vote of the people shall be 
amended or repealed by the General Assembly or by any City Council, except upon a yea and nay 
vote on roll call of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house of the General Assembly.” 
ARK. CONST. amend. 7. Michigan Constitution, article II, section 9, provides that laws “initiated 
or adopted by the people” may be amended or repealed in any manner “provided in the initiative 
measure or by three-fourths of the members elected to and serving in each house of the 
legislature.” MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9. Nebraska Constitution, article III-2 provides that “[t]he 
Legislature shall not amend, repeal, modify, or impair a law enacted by the people by initiative, 
contemporaneously with the adoption of this initiative measure or at any time thereafter, except 
upon a vote of at least two-thirds of all the members of the Legislature.” NEB. CONST. art. III-2. 
Nevada Constitution, article XIX, section 2, part 3, provides that “[a]n initiative measure so 
approved by the voters shall not be amended, annulled, repealed, set aside or suspended by the 
Legislature within 3 years from the date it takes effect.” NEV. CONST. art. XIX, § 2, part 3. North 
Dakota Constitution, article III, section 8, provides that “[a] measure approved by the electors 
may not be repealed or amended by the legislative assembly for seven years from its effective 
date, except by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house.” N.D. CONST. art. III, § 8. 
Washington Constitution, article II, section 1(c) provides that the Washington State Legislature 
can repeal or amend an initiative by a two-thirds vote of each house during the first two years of 
enactment and by majority vote thereafter. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(c). Wyoming Constitution, 
article III, section 52(f) provides that “[a]n initiated law . . . is not subject to veto, and may not be 
repealed by the legislature within two (2) years of its effective date[, but] may be amended at any 
time.” WYO. CONST. art. III, § 52(f). 
 309. Karl Manheim & Edward P. Howard, Symposium on the California Initiative Process: A 
Structural Theory of the Initiative Power in California, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1165, 1197 n.213 
(1998) (citing CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c)) (“The Legislature . . . may amend or repeal an 
initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved by the electors 
unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without their approval.”). 
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In the early 1900s when the initiative [process] was first 
adopted, there were reasons to fear that legislatures might 
do all they could to sabotage measures adopted through the 
initiative process. In actual practice, however, legislative 
sabotage has not proved to be a major problem, even in the 
states where the legislature can easily amend or repeal 
initiative measures.” 310 
Thus, one could argue that this feature of California’s initiative 
scheme only succeeds in unnecessarily thwarting the Legislature’s 
ability to amend voter-initiated statutes that have not fulfilled their 
intended missions or are too costly. 
d.  The sheer volume of voter initiatives in California 
California’s initiative system also differs from other states’ in 
that no other state puts as many issues before its electorate. 311 As 
every good citizen of the Golden State knows, California voters have 
a great deal of studying to do if they are to understand the purposes 
and effects of the numerous propositions on a given ballot. Since the 
inception of the voter initiative process in 1911, “the people of 
California have used the ballot measure process more than any other 
state to create the laws by which they are governed.” 312 Until the 
1970s, California’s use of the ballot initiative followed the national 
trend. In the 1970s, 
the state’s initiative use began to accelerate well beyond 
national averages. California has since become the national 
leader in initiative use. . . . In 1990 alone, eighteen 
initiatives found their way onto the ballot, twice the total 
number of California initiatives for the entire 1960s. That 
record was surpassed by the March 2000 primary election 
which included twenty state [initiative] propositions. 313 
“Because most voters have limited time, attention, and interest 
in politics, and because the political realm presents people with 
complex choices, voter competence depends on the ability to use 
 
 310. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 252, at 80 (emphasis added). 
 311. See id. at 74 tbl. 19. 
 312. L. Tobe Liebert, Researching California Ballot Measures, 90 LAW LIBR. J. 27, 28 
(1998). 
 313. Becky Kruse, The Truth in Masquerade: Regulating False Ballot Proposition Ads 
Through State Anti-False Speech Statutes, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 129, 137 (2001). 
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particular pieces of available information as shortcuts for decision 
making.” 314 One of the most important “shortcuts” used by 
California voters is the Voter Information Guide mailed to all 
registered voters in the state. 315 Most voters rely heavily on the Voter 
Information Guide, which includes the Legislative Analyst’s fiscal 
impact statements, in assessing whether the state can afford to adopt 
and implement new legislation. 316 The statement of fiscal impact 
prepared by the Legislative Analyst is “for the purpose of suggestion 
only and shall not have any binding effect on the proponents of the 
initiative measure.” 317 
California Election Code section 9005 provides 
 (a) The Attorney General, in preparing a circulating 
title and summary for a proposed initiative measure, shall, 
 
 314. Elizabeth Garrett, Voting with Cues, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1011, 1012–13 (2003). 
 315. California Election Code section 9084 requires that the voter ballot pamphlets include 
(a) A complete copy of each state measure; (b) A copy of the specific constitutional or 
statutory provision, if any, that each state measure would repeal or revise; (c) A copy 
of the arguments and rebuttals for and against each state measure; (d) A copy of the 
analysis of each state measure; (e) Tables of contents, indexes, art work, graphics, and 
other materials that the Secretary of State determines will make the ballot pamphlet 
easier to understand or more useful for the average voter; (f) A notice, conspicuously 
printed on the cover of the ballot pamphlet, indicating that additional copies of the 
ballot pamphlet will be mailed by the county elections official upon request; (g) A 
written explanation of the judicial retention procedure as required by Section 9083; (h) 
The Voter Bill of Rights pursuant to Section 2300; (i) If the ballot contains an election 
for the office of United States Senator, information on candidates for United States 
Senator. A candidate for United States Senator may purchase the space to place a 
statement in the state ballot pamphlet that does not exceed 250 words. The statement 
may not make any reference to any opponent of the candidate. The statement shall be 
submitted in accordance with timeframes and procedures set forth by the Secretary of 
State for the preparation of the state ballot pamphlet.; (j) If the ballot contains a 
question on the confirmation or retention of a justice of the Supreme Court, 
information on justices of the Supreme Court who are subject to confirmation or 
retention.; (k) If the ballot contains an election for the offices of President and Vice 
President of the United States, a notice that refers voters to the Secretary of State’s 
Internet Web site for information about candidates for the offices of President and Vice 
President of the United States. 
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9084 (West 2009). 
 316. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 252, at 165–69. Pursuant to California Government Code 
§ 12172(b) (2010), the Legislative Analyst is required to 
furnish the Secretary of State with a statement of fiscal impact with respect to the 
initiative measure within 25 working days after being requested to do so . . . . In the 
preparation of the statement of fiscal impact, the Legislative Analyst may use the fiscal 
estimate or the opinion prepared pursuant to Section 9005 of the Elections Code. 
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12172(b) (West 2010). 
 317. GOV’T § 12172(b). 
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in boldface print, include in the circulating title and 
summary either the estimate of the amount of any increase 
or decrease in revenues or costs to the state or local 
government, or an opinion as to whether or not a substantial 
net change in state or local finances would result if the 
proposed initiative is adopted; 
 (b) The estimate as required by this section shall be 
made jointly by the Department of Finance and the Joint 
Legislative Budget Committee, who shall deliver the 
estimate to the Attorney General so that he or she may 
include the estimate in the circulating title and summary 
prepared by him or her; 
 (c) The estimate shall be delivered to the Attorney 
General within 25 working days from the date of receipt of 
the final version of the proposed initiative measure from the 
Attorney General, unless, in the opinion of both the 
Department of Finance and the Joint Legislative Budget 
Committee, a reasonable estimate of the net impact of the 
proposed initiative measure cannot be prepared within the 
25-day period. In the latter case, the Department of Finance 
and the Joint Legislative Budget Committee shall, within 
the 25-day period, give the Attorney General their opinion 
as to whether or not a substantial net change in state or local 
finances would result if the proposed initiative measure is 
adopted; 
 (d) A statement of fiscal impact prepared by the 
Legislative Analyst pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 
12172 of the Government Code may be used by the 
Department of Finance and the Joint Legislative Budget 
Committee in the preparation of the fiscal estimate or the 
opinion. 318 
Despite the summary nature of the Voter Information Guide, a 
significant time commitment is required to study the issues presented 
therein. For example, “the 1990 [ballot] pamphlet was 224 pages 
long.” 319 One California study performed in 2000 showed that it 
 
 318. ELEC. § 9005. The Department of Finance is part of the executive branch of California’s 
government. 
 319. Schacter, supra note 290, at 142 (discussing California Voter Information Guides). One 
  
S130              LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:S41 
would take the average person five hours to read the Voter 
Information Guide, which averages about 150 pages. This does not 
include time spent reflecting on the issues or attempting to decipher 
the initiatives’ legalese. 320 
“Most Californians (84%) rank the Voter Information Guide 
mailed to voters by the Secretary of State as a useful information 
source in deciding how to vote on state initiatives, . . . [m]ore than 
half say the Voter Information Guide is ‘very useful.’” 321 In another 
survey, “77.5%[] [of respondents indicated that they] find valuable 
the legislative analyst’s estimate of the fiscal effect of a measure.” 322 
Despite voters’ heavy reliance on the fiscal impact statements in the 
Voter Information Guide, those statements are not always precise 
and are subject to manipulation. 323 
As discussed below, the fiscal impact statements do not include 
any analysis of the proposed initiatives’ cumulative effect on the 
“states’ fiscal policy with regard to taxing and spending.” 324 It thus 
appears that voters are relying on the fiscal impact statements in 
casting their votes, even though those statements are based upon 
nonbinding estimates as to what the fiscal impact of the new laws 
could be, without any reference to the cumulative or potential costs 
associated with a given proposition or initiative. 325 
 
study concluded that to read the ballot measures on the ballot between 1970 and 1979 in full, “a 
voter in California . . . would have needed to read at the sixteenth to eighteenth grade level 
(bachelor’s degree plus two years).” Id. at 140. 
 320. Justin Henderson, Comment, The Tyranny of the Minority: Is It Time to Jettison Ballot 
Initiatives in Arizona?, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 963, 981–82 (2007). 
 321. SILVA, supra note 260, at 24. “By contrast, one in four rank news stories and websites as 
very useful, and only 11 percent say that paid political commercials are very useful as 
information sources on initiatives.” Id. 
 322. DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 252, at 168. 
 323. California Annual Review: Summary: 2008 California Criminal Law Ballot Initiatives, 
supra note 292 (explaining that the Attorney General’s Official Summary, including the 
Legislative Analyst Office’s assessment of fiscal effects, of 2000’s Proposition 36 which would 
“‘[r]equire[] probation and drug treatment programs, not incarceration, for [various drug 
offenses]’” only mentioned that the initiative would “‘[a]ppropriate[] treatment funds through 
2005–2006’” but “‘did not include a dollar figure in terms of costs, despite the fact that 
Proposition 36 unequivocally appropriated sixty million dollars for the first year following its 
enactment and one-hundred-twenty million dollars thereafter . . . . The summary of likely fiscal 
effects only mentioned the considerable savings that would result from decreased prison 
populations.’” (alterations in original) (first emphasis added)). 
 324. Levinson & Stern, supra note 302, at 696. 
 325. For example, “[a]lthough [California’s three strikes law] was not debated or understood 
by voters as a budget measure, it had profound budgetary consequences, requiring many new 
prisons and jails be built and maintained without providing any funding for them. Of course, the 
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2.  Death Penalty Initiatives in California 
The history of California’s current death penalty scheme began 
on February 17, 1972, when the California Supreme Court held that 
the death penalty constituted cruel or unusual punishment under the 
state constitution. 326 Later that year in Furman v. Georgia, 327 the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that death penalty statutes that allowed for 
unguided jury discretion in capital cases violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as 
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution. 328 
a.  The 1972 initiative amending the California Constitution 
On November 7, 1972, nine months after the California 
Supreme Court decision in Anderson, 329 and four months after 
Furman, the California electorate nullified Anderson by passing 
Proposition 17, an initiative that amended the California Constitution 
 
money for prison expansion and operations had to come from somewhere, so it was taken out of 
other public services, with more vulnerable constituents less able to defend themselves by 
sponsoring initiatives of their own.” William M. Lunch, Budgeting by Initiative: An Oxymoron, 
34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 663, 666 (1998). 
 326. People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 899 & n.45 (Cal. 1972) (“No longer can it be said 
that capital punishment is not cruel per se, for the whole current of law for centuries justifies its 
infliction. Although world-wide acceptance of capital punishment at the turn of the century may 
then have warranted resolving doubts as to its cruelty in favor of its constitutionality, the current 
has now reversed. It is now, literally, an unusual punishment among civilized nations . . . . 
Inasmuch as today’s decision is fully retroactive, any prisoner now under a sentence of death, the 
judgment as to which is final, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the superior court 
inviting that court to modify its judgment to provide for the appropriate alternative punishment of 
life imprisonment or life imprisonment without possibility of parole specified by statute for the 
crime for which he was sentenced to death.”). All prisoners on California’s death row had their 
sentences commuted to life in prison as a result of the Anderson opinion. 
  See generally John W. Poulos, Capital Punishment, the Legal Process, and the 
Emergence of the Lucas Court in California, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 157, 169 (1990) 
(“Dissatisfied with the California Legislature’s response to demands for the abolition of capital 
punishment and for further reform of capital procedures, and undoubtedly encouraged by the 
success of the civil rights movement and the criminal law revolution, reformers began to raise 
constitutional challenges to both capital punishment and the procedures used to impose it.” (citing 
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971); People v. McGautha, 452 P.2d 650 (Cal. 1969); In 
re Anderson, 447 P.2d 117 (Cal. 1968); People v. Seiterle, 420 P.2d 217 (Cal. 1966); People v. 
Duncan, 334 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1959)). 
 327. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 328. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (“[T]he imposition and carrying out of 
the death penalty in [cases where it is inflicted discriminatorily upon members of racial 
minorities] constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”). 
 329. 493 P.2d 880 (1972). 
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to provide that the death penalty is not cruel or unusual 
punishment. 330 In the summary explaining the initiative in the Voter 
Information Guide, next to the “Yes” or “No” boxes, voters were 
informed of the following as to costs: “Fiscal impact: None.” 331 The 
Legislative Analyst’s cost analysis for Proposition 17 explained that 
“[t]he main purpose of this initiative is to maintain the statutory and 
constitutional authority for imposition of the death penalty as it 
existed prior to February 17, 1972. The adoption of this initiative 
does not involve any significant direct added state or local cost or 
revenue consideration.” 332 Thus, Proposition 17 amended the 
California Constitution when it was approved by 67.5% of the voters 
in that election, or 40% of all eligible voters in the state at that 
time. 333 
b.  The 1973 statute: Introduction of 10 “special circumstances” 
“In response to the passage of Proposition 17, and in light of the 
intervening Furman decision apparently holding discretionary death 
penalty schemes unconstitutional, [in 1973] the California legislature 
adopted a mandatory death penalty to be applied upon proof of first 
degree murder and one of ten special circumstances.” 334 To be death-
 
 330. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, GENERAL ELECTION: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO 
CONSTITUTION 42 (1972), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1972g.pdf. The 
Voter Information Guide’s summary explained that Proposition 17 
[a]mends [the] California Constitution to provide that all state statutes in effect 
February 17, 1972 requiring, authorizing, imposing, or relating to [the] death penalty 
are in full force and effect, subject to legislative amendment or repeal by statute, 
initiative or referendum; and that [the] death penalty provided for under those state 
statutes shall not be deemed to be, or constitute, infliction of cruel or unusual 
punishments within the meaning of California Constitution, Article I, Section 6, nor 
shall such punishment for such offenses be deemed to contravene any other provision 
of [the] California Constitution. Fiscal Impact: None. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. 
 333. California Ballot Propositions (1911–Present), HASTINGS LAW LIBRARY, 
http://library.uchastings.edu/cgi-bin/starfinder/0?path=calprop.txt&id=webber&pass=webber& 
OK=OK (“Yes: 5,447,165 (67.5%); No: 2,617,514 (32.5%)”). There were 13,322,000 eligible 
voters in November 1972. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, HISTORICAL VOTER REGISTRATION AND 
PARTICIPATION IN STATEWIDE GENERAL ELECTIONS 1910–2009, at 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/historical-voter-reg/hist-voter-reg-and-part-general-
elections-1910-2009.pdf. 
 334. Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for 
Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1307–09 (1997) (citing 1973 Cal. Stat. 719, §§ 1–5; Rockwell 
v. Superior Court, 556 P.2d 1101, 1116 (Cal. 1976); 1977 Cal. Stat. 316, § 9). Unlike some 
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eligible, a defendant had to first be convicted of first degree murder, 
 
researchers who consider all felony murder special circumstances—regardless of how long the 
list of qualifying felony murders is—as just one “special circumstance,” authors Steven F. Shatz 
and Nina Rivkind explained in their article The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for 
Furman? that 
for purposes of ‘counting’ special circumstances, the various felony murder special 
circumstances [should be] counted separately, and the ‘prior murder’ and ‘multiple 
murder’ circumstances [should] also [be] counted separately . . . [because i]n assessing 
the narrowing function of the special circumstances, it is the number of distinct types 
of murderers, not the statutory denomination or arrangement of the special 
circumstances, that is significant. 
Id. at 1307 n.141 (citing Poulos, supra note 326). 
  Because we are concerned in the present Article with reviewing the “expansion” of the 
scope and reach of the death penalty in California, we will use the counting method described and 
employed by Shatz and Rivkind. Thus, as amended by the 1973 Act, § 190.2 made the following 
10 crimes death-eligible: 
[1] (a) The murder was intentional and was carried out pursuant to an agreement with 
the defendant. “An agreement,” as used in this subdivision, means an agreement by the 
person who committed the murder to accept valuable consideration for the act of 
murder from any person other than the victim [financial gain]. 
(b) The defendant personally committed the act which caused the death of the victim 
and any of the following additional circumstances exist: 
[2] (1) The victim is a peace officer, as defined in Section 830.1, subdivision (a) of 
Section 830.2, or subdivision (b) of Section 830.5, who, while engaged in the 
performance of his duty, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew or 
reasonably should have known that such victim was a peace officer engaged in the 
performance of his duties. 
[3] (2) The murder was willful, deliberate and premeditated and the victim was a 
witness to a crime who was intentionally killed for the purpose of preventing his 
testimony in any criminal proceeding. 
(3) The murder was willful, deliberate and premeditated and was committed during the 
commission or attempted commission of any of the following crimes [felony murder—
5 felonies included]: 
[4] (i) Robbery, in violation of Section 211. 
[5] (ii) Kidnapping, in violation of Section 207 or Section 209. Brief movements of a 
victim which are merely incidental to the commission of another offense and which do 
not substantially increase the victim’s risk of harm over that necessarily inherent in the 
other offense do not constitute kidnapping within the meaning of this paragraph. 
[6] (iii) Rape by force or violence, in violation of subdivision (2) of Section 261; or by 
threat of great and immediate bodily harm, in violation of subdivision (3) of Section 
261. 
[7] (iv) The performance of lewd or lascivious acts upon the person of a child under 
the age of 14, in violation of Section 288. 
[8](v) Burglary, in violation of subdivision (1) of Section 460, of an inhabited dwelling 
house entered by the defendant with an intent to commit grand or petit larceny or rape. 
(4) The defendant has in this [proceeding been convicted] [9 multiple murder] 
or in any prior proceeding been convicted [10 prior murder] of more than one offense 
of murder of the first or second degree. 
For the purpose of this paragraph an offense committed in another jurisdiction which if 
committed in California would be punishable as first or second degree murder shall be 
deemed to be murder of the first or second degree. 
1973 Cal. Stat. 719, 1–5 (codified as amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1979)) 
(emphasis added). 
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and then one or more of the ten enumerated “special circumstances” 
charged in the accusatory pleading had to be found true beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 335 
In 1976, in Woodson v. North Carolina, 336 the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that mandatory death penalty statutes are unconstitutional 
because “in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity 
underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the 
character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances 
of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensible part of the 
process of inflicting the penalty of death.” 337 On December 7, 1976, 
the California Supreme Court held that California’s mandatory 
scheme in the 1973 statute was unconstitutional because it made 
death a mandatory punishment for first degree murders encompassed 
by the special circumstances, without consideration of evidence of 
 
 335. Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 334, at 1307–09. See also Rockwell v. Superior Court, 556 
P.2d 1101, 1104 n.1 (Cal. 1976), explaining that: 
  [s]ection 190.1 directed that a separate trial on the question of “special 
circumstances” follow the determination of guilt: 
In any case in which the death penalty is to be imposed as the penalty for an 
offense only upon the finding of the truth of the special circumstances enumerated 
in Section 190.2, the guilt or innocence of the person charged shall first be 
determined without a finding as to penalty. In any such case the person charged 
shall be represented by counsel. If such a person has been found guilty of such an 
offense, and has been found sane on any plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, 
and any one or more of the special circumstances enumerated in Section 190.2 
have been charged, there shall be further proceedings on the issue of the special 
circumstances charged. In any such proceedings the person shall be represented 
by counsel. The determination of the truth of any or all of the special 
circumstances charged shall be made by the trier of fact on the evidence 
presented. In case of a reasonable doubt whether a special circumstance is true, 
the defendant is entitled to a finding that it is not true. The trier of fact shall make 
a special finding that each special circumstance charged is either true or not 
true. . . . 
If the trier of fact finds, as to any person convicted of any offense under 
Section 190 requiring further proceedings that any one or more of the special 
circumstances enumerated in Section 190.2 as charged is true, the defendant shall 
suffer the penalty of death, and neither the finding that any of the remaining 
special circumstances charged is not true, nor if the trier of fact is a jury, the 
inability of the jury to agree on the issue of the truth or untruth of any of the 
remaining special circumstances charged, shall prohibit the imposition of such 
penalty . . . .” 
Rockwell v. Superior Court, 556 P.2d 1101, 1116 (Cal. 1976); Poulos, supra note 326, at 173–97 
(discussing California statutes, initiatives, and cases dealing with capital punishment and special 
circumstances requirements). 
 336. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 337. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (internal citation omitted). 
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mitigating circumstances or a defendant’s personal characteristics. 338 
c.  The 1977 statute: 12 more death-eligible crimes 
In January 1977, Governor Jerry Brown addressed the California 
Legislature and “said [that] he would refuse, as a matter of 
conscience, to sign any bill re-establishing the death penalty in 
California.” 339 As one news account explained 
 If members of the state legislature decide to push 
through a death penalty bill they will need to be able to 
muster a two thirds majority to overcome Mr. Brown’s 
veto, and with the Democrats in control of both houses that 
may not be easy. As a precaution, therefore, the advocates 
of capital punishment have promptly begun drafting a 
popular initiative for the California ballot to coincide with 
the next . . . election. 
 Recent opinion polls suggest that more than two thirds 
of California’s voters want the death penalty restored in 
some form or other. So in making this stand, Mr. Brown is 
taking a risk. 340 
In response to Governor Brown’s address, 
[s]upporters of the death penalty said they expect to take the 
issue directly to voters in another initiative. But [Governor] 
Brown’s declaration that he would veto a capital 
punishment bill was praised by both foes and supporters of 
the death penalty. ‘I am very pleased that he has been 
forthright in making his views known,’ said Republican 
Sen. George Deukmejian, the legislature’s leading advocate 
of the death penalty. 341 
In May 1977, the California Legislature passed legislation 
intended to restore capital punishment in California in compliance 
 
 338. Rockwell v. Superior Court, 556 P.2d 1101, 1116 (Cal. 1976). 
 339. California; Brown Still Astonishes, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 1977, at 34. 
 340. Id. As an interesting side note, in the same address to the California Legislature, 
Governor Brown predicted that California would have a “budget surplus of $1.7 billion by next 
July, half of which [was] already in hand.” Id. 
 341. Doug Willis, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 6, 1977 “Gov. Edmund Brown Jr. said Thursday 
he will veto any death penalty bill sent to him by the California Legislature.” Id. “Democratic 
Assembly Speaker Leo McCarthy, a death penalty foe, said, ‘Knowing full well that the majority 
of the public is in favor of the death penalty, the statement he just made was one of tremendous 
courage.’” Id. 
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with the new requirements recently announced in the death penalty 
cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. 342 On May 27, 1977, four 
hours after the bill reached his desk, Governor Brown vetoed it. 343 
The California Senate initiated the override process on June 23, 
1977, by voting 27–12 to reject the Governor’s veto. 344 On 
August 11, 1977, the California Assembly overrode Governor 
Brown’s veto and enacted a new death penalty law. 345 “Each vote 
margin was exactly the two-thirds majority needed to override.” 346 It 
was “the first time since Brown had taken office in 1975 that the 
[California] [L]egislature had successfully overridden a [Brown] 
veto and only the third time in 31 years that a California governor 
had been overridden.” 347 In response, the Governor said, “This is 
their view. I don’t agree with it, but as long as I’m governor, I will 
carry out my oath of office.” 348 
The 1977 statute reestablished the death penalty by restoring a 
separate penalty phase of capital trials and returning discretion to the 
jury, but limiting that discretion by requiring that the jury first find 
one of 12 special circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt to 
make a convicted first degree murderer death-eligible. 349 The special 
circumstances, which were defined in the 1977 statute and contained 
in Penal Code section 190.2, were substantially similar to the special 
circumstances in the 1973 statute; they both made the following 
 
 342. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 
(1976); ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 27, 1977. 
 343. Death Row Population Decreases Reported, FACTS ON FILE, WORLD NEWS DIGEST, 
Aug. 6, 1977, 593, at F3; ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 27, 1977. (“‘Statistics can be marshaled and 
arguments propounded but at some point each of us must decide for himself what sort of future he 
would want,’ Brown said in a brief veto message. ‘For me, this would be a society where we do 
not attempt to use death as a punishment.’”) 
 344. Death Penalty Veto Overridden in Calif., FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, 
Aug. 27, 1977, 652, at C2. 
 345. Bob Egelko, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 11, 1977. 
 346. Death Penalty Veto Overridden in Calif., supra note 344. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id.; see also California; Politics of the Death Penalty, ECONOMIST, Aug. 20, 1977, at 31 
(“Several members [of the California Legislature] acknowledged that they overrode their own 
consciences as well, and voted for the death penalty because their constituents favoured it. In fact 
the final debate last week turned primarily on the philosophical point of whether a legislator 
should heed his own conscience or feel obliged to carry out the public’s wishes. Demand for the 
death penalty has been overwhelming in recent opinion polls.”). 
 349. The principal authors of the measure were Republican Senator George Deukmejian and 
Democrat Assemblyman Alister McAlister who were rival candidates for the Attorney General’s 
post in the upcoming election. California; Politics of the Death Penalty, supra note 348, at 31. 
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crimes death-eligible: (1) murder for financial gain, or contract 
killings; (2) killing of a peace officer; (3) killing a witness; 
(4) multiple murders; (5) murder by one who has killed in the past; 350 
and murder committed during one of five enumerated felonies—
(6) robbery, (7) kidnapping, (8) rape, (9) lewd or lascivious act upon 
a minor under the age of 14, and (10) burglary. 351 The 1977 Act 
added two new special circumstances to the list: (11) murder by 
means of destructive device or explosive and (12) murder by torture, 
for a total of 12 death-eligible crimes. 352 Additionally, while the 
1973 statute had limited capital punishment to defendants who 
“personally committed the act which caused the death of the 
victim,” 353 the 1977 statute expanded the scope of the special 
circumstances to make accomplices death-eligible if they were 
personally present and “physically” aided in the commission of the 
act or acts causing death and acted with intent. 354 The 1977 statute 
brought California’s death penalty law into conformity with the 
requirements of Woodson v. North Carolina 355 by creating 
sentencing standards known as aggravating and mitigating factors, 356 
and requiring that the trier of fact, “[a]fter having heard and received 
all of the evidence . . . take into account and be guided by the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances” and determine whether 
the penalty shall be death or life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole. 357 
 
 350. Under the 1977 statute, where the special circumstance alleged was a prior conviction of 
first or second degree murder, a special circumstance phase of trial was required. CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 190.1(a) (West 1979); John W. Poulos, The Lucas Court and Capital Punishment: The 
Original Understanding of the Special Circumstances, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 333, 346–48 
nn.66–70 (1990). “The obvious reason for making an exception for the prior-murder-conviction 
special circumstance is to protect the defendant from the prejudice inherent in learning that the 
defendant has been convicted previously of murder while the trier of fact is deciding the question 
of the defendant’s guilt of first degree murder.” Id. at 351. 
 351. Poulos, supra note 326, at 180 n.110. 
 352. Id. at 181. 
 353. This did not include murders for financial gain or contract killings where both the killer 
and the hirer were death-eligible. 
 354. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3, 1977 CAL. STAT. 316, § 11; Poulos, supra note 326, at 181. 
Accomplice liability did not apply in cases involving murders for hire and murders by destructive 
device or explosion. 
 355. 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). 
 356. 1977 CAL. STAT. 316, § 11. 
 357. Id. 
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d.  The 1978 Briggs Initiative: Proposition 7—16 more special 
circumstances, 28 death-eligible crimes 
Despite the significant expansion in the scope of the state’s 
death penalty law provided for under the 1977 statute, by October 
1977, efforts were already underway to put an initiative on the ballot 
in the next election to expand the scope of California’s death penalty. 
State Senator John V. Briggs—a gubernatorial candidate hopeful—
began campaigning for support for Proposition 7, an initiative that 
would “broaden the list of crimes for which capital punishment could 
be invoked.” 358 
Proposition 7 faced no real or organized opposition and thus 
received little coverage in the press as it was considered non-
controversial. Proposition 7, which became known as the Briggs 
Initiative, proposed adding sixteen special circumstances to those 
enacted by the Legislature in the 1977 statute 359 to the existing list of 
 
 358. Lou Cannon, GOP Convention in Calif. Haunted by Lingering Differences, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 3, 1977, at A2. 
 359. The proposed special circumstances are set forth as underlined below: 
Section 190.2. (a) The penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first 
degree shall be death or confinement in state prison for a term of life without the 
possibility of parole in any case in which one or more of the following special 
circumstances has been charged and specially found under Section 190.4, to be true: 
(1) The murder was intentional and carried out for FINANCIAL GAIN. 
(2) The defendant was previously convicted of murder in the first degree or second 
degree. [PRIOR MURDER] For the purpose of this paragraph an offense committed in 
another jurisdiction which if committed in California would be punishable as first or 
second degree murder shall be deemed murder in the first or second degree. 
(3) The defendant has in this proceeding been convicted of more than one offense of 
murder in the first or second degree. [MULTIPLE MURDER] 
(4) The murder was committed by means of a [HIDDEN] DESTRUCTIVE DEVICE, BOMB, 
OR EXPLOSIVE planted, hidden or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building or 
structure, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that his act or acts 
would create a great risk of death to a human being or human beings. 
(5) The murder was committed for the purpose of AVOIDING OR PREVENTING A 
LAWFUL ARREST or to perfect or attempt to perfect an ESCAPE FROM LAWFUL 
CUSTODY. 
(6) The murder was committed by means of a [MAILED] DESTRUCTIVE DEVICE, BOMB, 
OR EXPLOSIVE that the defendant mailed or delivered, attempted to mail or deliver, or 
cause to be mailed or delivered and the defendant knew or reasonably should have 
known that his act or acts would create a great risk of death to a human being or human 
beings. 
(7) The victim was a PEACE OFFICER as defined in Section 830.1, 830.2, 830.3, 830.31, 
830.35, 830.36, 830.4, 830.5, 830.5a, 830.6, 830.10, 830.11 or 830.12, who, while 
engaged in the course of the performance of his duties, was intentionally killed, and 
such defendant knew or reasonably should have known that such victim was a peace 
officer engaged in the performance of his duties; or the victim was a peace officer as 
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defined in the above enumerated sections of the Penal Code, or a former peace officer 
under any of such sections, and was intentionally killed in retaliation for the 
performance of his official duties. 
(8) The victim was a FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER or agent, who, while 
engaged in the course of the performance of his duties was intentionally killed, and 
such defendant knew or reasonably should have known that such victim was a federal 
law enforcement officer or agent, engaged in the performance of his duties; or the 
victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent, and was intentionally killed in 
retaliation for the performance of his official duties. 
(9) The victim was a FIREMAN as defined in Section 245.1, who while engaged in the 
course of the performance of his duties was intentionally killed, and such defendant 
knew or reasonably should have known that such victim was a fireman engaged in the 
performance of his duties. 
(10) The victim was a WITNESS TO A CRIME who was intentionally killed for the 
purpose of preventing his testimony in any criminal proceeding, and the killing was not 
committed during the commission, or attempted commission or the crime to which he 
was a witness; or the victim was a witness to a crime and was intentionally killed in 
retaliation for his testimony in any criminal proceeding. 
(11) The victim was a PROSECUTOR or assistant prosecutor or a former prosecutor or 
assistant prosecutor of any local or state prosecutor’s office in this state or any other 
state, or of a federal prosecutor’s office and the murder was carried out in retaliation 
for or to prevent the performance of the victim’s official duties. 
(12) The victim was a JUDGE or former judge of any court of record in the local, state 
or federal system in the State of California or in any other state of the United States 
and the murder was carried out in retaliation for or to prevent the performance of the 
victim’s official duties. 
(13) The victim was an elected or appointed official or former [OFFICIAL OF THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, A LOCAL OR STATE GOVERNMENT OF CALIFORNIA], or of 
any local or state government of any other state in the United States and the killing was 
intentionally carried out in retaliation for or to prevent the performance of the victim’s 
official duties. 
(14) The murder was especially HEINOUS, ATROCIOUS, OR CRUEL, manifesting 
exceptional depravity. As utilized in this section, the phrase “especially heinous, 
atrocious or cruel manifesting exceptional depravity” means a conscienceless, or 
pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim. 
(15) The defendant intentionally killed the victim while LYING IN WAIT. 
(16) The victim was intentionally KILLED BECAUSE OF HIS RACE, COLOR, RELIGION, 
NATIONALITY OR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN. (17) The murder was committed while the 
defendant was engaged in or was AN ACCOMPLICE [NO INTENT REQUIRED] in the 
commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing or 
attempting to commit the following felonies [FELONY MURDER]: 
  [18] (i) ROBBERY in violation of Section 211. 
  [19] (ii) KIDNAPPING in violation of Sections 207 and 209. 
  [20] (iii) RAPE in violation of Section 261. 
  [21] (iv) SODOMY in violation of Section 286. 
  [22] (v) The performance of a LEWD OR LASCIVIOUS ACT UPON PERSON OF A CHILD 
UNDER THE AGE OF 14 in violation of Section 288. 
  [23] (vi) ORAL COPULATION in violation of Section 288a. 
  [24] (vii) BURGLARY in the first or second degree in violation of Section 460. 
  [25] (viii) ARSON in violation of Section 447. 
  [26] (ix) TRAINWRECKING in violation of Section 219. 
[27] (18) The murder was intentional and involved the infliction of TORTURE. For the 
purpose of this section torture requires proof of the infliction of extreme physical pain 
no matter how long its duration. [28] (19) The defendant intentionally killed the victim 
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twelve special circumstances, for a total of 28. 360 The additional 
circumstances that would make a person convicted of first degree 
murder eligible for the death penalty can be summarized as follows: 
Victim Special Circumstances: (1) federal officer; (2) fireman; 
(3) prosecutor; (4) judge; and (5) federal or state official. 
Felony Murder Special Circumstances: (6) sodomy; (7) oral 
copulation; (8) arson; and (9) trainwrecking. 
“Means” Special Circumstances: (10) destructive device, bomb 
or explosive through the mail; (11) lying in wait; and (12) poison. 
“Motive” Special Circumstances: (13) to avoid arrest or escape; 
and (14) “hate” motive. 
“Catchall” Special Circumstance: (15) murder that was 
“especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional 
depravity.” 
Accomplice Special Circumstance: (16) “eliminate[ed] the 
‘personal presence’ and ‘physical aid’ requirements generally 
applicable under the 1977 law.” 361 
“[T]he Briggs Initiative [also] substantially broadened the 
definitions of prior special circumstances, most significantly by 
eliminating the across-the-board intent to kill requirement of the 
1977 law.” 362 
In May 1978, Andrew Edward Robertson became the first 
 
by the administration of POISON.  
(b) Every person whether or not the actual killer found guilty of intentionally aiding, 
abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing, soliciting, requesting, or assisting any 
actor in the commission of murder in the first degree shall suffer death or confinement 
in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole, in any case in which 
one or more of the special circumstances enumerated in paragraphs (1), (3), (4), (5), 
(6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), or (19) of subdivision 
(a) of this section has been charged and specially found under Section 190.4 to be true. 
1990 CAL. STAT. 115, § 10 (codified as amended CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2) (emphasis added), 
available at http://library.uchastings.edu/cgi-bin/starfinder/0?path=calprop.txt&id=webber& 
pass=webber&OK=OK. 
 360. CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF SPECIAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES IN CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY CASES 15 (2008), available at 
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/dp/expert/Kreitzberg.pdf. 
 361. Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 334, at 1313 n.163 (“With respect to murderers other than 
actual killers, the prosecution still was required to prove an intent to kill.” (citing CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 190.2(b) (West 1988) (repealed 1990)). 
 362. Id. at 1313. “Under the Briggs Initiative, the majority of the special circumstances, 
including the felony murder circumstances, were applicable even in the absence of proof that the 
murder was intentional.” Id. at 1313 nn.161–62 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17); 1977 
Cal. Stat. 316(c); People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d 1306, 1325 (Cal. 1987) (holding that “intent to 
kill is not an element of the felony murder special circumstance”)). 
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person sentenced to die under California’s 1977 death penalty 
statute. 363 As noted in the Overview part, supra, Mr. Robertson died 
in prison of natural causes on August 22, 1998, after spending more 
than 20 years on death row. 364 At the time of his death, his § 2254 
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed in 1990, was still pending 
in the federal district court for the Central District of California. 
With no organized opposition, polls showed that as of 
September 20, 1978, Proposition 7 was “leading 8.3-to-9 percent.” 365 
The Argument in Favor of Proposition 7 read: 
MURDER. PENALTY—INITIATIVE STATUTE 
Argument in Favor of Proposition 7 
 CHARLES MANSON, SIRHAN SIRHAN, THE 
ZODIAC KILLER, THE SKID-ROW SLASHER, THE 
HILLSIDE STRANGLER. 
 These infamous names have become far too familiar to 
every Californian. They represent only a small portion of 
the deadly plague of violent crime which terrorizes law-
abiding citizens. 
 Since 1972, the people have been demanding a tough, 
effective death penalty law to protect our families from 
ruthless killers. But, every effort to enact such a law has 
been thwarted by powerful anti-death penalty politicians in 
the State Legislature. 
 In August of 1977, when the public outcry for a capital 
punishment law became too loud to ignore, the anti-death 
penalty politicians used their influence to make sure that the 
death penalty law passed by the State Legislature was as 
weak and ineffective as possible. 
 That is why 470,000 concerned citizens signed 
petitions to give you the opportunity to vote on this new, 
tough death penalty law. 
 Even if the President of the United States were 
 
 363. ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 3, 1978 (on file with authors) (discussing Gregory Michael 
Teron Jr.’s sentence and revisions to California’s death penalty law). Teron, 24, was sentenced to 
death before Robertson, but the California Supreme Court vacated his sentence because it was 
based on Teron having committed a prior murder in 1975, before the effective date of California’s 
1977 statute, August 11, 1977. People v. Teron, 588 P.2d 773, 775 (Cal. 1979). 
 364. Mr. Robertson is the 26th inmate listed in the Overview’s sidebar, supra pages S58, S60. 
 365. Lou Cannon, Poll Shows Californians Support Controversial Initiatives, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 20, 1978, at A1. 
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assassinated in California, his killer would not receive the 
death penalty in some circumstances. Why? Because the 
Legislature’s weak death penalty law does not apply. 
Proposition 7 would. 
 If Charles Manson were to order his family of drug-
crazed killers to slaughter your family, Manson would not 
receive the death penalty. Why? Because the Legislature’s 
death penalty law does not apply to the master mind of a 
murder such as Manson. Proposition 7 would. 
 And, if you were to be killed on your way home 
tonight simply because the murderer was high on dope and 
wanted the thrill, that criminal would not receive the death 
penalty. Why? Because the Legislature’s weak death 
penalty law does not apply to every murderer. Proposition 7 
would. 
 Proposition 7 would also apply to the killer of a judge, 
a prosecutor, or a fireman. It would apply to a killer who 
murders a citizen in cold blood because of his race or 
religion or nationality. And, it would apply to all situations 
which are covered by our current death penalty law. 
 In short, your YES vote on Proposition 7 will give 
every Californian the protection of the nation’s toughest, 
most effective death penalty law. 366 
 A long and distinguished list of judges and law 
enforcement officials have agreed that Proposition 7 will 
provide them with a powerful weapon of deterrence in their 
war on violent crime. 
 Your YES vote on Proposition 7 will help law 
enforcement officials stop violent crime—NOW. 367 
Proposition 7 was approved by 71.1% of voters. 368 Passage of 
the Briggs Initiative amended Penal Code section 190 and did not 
 
 366. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, NOVEMBER 1978, supra note 10, at 34. 
 367. Id. The Argument in Favor was signed by State Senator John Briggs, Donald H. Heller, a 
former federal prosecutor, and the President of the California Sheriffs’ Association Duane Lowe. 
In the Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 7 the proponents reiterated that “[t]his citizen’s 
initiative will give your family the protection of the strongest, most effective death penalty law in 
the nation.” Id. at 35 (emphasis added). The full text of the proposed law, reprinted in the Voter 
Information Guide, was over five pages in length, single-spaced. 
 368. Abbreviated Listing, Proposition 7, California Ballot Propositions (1911–Present), 
http://library.uchastings.edu/cgi-bin/starfinder/17676/calprop.txt (last visited June 4, 2011). 
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give the legislature authority to amend the section without voter 
approval. 369 Every change to section 190 must be voted on and 
passed by the people. 370 In the “Official Title and Summary Prepared 
by the Attorney General,” voters were told: “Financial impact: 
Indeterminable future increase in state costs.” 371 The Fiscal Effect 
statement on the ballot stated, in part: “We estimate that, over time, 
this measure would increase the number of persons in California 
prisons, and thereby increase the cost to the state of operating the 
prison system. . . . There could also be an increase in the number of 
executions as a result of this proposition, offsetting part of the 
increase in the prison population.” 372 
e.  The 1990 initiatives: Propositions 114 and 115—Five more 
special circumstances, 33 death-eligible crimes 
By 1990, there were 279 inmates on death row. 373 While there 
had been 11 deaths of condemned inmates on death row due to 
natural causes and suicides between 1980 and 1991, not a single 
execution occurred during that time period. 374 
On June 5, 1990, voters passed an initiative referred to as 
Proposition 114. It was the first change to California’s death penalty 
law since the Briggs Initiative was passed. 375 Proposition 114 
increased the list of death-eligible crimes to include crimes against 
an increased number and type of the peace officers originally set 
forth under the Briggs Initiative. 376 The Fiscal Impact Statement on 
 
 369. See id.  
 370. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 252, at 79. 
 371. Id. at 32. 
 372. Id. at 33 (emphasis added). 
 373. See supra text accompanying note 239. 
 374. INMATES EXECUTED, 1978 TO PRESENT, supra note 17. 
 375. 1989 Cal. Stat. 1165, § 16 (codified as amended CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(7)), 
available at http://library.uchastings.edu/cgi-bin/starfinder/0?path=calprop.txt&id=webber& 
pass=webber&OK=OK. 
 376. The Voter Information Guide explained: 
  Since 1978, there have been no changes to the Death Penalty Initiative. The 
Legislature, however, has amended the Penal Code. These amendments have resulted 
in some persons being deleted from, and other persons being added to, the definition of 
a peace officer. These persons include various employees of the state and local 
governments. 
PROPOSAL 
  By reference, this measure would incorporate the legislative changes in the 
definition of a peace officer into the provisions of the 1978 Death Penalty Initiative. As 
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the ballot stated: “This measure increases the number of crimes for 
which the special circumstances for first degree murder may apply. 
To the extent these changes result in longer prison terms, there will 
be unknown increases in state costs.” 377 The initiative was approved 
by 71.12% of the persons who turned out to vote at that election. 378 
Proposition 115 was on the same ballot as Proposition 114. 379 
This initiative was known as the Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, 
and it proposed “mak[ing] numerous significant and complex 
changes in criminal law and in the judicial procedures that must be 
followed in criminal cases.” 380 Proposition 115 expanded the 
definition of first degree murder and increased the total number of 
death-eligible offenses to 33. Section 190.2 was revised to make five 
new crimes punishable by death: first degree murder when (1) “[t]he 
victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally killed for the 
purpose of preventing . . . testimony in any . . . juvenile proceeding”; 
 
a result, this measure expands the number and types of peace officers the murder of 
whom would be a special circumstance under the 1978 Death Penalty Initiative. 
FISCAL EFFECT 
  This measure increases the number of crimes for which the special circumstances 
for first-degree murder may apply. To the extent these changes result in longer prison 
terms, there will be unknown increases in state costs. 
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA PRIMARY ELECTION, JUNE 5, 1990: BALLOT PAMPHLET 28 
(1990) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, JUNE 1990] (emphasis added), available at 
http://holmes.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1990p.pdf. 
 377. Id. 
 378. California Ballot Propositions (1911–Present), supra note 333. 
 379. The text of the proposed bill stated, in part: 
  SECTION 1. (a) We the people of the State of California hereby find that the rights 
of crime victims are too often ignored by our courts and by our State Legislature, that 
the death penalty is a deterrent to murder, and that comprehensive reforms are needed 
in order to restore balance and fairness to our criminal justice system. 
  (b) In order to address these concerns and to accomplish these goals, we the people 
further find that it is necessary to reform the law as developed in numerous California 
Supreme Court decisions and as set forth in the statutes of this state. These decisions 
and statutes have unnecessarily expanded the rights of accused criminals far beyond 
that which is required by the United States Constitution, thereby unnecessarily adding 
to the costs of criminal cases, and diverting the judicial process from its function as a 
quest for truth. 
  (c) The goals of the people in enacting this measure are to restore balance to our 
criminal justice system, to create a system in which justice is swift and fair, and to 
create a system in which violent criminals receive just punishment, in which crime 
victims and witnesses are treated with care and respect, and in which society as a 
whole can be free from the fear of crime in our homes, neighborhoods, and schools. 
  (d) With these goals in mind, we the people do hereby enact the Crime Victims 
Justice Reform Act. 
Id. at 33. 
 380. Id. at 32. 
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the felony murder occurred during the commission of an additional 
category of (2) robbery; or (3) kidnapping; the felony murder 
occurred in the commission of a newly added felony of (4) mayhem, 
or (5) rape by instrument. 381 
Proposition 115 also 
expanded the liability of felony murder accomplices, 
eliminating the intent to kill element and requiring only that 
the accomplice meet the constitutional threshold established 
by Enmund [v. Florida 382] and Tison [v. Arizona 383]: that 
the accomplice have acted with “reckless indifference to 
human life and as a major participant” in a special 
circumstance felony. 384 
The Fiscal Impact Statement on the Voter Information Guide for 
Proposition 115 stated that 
[t]he net fiscal effect of this measure is unknown. The 
measure makes several significant changes to the criminal 
justice system. How the measure will be implemented and 
interpreted is unknown. There may be only a minor fiscal 
impact on state and local governments, or there may be a 
major fiscal impact. 385 
The initiative was approved by 57.03% of voters. 386 
By 1992, two years after Propositions 114 and 115 were passed, 
there were 345 prisoners on death row. 387 On April 21, 1992, 
California executed Robert Alton Harris. 388 He was the first prisoner 
executed following the adoption of the 1978 death penalty initiative. 
 
 381. Id.; Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, Stats 1989 Cal. Stat. 1165, § 16 (codified as 
amended CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1990)). In Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 
1990), the California Supreme Court concluded that some provisions of Prop 115, not related to 
the death penalty, were invalid because they constituted a revision to the California Constitution, 
rather than an amendment. Id. The provisions concerning the death penalty were upheld and 
remain in effect. 
 382. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 383. 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
 384. Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 334, at 1315 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 
(1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987)). 
 385. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, JUNE 1990, supra note 376, at 33. 
 386. BALLOTPEDIA, ballotpedia.org (last visited June 4, 2011). 
 387. NCJRS Abstract, NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., www.ncjrs.gov/App/ 
publications/abstract.aspx?ID=146472 (last visited June 4, 2011). 
 388. Capital Punishment, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/ 
Capital_Punishment/inmates_executed/robertHarris.html (last visited June 4, 2011). 
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“With his death, came the lifting of a psychological barrier to the use 
of capital punishment in California.” 389 The following year, on 
August 24, 1993, David Edwin Mason became the second person 
executed since 1978, after spending nine years, seven months on 
death row. 390 
By 1994, the Judicial Council was having difficulty attracting 
private attorneys to accept capital appeal appointments, and there 
was a serious “backlog in death penalty appeals” developing, with 
condemned inmates waiting up to three years for the appointment of 
counsel to represent them in their automatic appeals. 391 Over the next 
two years, California added more than 170 prisoners to death row for 
a total of 461 prisoners in 1996, at which time two more executions 
were carried out. 392 
f.  The 1996 initiatives: Propositions 195 and 196— 
Three more special circumstances, 36 death-eligible crimes 
In 1996, voters passed two initiatives, Propositions 195 and 196, 
which added three more special circumstances: felony murder 
carjacking, murder of a juror, and murder by discharging a firearm 
from a motor vehicle (drive-by shooting). The Fiscal Impact 
Statement for Proposition 195 in the Voter Information Guide stated 
that there would be “[p]robably minor additional state costs.” 393 The 
initiative was approved by 85.82% of voters. 394 The Fiscal Impact 
Statement on the Voter Information Guide discussing Proposition 
196 stated that “[a]doption of this measure would result in unknown 
state costs, potentially ranging into several millions of dollars 
 
 389. John H. Culver & Chantel Boyens, Political Cycles of Life and Death: Capital 
Punishment as Public Policy in California, 65 ALB. L. REV. 991, 1006 (2002). 
 390. INMATES EXECUTED, 1978 TO PRESENT, supra note 17. 
 391. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 136. “In January 1994, in an attempt to 
recruit additional private counsel, the Judicial Council was authorized to pay attorneys based on 
either an hourly rate or a fixed-fee basis.” Id. 
 392. See INMATES EXECUTED, 1978 TO PRESENT, supra note 17. William George Bonin was 
executed on February 23, 1996, after 13 years, one month on death row; Keith Daniel Williams 
was executed on May 3, 1996, after 17 years on death row. Id. See supra note 239 (stating that 
there were 461 inmates on death row in 1996). 
 393. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA PRIMARY ELECTION, MARCH 26, 1996: BALLOT 
PAMPHLET 20 (1996) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, MARCH 1996], available at 
http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1996p.pdf. 
 394. 1995 Cal. Stat. 477, § 1, available at http://library.uchastings.edu/cgi-bin/starfinder/0? 
path=calprop.txt&id=webber&pass=webber&OK=OK. 
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annually in the long run.” 395 The Legislative Analyst explained, 
however, that since  
state law already permits carjackers or carjack-kidnappers 
who commit first-degree murder to be charged with robbery 
or kidnapping, thereby subjecting them to the harsher 
penalties for special circumstance crimes[,] . . . the changes 
in the law made by this measure explicitly listing those two 
crimes as special circumstances are likely to result [only] in 
minor additional incarceration costs. 396 
Additionally, Proposition 195 stated that “[t]he provision of this 
measure designating the first-degree murder of a juror as a special 
circumstance crime is likely to have little fiscal effect because such 
crimes occur infrequently. In summary, we estimate that the measure 
would probably result in minor additional state costs.” 397 
Earlier in 1996, in an attempt to address the increasingly serious 
backlog in death penalty appeals, three bills were introduced in the 
Legislature to overhaul the system for appointing counsel in capital 
cases, including one bill to establish an Office of Postconviction 
Counsel that would be charged with “represent[ing] indigent persons 
convicted and sentenced to death for the purpose of instituting and 
prosecuting postconviction actions in the state and federal courts and 
challenging the legality of the judgment or sentence imposed.” 398 
 
 395. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, MARCH 1996, supra note 393, at 24. 
 396. Id. at 21. 
 397. Id. 
 398. S.B. 1533, 1996 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/95-
96/bill/sen/sb_1501-1550/sb_1533_cfa_960709_163253_asm_comm.html. The Legislative 
Analyst discusses the three bills as follows: 
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS CONSIDERED LAST YEAR 
  Three bills were introduced last session (one of which was enacted) as vehicles for 
the Governor’s proposal to make significant changes in the handling of death penalty 
appeals. The proposed changes included procedural changes for the appeal process and 
changes in the process for appointing counsel. 
  Procedural Changes. Chapter 1086, Statutes of 1996 (AB 195, Morrow), sets forth 
new statutory guidelines for the trial court record certification process. Trial court 
records in death penalty cases are often longer than 10,000 pages and can reach 90,000 
pages. As Figure 1 shows, currently the process of correction and certification of the 
record can take up to five years. The changes are intended to expedite the record 
certification process by setting specific time lines for the completion and correction of 
the record soon after completion of the trial. 
  Attorney Appointment Process. Two other bills, which were not enacted, would 
have changed the manner in which counsel are appointed for indigent persons 
convicted and sentenced to death. These changes would have made the California 
appointment process similar to the Florida process. Under the proposal, there would 
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None of the legislation was passed.  
In a 1997 report to the Legislature, the Legislative Analyst 
summarized the “Backlog of Death Penalty Appeals” 399 problem as 
follows: 
 The large number of inmates on death row who are 
awaiting appointment of defense counsel raises questions 
about the process by which the state provides legal 
representation for indigent criminal defendants. Without an 
attorney, an inmate’s appeal to the Supreme Court—which 
is required under the state’s death penalty law—cannot go 
forward. Although the Legislature considered several bills 
last year that were designed to reduce the backlog, the 
budget proposes no comprehensive strategy to reduce the 
backlog of these appointments in 1997–98. The Legislature 
will need to consider factors of cost, efficiency, and quality 
of legal representation when considering alternative 
solutions for this growing problem. 
. . . . 
WHAT CAN THE LEGISLATURE DO? 
 Several potential options are available to the 
Legislature for reforming the capital appellate process in 
order to reduce the backlog of inmates on death row 
without legal representation. Issues concerning the 
availability of qualified counsel and the cost efficiency of 
the current appellate services will be important for the 
Legislature to consider. 
 
have been two separate entities, one for state and federal habeas corpus claims and the 
other for direct appeals. Senate Bill 1533 (Calderon) would have created a new state 
agency, the Office of Post Conviction Counsel. The primary responsibility for the 
office would have been to handle both state and federal habeas petitions, as is done by 
the Capital Collateral Representative’s Office in Florida. 
  A companion bill, AB 2008 (K. Murray) provided that the primary responsibilities 
for the SPD would be for automatic appeals of death penalty cases. The intent of this 
legislation was to expand the SPD’s responsibilities to eventually handle all the direct 
capital appeals so that the hiring of private counsel would no longer be necessary. The 
proposal included provisions for the SPD to begin a training program for attorneys and 
also increased pay for private attorneys taking new appointments to $125 per hour. 
Under the bill, private counsel would have continued to take cases in order to help 
reduce the growing backlog of cases. The Governor vetoed AB 2008 because SB 1553 
was not enacted by the Legislature. 
LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 136. 
 399. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 136. 
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 The Legislature has been concerned about the backlog 
of inmates on death row without legal representation. 
Without an attorney, which is guaranteed by the 
Constitution, an inmate’s appeal to the Supreme Court—
which is required under the state’s death penalty law—
cannot go forward. The current delays in appointing 
attorneys to these cases place serious burdens on many 
parties—the inmates, the families of victims, the Attorney 
General (who handles the appeal for the state), and law 
enforcement and criminal justice officials who prosecuted 
the original case. 
 Reducing the backlog of cases without legal 
representation will not be easy. This is because the size of 
the backlog is large. Given that there are only 132 attorneys 
currently handling these cases statewide, the Legislature 
should consider options which may attract more attorneys 
to take cases. This could prove difficult, however, because 
many attorneys will not meet the Judicial Council’s 
minimum qualifications and most qualified attorneys can 
only handle one case at a time. In addition, the cases are 
frequently very long, complex, and generally unattractive. 
. . . . 
 Conclusion: As we indicated earlier, the budget does 
not contain any proposals to reduce the backlog of inmates 
on death row without attorneys. There are several options 
that the Legislature could consider if it wishes to address 
this problem, including changes in qualifications and pay of 
attorneys, expansion of existing programs, and creation of 
new state entities. It is not clear, however, that any option 
will reduce the backlog in the near term. 400 
By 1998, the “growing backlog of death penalty cases” 
prompted California Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk to “urge[] 
state senators to approve an amendment to the California 
Constitution to create two Supreme Courts—one for civil cases, the 
other for criminal appeals.” 401 There was also a significant shortage 
 
 400. Id. 
 401. Gerald Uelmen, Commentary, Bigger Court Won’t Be Speedier; Death Appeals: 
Splitting the State High Court into Two Divisions and Adding Justices Would Create Confusion, 
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of qualified counsel to handle death penalty appeals and capital state 
habeas corpus litigation. 402 “More than 150 of the 500 occupants of 
California’s death row still lack counsel to handle their appeals.” 403 
The Chief Justice at the time, Ronald M. George, “persuad[ed] the 
Legislature to fund a new Habeas Corpus Resource Center to 
expedite the handling of habeas claims concurrently with direct 
appeals.” 404 In 1998, the Legislative Analyst reported that “the 
Legislature and Governor enacted Chapter 869, Statutes of 1997 
(S.B. 513, Lockyer), which changed the process for appointing 
counsel to death penalty appeals cases and provided for the creation 
of the [HCRC].” 405 While the Legislature committed additional 
resources to reducing the backlog of death penalty appeals, the 
Legislative Analyst recommended that “Continuing Legislative 
Oversight [Was] Needed”: 406 
 We recommend that the Office of the State Public 
Defender report at budget hearings on its development of 
attorney training programs and the implementation of 
automated case management systems and attorney 
workload standards. In addition, we recommend that the 
Legislature adopt supplemental report language directing 
the newly created California Habeas Resource Center to 
provide the same information. 
 The Legislature has been concerned about the backlog 
of inmates on death row without legal representation. 
Without an attorney, which is guaranteed by the 
Constitution, an inmate’s appeal to the Supreme Court—
which is required under the state’s death penalty law—
cannot go forward. The current delays in appointing 
attorneys to these cases place serious burdens on many 
 
L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1998, at M5. 
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. 
 404. Id. The Habeas Corpus Resource Center was established in 1998 as a part of the judicial 
branch of the State of California to accept appointments in state and federal habeas corpus 
proceedings and to provide training and support for private attorneys who take on these cases. See 
CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 68660–64 (West 2010). 
 405. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, supra note 136. 
 406. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, Crosscutting: Reforming California’s Adult Parole 
System (last visited May 30, 2011), http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_1998/crim_justice_ 
crosscutting_anl98.html. 
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parties—the inmates, the families of victims, and law 
enforcement and criminal justice officials who prosecuted 
the original case. 407 
On July 14, 1998, Thomas M. Thompson was executed after 14 
years, one month on death row; on February 9, 1999, Jaturun 
Siripongs was executed after 15 years, nine months on death row; 
and, on May 4, 1999, Manuel Babbitt was executed after spending 16 
years, 10 months on death row, bringing the total number of persons 
executed in California in the 20 years since 1978 to seven. 408 
g.  1999: Proposed initiative to abolish the death penalty 
By the end of 1999, there were 558 prisoners on California’s 
death row, including over 100 who had been on death row for 15 
years or longer. A private citizen proposed a constitutional 
amendment that would abolish the death penalty in California and 
commute the sentences of those prisoners on death row to “life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.” 409 For reasons that 
are unclear from the legislative record, the initiative failed to qualify 
and was thus not presented to the voters. It is interesting to note, 
however, that in analyzing the proposed initiative’s effects, the 
Legislative Analyst addressed cost issues related to the 
administration of the death penalty in California that it had failed to 
raise in its prior analyses of other initiatives that expanded the death 
penalty’s scope. In its letter of September 9, 1999, to Attorney 
General Bill Lockyer analyzing the proposed amendment’s fiscal 
effects, the Legislative Analyst stated: 
This measure would amend the California Constitution to 
prohibit the imposition of the death penalty as the penalty 
for any crime punished by the state. The measure also 
specifies that offenders under a sentence of death at the 
 
 407. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 408. INMATES EXECUTED, 1978 TO PRESENT, supra note 17; N.Y. STATE DEFENDERS ASS’N, 
DEATH PENALTY ARCHIVES 47 (2008), available at http://www.nysda.org/08_ 
DeathPenaltyAll.pdf (“In California the federal court’s distrust of the state’s highest court has 
resulted in lengthy reviews of death sentences, reducing the number of people executed to a 
trickle.”) (citing A Failure to Execute: More Than 100 Inmates Have Sat on California’s Death 
Row for 15 Years or Longer, RECORDER, Dec. 16, 1999). 
 409. Alex Jacinto, Abolition of the Death Penalty: Initiative Constitutional Amendment, Sec. 
of State No. 854, Attorney Gen. No. SA1999RF0031 (1999), available at 
http://library.uchastings.edu/library/california-research/ca-ballot-measures.html (follow 
“California Ballot Initiatives Database” hyperlink) 
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time of this measure’s enactment would not be executed 
and would instead serve a prison term of life without the 
possibility of parole. 
. . . . 
BACKGROUND 
. . . . 
 As of May 1999, 537 offenders had received a death 
sentence and had been transferred to “death row” at San 
Quentin State Prison to await execution. By law, death 
penalty verdicts are automatically appealed to the 
California Supreme Court; also, such cases ordinarily 
involve an extensive series of appeals both to state and 
federal courts. 
 Both the state and county governments incur costs for 
murder trials, including costs for the courts, prosecution, 
and defense of indigent persons charged with murder. The 
state also incurs costs for death penalty appeals both for 
prosecution of such cases and for defense of indigent 
persons. 410 
 As of May 1999, the California Supreme Court had 
affirmed 189 death sentences under the automatic appeal 
process. Many additional cases remain pending in the 
courts. Seven persons have been executed since the current 
death penalty law was enacted in 1978. 
FISCAL EFFECT 
 The measure would have a number of fiscal effects on 
the state and local governments. The major fiscal effects are 
discussed below. 
 Murder Trial Costs. Elimination of the death penalty 
could result in reduced court time and workload in two 
ways. First, some murder cases may be resolved by guilty 
pleas instead of going to trial. Second, for some of those 
murder cases that do proceed to trial, the time it takes to try 
them could be shortened. For example, jury selection for 
 
 410. Letter from Elizabeth G. Hill to Bill Lockyer, supra note 104 (emphasis added). The 
information in this letter was never seen by the voters because the initiative failed to qualify for 
the ballot. One wonders, however, why the Legislative Analyst Office never presented such 
detailed analysis in discussing prior initiatives that proposed expanding the scope of the death 
penalty, instead stating that such costs were “unknown.” 
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some capital cases could be shortened by as much as three 
or four weeks. 
 As a result, this measure is likely to result in a 
reduction in costs to the state for support of the trial courts, 
as well as a reduction in costs to counties for prosecution 
and representation of indigent defendants charged with 
murder. The magnitude of the savings to the state and local 
governments is unknown, but could potentially range from 
the millions to the low tens of millions of dollars annually 
on a statewide basis. 
 These savings would be offset to the extent that 
prohibition of the death penalty eliminated an incentive for 
some offenders to reach plea agreements with county 
district attorneys in some murder cases. Some murder cases 
are being resolved with an offender’s plea to a murder 
charge in trade for an agreement by the district attorney not 
to seek the death penalty. If the death penalty is prohibited 
and these cases go to trial instead of being resolved through 
plea agreements, additional state and local governmental 
costs for support of courts, prosecution, and defense could 
result. The magnitude of these offsetting costs is unknown. 
 Prohibition of the death penalty might also reduce 
expenditures by state and local law enforcement agencies 
on such cases, in part because law enforcement personnel 
are often key witnesses in murder trials. The amount of this 
potential expenditure decrease is unknown. 
 County Jail Costs. Persons held for trial on murder 
charges, particularly cases that could result in a death 
sentence, ordinarily remain in custody in county jail until 
the completion of their trial and sentencing. As some 
murder cases are expedited or eliminated due to the 
prohibition on capital punishment, as discussed above, the 
transfer of persons convicted of murder from county jail to 
state prison would be accelerated, thus reducing the costs 
for operation of county jails. The magnitude of the savings 
is unknown but could amount to as much as several 
millions of dollars annually statewide. 
 Appellate Litigation Costs. Eventually, the measure 
would likely reduce current annual state expenditures by the 
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state Department of Justice, the Office of the State Public 
Defender, the Habeus [sic] Corpus Resource Center, and 
the Court-Appointed Counsel program for the costs of 
litigating capital punishment appeals. These costs currently 
amount to about $35 million annually. However, 
expenditure of part of this $35 million for capital 
punishment litigation would probably continue until the 
courts determined how to procedurally resolve all past and 
pending cases involving death sentences. 
 The measure could also eventually result in an 
unknown reduction in expenditures by the California 
Supreme Court, potentially in the millions of dollars, by 
eliminating its workload of death penalty-related appeals. 
Any savings on the California Supreme Court workload 
could also be fully or partly offset by an increase in the 
workload for state appellate courts, which handle appeals of 
sentences of life without the possibility of parole. That is 
because there would likely be more such appeals for the 
appellate courts to handle if this measure were enacted. 
 State Correctional Costs. The enactment of this 
measure would result in an increase in state prison 
operation and construction costs because offenders who 
would otherwise have been executed would be held in state 
prisons for a much longer period of time. These additional 
costs would not occur in the near term because relatively 
few persons sentenced to death would otherwise have been 
executed due to the appeal of their cases. However, the net 
cost of imprisoning offenders for life without the possibility 
of parole, instead of sentencing them to death, could be 
significantly larger in the long term if capital cases were to 
be resolved much more quickly by the appeals courts in 
favor of allowing executions to proceed. The impact of such 
future court rulings is unknown. 
 To the extent that the enactment of this measure 
expedited murder trials and the transfer of persons 
convicted of murder from county jail to state prison, there 
could be a one-time increase in the number of convicted 
murderers into the state prison system. The operational and 
fiscal effects of this shift of offenders from county jails to 
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the state prison system would likely even out over time, 
however. 
 The enactment of this measure could also result in a 
reduction in operational and construction expenditures for 
the state’s prison system because, under prior court rulings, 
male offenders under death sentence must generally be held 
in separate cells on death row and cannot share cells with 
other inmates there. Prohibition of the death penalty might 
permit the state to move some former death row inmates to 
prison facilities where they could legally be double-celled 
with other high-security inmates at a lower security cost. 
Such a shift could generate significant one-time costs to 
modify existing prison facilities to hold former death row 
inmates, but could generate significant ongoing operational 
savings. 
 The accomplishment of such a shift would allow the 
otherwise vacant cells at the former death row to be used 
for other types of prison inmates, and allow the state to 
postpone construction of some additional prison space for 
its growing inmate population. These potential avoided 
costs are unknown, but could be in the low tens of millions 
of dollars. 
 Finally, the enactment of this measure would save the 
state the actual cost of carrying out executions. These 
savings would probably not be significant. 
Effect on Murder Rate. To the extent that the prohibition on 
the use of the death penalty has an effect on the incidence 
of murder in California, the measure could affect state and 
county government expenditures. The resulting fiscal 
impact, if any, is unknown and cannot be estimated. 
SUMMARY 
 The enactment of this measure is likely to result in 
both savings and costs to the state and local governments. 
When the full impact is realized, we estimate that the 
measure would probably result in net savings to the state of 
at least several tens of millions of dollars annually and net 
savings to local governments in the millions to tens of 
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millions of dollars annually on a statewide basis. 411 
The letter did not explain the events or factors that permitted the 
Legislative Analyst to identify and quantify so many aspects of the 
fiscal effects of the state’s capital punishment system, which had 
been up to then “[i]ndeterminable.” 412 
h.  The 2000 Initiatives: Propositions 18 and 21— 
Three more special circumstances, 39 death-eligible crimes 
In the 2000 election, voters considered whether to pass 
Proposition 18, an initiative to amend the California Penal Code to 
add kidnapping and arson by “lying in wait” to the list of death-
eligible offenses. For the first time the Legislative Analyst informed 
voters that there may be “increased state costs for appeals of 
additional death sentences.” 413 There was no mention, however, of 
increased trial costs associated with death penalty trials. There was 
no mention of the millions of dollars spent by the state to litigate 
capital habeas corpus petitions in state and federal courts, or of the 
critical shortage of counsel available to represent death row prisoners 
in the appeals and post-conviction proceedings. Nor was there any 
discussion of the considerable backlog of death penalty cases in the 
California Supreme Court; a backlog so severe that, as noted supra, 
Justice Mosk suggested that the California Constitution should be 
amended to create a separate Supreme Court to handle criminal 
appeals. 
Instead, the “Summary of the Legislative Analyst’s Estimate of 
Net State and Local Government Fiscal Impact” included in the 
Voter Information Guide stated: “Unknown, probably minor, 
 
 411. Id. 
 412. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, NOVEMBER 1978, supra note 10. 
 413. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA PRIMARY ELECTION, MARCH 7, 2000: BALLOT 
PAMPHLET 33 (2000) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, MARCH 2000], available at 
http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2000p.pdf (“This measure amends state law so that a case 
of first degree murder is eligible for a finding of a special circumstance if the murderer 
intentionally killed the victim “by means of lying in wait.” In so doing, this measure replaces the 
current language establishing a special circumstance for murders committed “while lying in 
wait.” This change would permit the finding of a special circumstance not only in a case in which 
a murder occurred immediately upon a confrontation between the murderer and the victim, but 
also in a case in which the murderer waited for the victim, captured the victim, transported the 
victim to another location, and then committed the murder. This measure also amends state law 
so that a case of first degree murder is eligible for a finding of a special circumstance if arson or 
kidnapping was committed to further the murder scheme.”). 
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additional state costs.” 414 In the section setting forth the “Argument 
Against Proposition 18,” voters were told that “[i]t costs California 
taxpayers $2 million over and above the cost of life imprisonment 
each time a murderer is sent to Death Row.” 415 The initiative was 
approved by 72.6% of voters. 416 
In that 2000 election, California voters passed another initiative, 
known as Proposition 21, which “add[ed] gang-related murder to the 
list of ‘special circumstances’ that make offenders eligible for the 
death penalty.” 417 In the Voter Information Guide, there was no 
indication in the fiscal effect analysis of what the state’s increased 
costs would be for the death penalty portion of this initiative, either 
for increased costs to house inmates on death row, or for the increase 
in capital litigation certain to follow passage of the measure. 418 The 
 
 414. Id. at 32. The full Fiscal Effect Statement stated that 
[t]his measure would increase state costs primarily as a result of longer prison terms for 
the murderers who would receive a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Also, 
there would be increased state costs for appeals of additional death sentences, which 
are automatically subject to appeal to the California Supreme Court. The magnitude of 
these costs is unknown, but is probably minor, because relatively few offenders are 
likely to be affected by this measure. 
Id. at 33. 
 415. Id. at 35. The text of the proposed law stated: “This law proposed by Senate Bill 1878 of 
the 1997–98 Regular Session (Chapter 629, Statutes of 1998) is submitted to the people in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 10 of Article II of the California Constitution. This 
proposed law amends a section of the Penal Code . . . .” Id. at 117. 
 416. Summary of Votes Cast for Offices and Measures, in CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEMENT 
OF VOTE: 2000 PRIMARY ELECTIONS, MARCH 7, 2000 (2000), at xxx, available at 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2000_primary/sum.pdf. 
 417. Id. at 46 (“This measure increases the extra prison terms for gang-related crimes to two, 
three, or four years, unless they are serious or violent crimes in which case the new extra prison 
terms would be five and ten years, respectively. In addition, this measure adds gang-related 
murder to the list of ‘special circumstances’ that make offenders eligible for the death penalty.”); 
CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, Juvenile Crime. Initiative Statute. Analysis by the Legislative Analyst, 
http://primary2000.sos.ca.gov/VoterGuide/Propositions/21analysis.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2011) 
(“The fiscal effect of these changes [proposed by the initiative] is unknown.”) 
 418. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 417. Proposition 21 had several components. Without 
specifying what costs would be incurred as a result of more condemned prisoners being housed 
on death row, and added counsel costs associated with capital litigation, the Fiscal Effect 
Statement on the voter guide stated that, as to the gang provisions which generally called for 
longer sentences for gang-related crimes, 
[t]he extra prison sentences added by the measure would result in some offenders 
spending more time in state prison, thus increasing costs to the state for operating and 
constructing prisons. The CDC estimates the measure would result in ongoing annual 
costs of about $30 million and one-time construction costs totaling about $70 million 
by 2025 to house these offenders for longer periods. 
Id. 
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proposition was approved by 62.1% of voters. 419 
3.  Cumulative Effect of Death Penalty Initiatives: 
What the Voters Were and Were Not Told 
“Nowhere is the current need for critical analysis more 
compelling than in assessing the cumulative effects of initiatives—
both direct and indirect—on the process leading to the formulation 
and implementation of [a] state[’s] fiscal policy.” 420 Under 
California’s current initiative system there is no effective mechanism 
for tracking the cumulative effect of multiple individual initiatives 
passed over a period of many years. 421 “The cumulative effect of 
what may otherwise be reasonable individual initiative enactments 
cannot be considered and fine-tuned either easily or reliably. Indeed, 
because of this characteristic, initiatives present deceptively simple 
solutions for quite complex problems.” 422 
In response to heightened concerns about increased crime in the 
state, California voters repeatedly embraced what purported to be 
“get tough on crime” policies at the ballot box, calling for tougher 
sentencing laws, including the continuous expansion of the list of 
death-eligible crimes. To the death penalty statute enacted by the 
California Legislature in 1977, which made 12 crimes “death-
eligible,” California voters have added through the initiative process 
an additional 27 crimes punishable by death. In the Voter 
Information Guide, the electorate was told that the fiscal effect 
would be: 
Proposition 17—“Financial impact: None” 423 
Proposition 7—“Financial impact: Indeterminable future 
increase in state costs” 424 
 
 419. Summary of Votes Cast for Offices and Measures, supra note 416, at xxx. 
 420. Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Difficulties in Achieving Coherent State and Local Fiscal 
Policy at the Intersection of Direct Democracy and Republicanism: The Property Tax as a Case 
in Point, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 511, 514 (2002). 
 421. See id. at 543. 
 422. Id. 
 423. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 330, at 42. This proposition amended the California 
Constitution to override the California Supreme Court’s ruling in People v. Anderson that the 
death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See id. “The adoption of this initiative 
does not involve any significant direct added state or local cost or revenue consideration.” Id. 
 424. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, NOVEMBER 1978, supra note 10, at 32. The 1978 
Briggs Initiative increased the number of special circumstances (or death-eligible) crimes from 
five to 10. Id. The Legislative Analyst stated: “We estimate that, over time, this measure would 
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Proposition 114—“unknown increases in state costs” 425 
Proposition 115—“only a minor fiscal impact on state and local 
governments, or there may be a major fiscal impact” 426 
Proposition 195—“probably result in minor additional state 
costs” 427 
Proposition 196—“unknown state costs, potentially ranging into 
several millions of dollars annually in the long run” 428 
Proposition 18—“unknown, but . . . probably minor, because 
relatively few offenders are likely to be affected by this measure” 429 
Proposition 21—“no indication that there would be costs 
associated with adding gang-related murders to the list of special 
circumstances in the Fiscal Effect analysis” 430 
In studying what the fiscal effects of these initiatives would be, 
voters were not told that among the far-reaching costs that were 
“unknown” or “indeterminable” are: 
1. Increased costs for trials in which the prosecutor is 
seeking the death penalty 
2. Increased costs for recruiting and training attorneys to 
represent death row inmates in post-conviction collateral 
proceedings 
3. Increased costs to pay appellate and state habeas corpus 
counsel 
4. Increased costs for state-funded investigation of claims 
raised in state habeas corpus proceedings 
5. Increased costs to house death row inmates 
6. Increased costs to pay for additional prison guards to 
handle the burgeoning death row population 
7. Increased costs to build a bigger condemned inmate 
housing facility 
8. Increased costs to hire additional court staff to manage 
 
increase the number of persons in California prisons, and thereby increase the cost to the state of 
operating the prison system. . . . There could also be an increase in the number of executions as a 
result of this proposition, offsetting part of the increase in the prison population.” Id. at 33 
(emphasis added). 
 425. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, JUNE 1990, supra note 376, at 28. 
 426. Id. at 32. 
 427. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, MARCH 1996, supra note 393, at 21. 
 428. Id. at 24. 
 429. CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, MARCH 2000, supra note 413, at 33. 
 430. Id. at 46. 
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the California Supreme Court docket of capital cases, 
including the automatic appeals and state habeas corpus 
petitions 
9. Increased costs to the federal taxpayers for the 
investigation of claims raised for the first time in federal 
habeas corpus proceedings filed by state death row 
inmates 
10. Increased costs to pay appointed counsel to represent 
condemned inmates in federal habeas corpus proceedings 
11. Increased costs to hire permanent staff to manage the 
federal district court dockets of capital habeas cases 
12. Increased costs for funding new federal judgeships to 
handle the increase in caseload caused by habeas corpus 
proceedings initiated by state death row inmates 
California voters who voted in favor of “get tough on crime” 
death penalty initiatives were not informed of the cost of enforcing 
these initiatives. These initiatives have expanded the type of crimes 
that authorize the imposing of capital punishment from 12 crimes in 
1978 to the present 39 types of first degree murder criminal conduct. 
We are persuaded that the electorate has been provided neither with a 
clear and honest picture of both the cumulative cost of implementing 
the death penalty in California nor with the role direct voter 
initiatives have played in creating their state’s now defunct system of 
capital punishment. Our goal in publishing the findings of our 
research is to assist the electorate in deciding whether to demand 
reforms from the Legislature or to bring direct ballot initiatives to 
repair or abolish California’s death penalty system. 
III.  HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS AHEAD: 
POTENTIAL STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ARISING 
OUT OF CALIFORNIA’S CURRENT DEATH PENALTY SCHEME 
With the hands of the executive and legislators tied by an 
initiative process that authorizes voters to enact legislation that 
cannot be vetoed by the Governor or amended or repealed by the 
Legislature, the California courts have been called upon to assume an 
increasingly important role in construing the reach of the California 
initiative process. 431 If reforms in California’s death penalty system 
 
 431. The California Supreme Court has been called upon to determine the legality of 
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are not forthcoming, it is likely that California courts will be asked to 
determine whether the capital punishment scheme created through 
the initiative process runs afoul of the California Constitution or the 
U.S. Constitution or both. 
A.  Is the Current Death Penalty Scheme 
What California Voters Intended? 
“In construing constitutional and statutory provisions, whether 
enacted by the Legislature or by initiative, the intent of the enacting 
body is the paramount consideration.” 432 Former Chief Justice 
George has commented that in reviewing a voter initiative’s validity, 
the Court’s “task is simply to interpret and apply the initiative’s 
language so as to effectuate the electorate’s intent.” 433 
Our research has uncovered no cases in which the California 
Supreme Court has been asked to determine whether the current 
death penalty scheme is what the voters “intended.” However, in 
view of the current state of California’s capital punishment system—
and the manner in which the death penalty laws have been 
implemented in California over the last 32 years—the answer to 
whether voters intended to spend $4 billion on a system that has 
resulted in no more than 13 executions, certainly must be a 
resounding “No.” 
“California courts recognize the general principle that an 
election cannot stand in the face of irregularity or illegality in the 
election process which affected the result—a departure from legal 
requirements that ‘in fact prevented “the fair expression of popular 
will.”’” 434 “This overriding principle . . . can be viewed as 
encompassing a concern about fundamental fairness or due process 
in the election procedures themselves.” 435 Deciding whether an 
 
initiatives concerning a broad spectrum of policy issues including affirmative action, term limits, 
campaign finance reform, immigrant social services, tribal gaming, gay marriage, and mandatory 
sentences for career offenders (“Three Strikes”). See e.g., Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 
287–88 (Cal. 1982). 
 432. In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744, 754 (Cal. 1985). 
 433. Robert L. v. Superior Court, 69 P.3d 951, 955 (Cal. 2003) (quoting Hi-Voltage Wire 
Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose 12 P.3d 1068, 1093 (Cal. 2000) (George, C. J., concurring and 
dissenting)). 
 434. Horwath v. City of E. Palo Alto, 261 Cal. Rptr. 108, 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (citing 
Canales v. City of Alviso, 474 P.2d 417, 422 (Cal. 1970); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 84 
P.2d 1034, 1036 (Cal. 1938); Rideout v. City of Los Angeles, 197 P. 74, 75 (Cal. 1921)). 
 435. Id. 
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initiative is defective on due process grounds 
will depend on whether the materials, in light of other 
circumstances of the election, were so inaccurate or 
misleading as to prevent the voters from making informed 
choices. . . . [C]ourts should examine the extent of 
preelection publicity. . . . The ready availability of the text 
of the ordinance, or the official dissemination and content 
of other related materials, such as arguments for or against 
the measure, will also bear on whether the statutory 
noncompliance rendered the election unfair. Finally, courts 
should take into account the materiality of the omission or 
other informational deficiency. Flaws striking at the very 
nature and purpose of the legislation are more serious than 
other, more ancillary matters. 436 
“Ballot summaries and arguments may be considered when 
determining voters’ intent.” 437 
Unquestionably, the ballot label, ballot title and summary, 
and “Fiscal Effect” analysis prepared by petitioner must 
reasonably inform the voters of the proposed measure’s 
fiscal impacts. To this end, these materials must be true and 
impartial and not argumentative. “The main purpose of 
these requirements is to avoid misleading the public with 
inaccurate information.” 438 
California Elections Code section 9087 provides that “[t]he 
Legislative Analyst shall prepare an impartial analysis of the 
measure describing the measure and including a fiscal analysis of the 
 
 436. Id. at 115. 
 437. Legislature v. Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17, 25 n.14 (Cal. 1983); see also Prof’l Eng’rs in 
California Gov’t v. Kempton, 155 P.3d 226, 239 (Cal. 2007) (citing Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17, 25 
n.14 (Cal. 1983)); Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. Bd. of Equalization, 265 Cal. Rptr. 195, 202 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1989) (“The ballot summary, arguments and analysis of Proposition 13 are of limited 
assistance [because] . . . . ‘Read as a whole, these materials present Proposition 13 as a measure 
concerned with real property tax relief for homeowners.’ Although these materials reiterate that a 
two-thirds vote of the Legislature is required to enact any change in state taxes designed to 
increase revenues, there is nothing in the ballot arguments or summaries which indicates an intent 
by the people to limit their existing power to enact tax increases by statewide statutory initiative.” 
(citation omitted)); Estate of Cirone v. Cirone, 200 Cal. Rptr. 511, 512 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)). 
 438. Taylor v. Superior Court, No. C064428, 2010 WL 928419, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 
2010) ) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. 
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1284 (Cal. 1978)) (citing CAL. ELEC. CODE 
§ 9087(a), (e) (West 2011)); see Horneff v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 79, 84 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003)). 
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measure showing the amount of any increase or decrease in revenue 
or cost to state or local government”; that the analysis “be written in 
clear and concise terms, so as to be easily understood by the average 
voter”; and that it “generally set forth in an impartial manner the 
information the average voter needs to adequately understand the 
measure.” 439 
While Elections Code section 9092 provides for a preelection 
challenge to the sufficiency of a petitioner’s fiscal analysis, 440 in 
ruling on such a challenge a respondent court is not vested with a 
wide range of discretion. 441 Instead, relief may be granted “only upon 
clear and convincing proof that the [challenged ballot materials] in 
question [are] false, misleading, or inconsistent with the 
requirements of this code.” 442 
It is clear from our research that, voting on the death penalty 
initiatives over a period of 32 years, California voters were not 
properly informed as to what the costs of expanding the imposition 
of capital punishment would be; nor were they informed of the fact 
that if the Legislature failed to provide proper funding to carry out 
those initiatives, it would result in the de facto repeal of the death 
penalty, resulting in what appears to be the weakest, least effective 
death penalty system in the nation. 
Because the California Supreme Court has never addressed this 
question, it is unclear whether the informational deficiencies in the 
Voter Information Guides concerning the real costs of implementing 
the state’s death penalty initiatives constitute “[f]laws striking at the 
very nature and purpose of the legislation, [which] are more serious 
than other, more ancillary matters.” 443 
B.  Have California’s Death Penalty Laws Created “an 
Impermissible Impairment of ‘Essential Government Functions’”? 
In People v. Frierson, 444 the defendant argued in his direct 
appeal from his conviction and sentence of death that “the 1972 
 
 439. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9087 (West 2011). 
 440. ELEC. § 9092. 
 441. See Horneff, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 83–84. 
 442. ELEC. § 9092. 
 443. Horwath v. City of E. Palo Alto, 261 Cal. Rptr. 108, 115 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
 444. 599 P.2d 587 (Cal. 1979). 
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initiative measure which adopted section 27 445 [of Article I of the 
California Constitution] was improper because it constituted a 
‘revision’ of the state charter rather than a mere ‘amendment’ 
thereof.” 446 Frierson argued that since “section 27 contemplates 
‘removal of judicial review’ of the death penalty from a carefully 
built state constitutional structure, [it results] in ‘a significant change 
in a principle underlying our system of democratic government and 
can only be accomplished by constitutional revision.’” 447 
The California Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding 
that  
“[E]ven a relatively simple enactment may accomplish such 
far reaching changes in the nature of our basic 
governmental plan as to amount to a revision . . . .” Section 
27 . . . accomplishes no such sweeping result . . . [because 
the court] retain[s] broad powers of judicial review of 
death sentences to assure that each sentence has been 
properly and legally imposed and to safeguard against 
arbitrary or disproportionate treatment. In addition, [the 
court] possess[es] unrestricted authority to measure and 
appraise the constitutionality of the death penalty under the 
federal Constitution, in accordance with the guidelines 
established by the United States Supreme Court. We are 
thus led to the conclusion that the constitutional change 
worked by section 27 is not so broad as to constitute a 
fundamental constitutional revision. 448 
Three years later, in Brosnahan v. Brown, 449 the California 
Supreme Court was asked to determine the legality of another 
initiative—Proposition 8 in the 1982 election—known as “The 
Victims’ Bill of Rights.” This initiative was broad in scope and 
“propose[d] many changes in the [California] Constitution and [its] 
statutory law that would alter criminal justice procedures, and 
 
 445. Article I, section 27 declares that “[t]he death penalty . . . shall not be deemed to be, or to 
constitute, the infliction of cruel or unusual punishments within the meaning of Article I, Section 
6 nor shall such punishment for such offenses be deemed to contravene any other provision of 
this constitution.” Frierson, 599 P.2d at 612. 
 446. Id. at 613. 
 447. Id. at 614. 
 448. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. 
of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Cal. 1978)). 
 449. 651 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1982). 
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punishments and constitutional rights.” 450 As with the numerous 
death penalty initiatives passed by the voters, in the Voter 
Information Guide that was circulated prior to election day, the 
Legislative Analyst indicated that “[t]he net fiscal effect of th[e] 
measure cannot be determined with any degree of certainty. This is 
because the fiscal effect would depend on many factors that cannot 
be predicted . . . [such as] how the criminal justice system reacts to 
 
 450. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA PRIMARY ELECTION, JUNE 8, 1982: BALLOT 
PAMPHLET 32 (1982), available at http://library.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1982p.pdf. Included in 
this one initiative were major provisions addressing issues including: 
• restitution for victims of crimes; 
• a measure adding “a section to the State Constitution declaring that students and 
staff of public elementary and secondary schools have the ‘inalienable right to 
attend campuses which are safe, secure, and peaceful’”; 
• a measure allowing the “most relevant evidence to be presented in criminal cases, 
subject to such exceptions as the Legislature may in the future enact by a two-
thirds vote”; 
• a measure “amend[ing] the State Constitution to give the courts discretion in 
deciding whether to grant bail” except “in felony cases punishable by death when 
the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is great”; 
• a “measure . . . [adding] to the State Constitution a provision requiring the 
courts—in fixing, reducing, or denying bail or permitting release without bail—to 
consider the same factors that they now are required by statute to consider in 
fixing the amount of bail,” making “protection of the public’s safety the primary 
consideration in bail determinations”; 
• a measure “prohibit[ing] the courts from releasing without bail persons charged 
with certain felonies”; 
• a “measure . . . requir[ing] the court to state for the record its reasons for deciding 
to (a) grant or deny bail or (b) release an accused person without bail”; 
• a measure “amend[ing] the State Constitution to require that information about 
prior felony convictions be used without limitation to discredit the testimony of a 
witness, including that of a defendant”; 
• a measure “that would increase prison sentences for persons convicted of 
specified felonies” by increasing the length of sentences for defendants with 
certain prior offenses; 
• a measure “prohibit[ing] the use of evidence concerning a defendant’s 
intoxication, trauma, mental illness, disease, or defect for the purpose of proving 
or contesting whether a defendant had a certain state of mind in connection with 
the commission of a crime”; 
• a “measure . . . requir[ing] that the victims of any crimes, or the next of kin of the 
victims if the victims have died, be notified of (1) the sentencing hearing and 
(2) any parole hearing (if they so request) involving persons sentenced to state 
prison or the Youth Authority”; 
• a “measure . . . [placing] restrictions on plea bargaining in cases involving 
specified felonies and offenses of driving while under the influence of an 
intoxicating substance”; and 
• a “measure . . . prohibit[ing] sending to the Youth Authority persons who were 18 
years of age or older at the time they committed murder, rape, or other specified 
felonies.” 
Id. at 32, 54–55. 
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the measure.” 451 Voters were informed, “however, [that] approval of 
the measure would result in major state and local costs.” 452 
A group of three voters and taxpayers petitioned for writs of 
mandate or prohibition, objecting “to the expenditure of public funds 
to implement” the new bill and argued that it was unconstitutional on 
several grounds. 453 The petitioners argued that the initiative proposed 
a revision, rather than an amendment, to the California 
Constitution. 454 The California Supreme Court was asked to 
determine whether the revision to the California Constitution was 
 
 451. Id. at 55. 
 452. Id. The ballot pamphlet further stated: 
[The] Department of Corrections estimate[d] that the provisions that would result in 
longer prison terms for repeat offenders would lengthen the terms of at least 1,200 
persons each year . . . [which could increase] annual state prison operating costs . . . by 
about $47 million (in 1982–83 prices) by the mid-1990s. This cost estimate assumes 
that the state’s prison population would be about 3,600 higher than under existing law. 
In addition, the state might need to spend up to $280 million (in 1982 prices) to 
construct facilities to house these additional prisoners. The construction cost estimate 
assumes that existing standards for prisons would be followed when the new facilities 
were constructed, and that the custody levels (for example, maximum security) 
required for the additional inmates would match current housing patterns. To the extent 
that some of the additional prisoners could be housed by crowding existing facilities, 
both the estimated operating and construction costs could be reduced. 
Id. at 55–56. 
 453. Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 276 (Cal. 1982). First, Petitioners objected to 
Proposition 8 as being too broad, arguing that it violated the single-subject requirement of article 
II, section 8, subdivision (d), of the California Constitution. Id. at 282–84. The California 
Supreme Court disagreed. It held that the initiative concerned the single subject of “the right to 
safety encompassed within article I, section 28, subdivision (c), [and] was intended to be, is 
aimed at, and is limited to, the single subject of safety from criminal behavior.” Id. at 281. The 
court also rejected Petitioners’ challenge that was grounded on the claim “that the proponents of 
Proposition 8 failed in several particulars to comply with the constitutionally mandated procedure 
for amending statutes.” Id. at 284. Petitioner also argued “that Proposition 8 is such a ‘drastic and 
far-reaching’ measure as to constitute a ‘revision’ of the state Constitution rather than a mere 
‘amendment’ thereof.” Id. at 288. State constitutional amendments may be passed by voter 
initiative, whereas constitutional revisions may not. Id. (citing Amador Valley Joint Union High 
Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1284 (Cal. 1978); CAL. CONST. art. XVIII) 
(“[A]lthough the voters may accomplish an amendment by the initiative process, a constitutional 
revision may be adopted only after the convening of a constitutional convention and popular 
ratification or by legislative submission to the people.”). The court held that “while Proposition 8 
does accomplish substantial changes in our criminal justice system, even in combination these 
changes fall considerably short of constituting ‘such far reaching changes in the nature of our 
basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.” Id. at 288–89 (quoting Amador, 583 P.2d at 
1286; McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 798 (Cal. 1948)). 
 454. Id. at 288; see Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 79–80 (Cal. 2009) (“[A]n amendment to 
the California Constitution may be proposed to the electorate either by the required vote of the 
Legislature or by an initiative petition signed by the requisite number of voters. A revision to the 
California Constitution may be proposed either by the required vote of the Legislature or by a 
constitutional convention (proposed by the Legislature and approved by the voters).”). 
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“invalid as an impermissible impairment of ‘essential government 
functions.’” 455 The petitioners in Brosnahan relied on authorities that 
“hold as a general proposition that ‘[t]he initiative . . . is not 
applicable where “the inevitable effect would be greatly to impair or 
wholly destroy the efficacy of some other governmental power, the 
practical application of which is essential.” 456 
The California Supreme Court rejected the Brosnahan 
petitioners’ challenge, holding as follows: 
 Petitioners conjure several supposed consequences of 
Proposition 8 which will severely impair the functioning of 
the courts, the Department of Corrections and the public 
school system. As will appear, however, none of these 
consequences is as inevitable as petitioners suggest. Indeed, 
we may assume that the courts and other agencies, 
 
 455. Brosnahan, 651 P.2d at 287. In Brosnahan v. Brown, three voter-taxpayers petitioned the 
California Supreme Court to consider whether there any “constitutional defects in the manner in 
which Proposition 8 [“The Victims’ Bill of Rights”] was submitted to the voters.” Id. at 276. 
Declaring it “the duty of the court to jealously guard [the] right of the people” [to make 
and pass laws] . . . the courts have described the initiative and referendum as 
articulating “one of the most precious rights of our democratic process” . . . . “[It] has 
long been our judicial policy to apply a liberal construction to this power wherever it is 
challenged in order that the right be not improperly annulled.” 
Id. at 289 (quoting Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 477 
(1976) (citations omitted)). The court has previously stated that “[t]he rules of construction of 
initiative enactments are the same as those for legislative enactments. The goal . . . is to determine 
and effectuate voter intent.” Williams v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 918, 925 (Ct. App. 
2001). 
 456. 651 P.2d at 287 (quoting Simpson v. Hite, 222 P.2d 225, 230 (Cal. 1950); citing 
Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001, 1012 (Cal. 1976)). The court noted that the 
principles of these cases involve local initiative or referendum measures, rather than statewide 
initiatives, and assumed, without deciding that the principles “are equally applicable to measures 
of statewide application.” Id. In a later case, the California Supreme Court decided that the 
principle does apply to statewide initiatives. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1084 (Cal. 
1990) (finding Brosnahan controlling when analyzing a statewide initiative). 
  The Brosnahan court emphasized that: 
“it is a fundamental precept of our law that, although the legislative power under our 
constitutional framework is firmly vested in the Legislature, ‘the people reserve to 
themselves the powers of initiative and referendum.’ It follows from this that, ‘“[the] 
power of initiative must be liberally construed . . . to promote the democratic 
process.”’ Indeed, as we [have] so very recently acknowledged . . . it is our solemn 
duty jealously to guard the sovereign people’s initiative power, “it being one of the 
most precious rights of our democratic process.” Consistent with prior precedent, we 
are required to resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of the exercise of this precious 
right. 
Brosnahan, 651 P.2d at 277 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 and Amador Valley Joint Union 
High Sch. Dist. v. State. Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1978)). 
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interpreting and applying the various provisions of 
Proposition 8, will approach their task with a view toward 
preserving, rather than destroying, the essential functions of 
government. 
 First, petitioners predict that the measure’s restrictions 
upon plea bargaining will have a most damaging effect 
upon already crowded court calendars. Even assuming that 
this prediction is accurate, we cannot accept petitioners’ 
underlying premise that an initiative measure which, as a 
collateral effect, may aggravate court congestion is void 
under the Simpson principle. 457 . . . No such constricting 
effect on court operations is herein presented. While plea 
bargaining may well be a useful device in reducing court 
congestion, unlike a courthouse it is really not an essential 
prerequisite to the administration of justice. Moreover, any 
effect upon the criminal justice system from restrictions 
upon plea bargaining would be largely speculative and 
would not appear on the face of Proposition 8. 458 
. . . . 
 Petitioners next predict that Proposition 8’s more 
severe sentencing provisions will increase California’s 
prison population to an extent exceeding the state budget 
for prison expenditures. Again, the point is entirely 
conjectural; one might as readily argue that the measure 
 
 457. In Simpson, the court held that an initiative measure which would have directly 
prevented a local board of supervisors from designating a site for court buildings was invalid 
because, among other adverse effects, such an initiative “could interfere with the functioning of 
the courts by depriving them of the quarters which the supervisors were bound to, and in good 
faith sought to, furnish.” Simpson, 222 P.2d at 230; see also Geiger v. Bd. of Supervisors, 313 
P.2d 545, 548–49 (Cal. 1957) (holding that a referendum to repeal local sales and use tax was 
invalid); Chase v. Kalber 153 P. 397, 400–01 (Cal. 1915) (holding that a referendum to repeal a 
street improvement ordinance was invalid). 
 458. Brosnahan, 651 P.2d at 287–88 (first and third emphases added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The court continued: 
That measure’s conditional prohibition against plea bargaining appears to apply only to 
the postindictment or postinformation stage, and only with respect to “serious felonies” 
as defined therein. Bargaining may continue with respect to lesser offenses. Moreover, 
even as to serious felonies, bargaining may proceed if material witnesses or evidence 
become unavailable, or if the plea would not substantially reduce the expected 
sentence. Finally, the Legislature by a two-thirds vote may restore plea bargaining in 
all cases. 
Brosnahan, 651 P.2d at 287. 
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will deter persons who otherwise might resort to crime, 
thereby reducing the prison population. Either contention 
involves pure guesswork . . . . 459 
The California Supreme Court has not yet been asked to 
consider whether the effect of California’s death penalty initiatives 
has been to create a law or laws that are “invalid as an impermissible 
impairment of ‘essential government functions.’” 460 
In view of the Court’s decision in Frierson, upholding the 
constitutionality of section 27 on the ground that the court “retain[s] 
broad powers of judicial review of death sentences to assure that 
each sentence has been properly and legally imposed and to 
safeguard against arbitrary or disproportionate treatment,” 461 an 
argument could be made that, despite the fact that the California 
Supreme Court retains “the power of judicial review of death 
sentences,” it appears that the Court may no longer be able to fulfill 
its duty to review death sentences in a manner that respects 
fundamental due process rights. 
The requirement that the California Supreme Court review the 
hundreds of death penalty appeals and habeas corpus petitions filed 
by death row inmates has had a significant and deleterious impact on 
the Court’s ability to carry out its duty to review other important 
constitutional, civil, and criminal matters. 462 The avalanche of death 
penalty appeals has not only prevented the California Supreme Court 
from reviewing important civil matters in a timely manner, but the 
extensive delays have also resulted in at least one condemned 
inmate—John Post—dying after spending nine years on death row 
before the California Supreme Court completed its review of his 
automatic appeal. 463 Thus, with respect to the appellate review 
 
 459. Id. at 288 (final emphasis added). 
 460. Id. at 287. 
 461. People v. Frierson, 599 P.2d 587, 614 (Cal. 1979) (emphasis added). 
 462. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 147. The enormous toll California’s death penalty 
initiatives have taken on the State Supreme Court has been apparent since at least 1988, when the 
number of automatic appeals from convictions and judgments of death was so overwhelming that 
it prompted California Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk to comment that: “The tragic fact is 
that important civil cases are not being heard because of the overwhelming presence of death 
penalty cases. . . . I think we have to take some drastic step . . . or civil cases will not be heard for 
years into the future and the development of civil law in California will be a casualty of the death 
penalty.” Lorie Hearn, Execution Decisions Strain Court; Other Key Issues in State Get Shunted 
Aside, Experts Warn, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 25, 1988, at A3. 
 463. See supra note 21. 
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proceedings available to Mr. Post, not only was he denied due 
process, but the backlog in the state’s high court also worked to deny 
him of all process. 
Unlike plea bargaining, which the Court held in Brosnahan was 
“not an essential prerequisite to the administration of justice” and 
thus did not serve to impair an “essential government function,” it 
could be argued that the timely review of the direct appeals of 
condemned inmates who have been sentenced to death is an 
“essential prerequisite to the administration of justice.” 464 
Unlike the “speculative” situation before the California Supreme 
Court in Brosnahan, the impending “breakdown” that California’s 
death penalty system is creating is neither “speculative” nor 
“conjectural.” The California Supreme “Court now faces a crisis, in 
which the death penalty backlog is threatening the Court’s ability to 
resolve other statewide issues of law and settle conflicts at the 
appellate level, which is its primary duty and responsibility.” 465 The 
backlogs are severe and growing worse each month. Despite its best 
efforts, there is no indication that the California Supreme Court will 
see an end to the backlog in automatic appeals from judgments of 
death in the near future. In 2010, the California Supreme Court 
issued final opinions in 23 automatic appeals, while another 33 
prisoners were sentenced to death and added to death row to begin 
their long wait for appointment of appellate counsel. 466 Even if the 
California Supreme Court abandoned its review of all other matters 
and reviewed only death penalty cases, it likely would take a 
minimum of three to four years to process the existing backlog of 
death penalty appeals and state habeas corpus petitions. 467 
 
 464. Brosnahan, 651 P.2d at 287. 
 465. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 147 (emphasis added). 
 466. E-mail from Robert Reichman to Paula Mitchell, supra note 65. Mr. Reichman reported 
that since 1978 and as of February 3, 2011, there have been 961 judgments of death entered for 
which automatic appeals have been filed. See id. During that same period the California Court of 
Appeal has issued final opinions in 549 automatic appeals. Id. 
 467. Testimony of Chief Justice Ronald M. George before the Commission on the Fair 
Administration of Justice, supra note 8, at 18–19. Chief Justice George testified before the 
Commission that in recent years, the California Supreme Court, which has seven justices, has 
issued 110 to 120 opinions per year—70 percent more than U.S. Supreme Court with nine 
justices. Id. at 7. Twenty to twenty-five percent of those opinions related to death penalty appeals 
and habeas corpus petitions. Id. Review of capital cases takes more time than reviewing issues 
presented to the Court in other cases. Id. at 7–8. There is an additional burden to review lengthy 
and complex habeas litigation, most of which do not result in written opinions but give rise to 
lengthy internal memoranda, which take substantial resources. Id. at 8. 
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C.  Is the Denial of Due Process Ever Cruel and Unusual? 
1.  Direct Appeal 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “there are important 
public interests in the process of appellate review.” 468 Thus, 
excessive delays in the appellate process may give rise to a denial of 
due process. 469 In Coe v. Thurman, 470 the Ninth Circuit explained 
that when “a state guarantees the right to a direct appeal, as 
California does, the state is required to make that appeal satisfy the 
Due Process Clause.” 471 “If ‘there is either an absence of available 
State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering 
such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner,’” a 
prisoner may seek federal habeas corpus relief without first 
exhausting the federal constitutional claims in state court. 472 The 
California Supreme Court has also acknowledged that “excessive 
appellate delays may sometimes result in a denial of due process.” 473 
To prevail on an excessive delay claim, a defendant or petitioner 
must “identify [some] concrete prejudice from the delay, such as an 
impairment of grounds for appeal.” 474 A compelling argument could 
be made that Mr. Post, who died while awaiting review of his 
automatic appeal by the California Supreme Court, suffered a 
“concrete prejudice from the delay.” 
2.  Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings 
A petition for writ of habeas corpus is not a game the law 
affords incarcerated people. It is the sole means to allow 
one whose very liberty has been deprived to thoroughly 
challenge both the procedural and substantive process. 
Because we as a society believe in the fundamental right of 
liberty of the individual, our system of government 
 
 468. United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 313 (1986). 
 469. Id. “[E]xcessive delay in the appellate process may also rise to the level of a due process 
violation.” Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 529, 530 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Antoine, 
906 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 470. 922 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 471. Id. at 530. 
 472. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988)). 
 473. People v. Anderson, 22 P.3d 347, 389 (Cal. 2001). 
 474. Id. 
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recognizes the values in making certain that a fair process 
has taken place thus preventing innocent people from 
forfeiting the right most sacred to them. The initial trial and 
appeal [have] proven in hundreds of cases not to have been 
infallible. 475 
State and federal courts have consistently held that the lengthy 
delays between capital convictions and executions that condemned 
inmates experience when seeking review of their convictions and 
habeas corpus petitions do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 476 In analyzing 
these claims, known as Lackey claims, courts have concluded that a 
petitioner facing execution cannot complain that the lengthy delay 
involved in pursuing post-conviction remedies violates the Eighth 
Amendment, because such a petitioner is considered responsible for 
the lengthy delay by virtue of having chosen that path. 477 Indeed, one 
of the few prisoners to be executed in California, Clarence Allen, 
made just such an argument before the U.S. Supreme Court, 
unsuccessfully, on the eve of his execution. 478 
 
 475. Williams v. Lockhart, 862 F.2d 155, 161 (8th Cir. 1988) (Lay, C.J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
 476. In 1995, Clarence Lackey, an inmate awaiting execution in Texas, raised a novel legal 
argument claiming that because of his lengthy wait on death row, it would be “cruel and unusual 
punishment” to execute him. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J.) (mem. 
respecting denial of certiorari). The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, but Justice Stevens 
issued a memorandum suggesting that lower courts examine the issue because there might well be 
a viable argument. See id. at 1046. This particular Eighth Amendment challenge has come to be 
known as a “Lackey claim.” It was raised again in a petition for certiorari which was denied in 
Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944 (1998). In his dissent from the denial of certiorari, Justice 
Breyer called the claim a “serious one.” Id. at 944 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). Similarly, in Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999), Justice Breyer dissented from 
denial of certiorari commenting that “[w]here a delay, measured in decades, reflects the State’s 
own failure to comply with the Constitution’s demands, the claim that time has rendered the 
execution inhuman is a particularly strong one.” Id. at 993 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
 477. See cases cited supra note 476. 
 478. See Alarcón, supra note 3, at 704–05 (“[O]n January 12, 2006, Mr. Allen’s counsel filed 
a second application for habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of California. In this application, Mr. Allen alleged that he was seventy-six years old and 
suffering from blindness, hearing loss, advanced diabetes, heart disease, complications from a 
stroke, and complications from a heart attack that left him in a wheelchair. He argued that his 
execution after his long stay on San Quentin’s death row would be cruel and unusual punishment 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court denied his application the same day it 
was filed. He filed a notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
on January 13, 2006. He also requested a certificate of appealability and a stay of execution. Both 
requests were denied on January 15, 2006. The United States Supreme Court denied Mr. Allen’s 
petition for certiorari on January 16, 2006. He was executed the following day.” (footnotes 
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The lengthy state-caused delays created by California’s defunct 
death penalty system, however, visit another type of harm on another 
group of prisoners: those who have died after languishing for many 
years on death row under sentences of death while still awaiting 
review either of their automatic appeals or of their potentially 
meritorious state or federal habeas corpus claims of constitutional 
violations. These cases are distinct and apart from those cases in 
which a condemned inmate has exhausted all of his or her post-
conviction remedies and execution is imminent. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “since the basic purpose 
of the writ is to enable those unlawfully incarcerated to obtain their 
freedom, it is fundamental that access of prisoners to the courts for 
the purpose of presenting their complaints may not be denied or 
obstructed.” 479 In addition, 
[b]y exercising the right to postconviction review, 
defendants are availing themselves of procedural 
protections that ensure the accuracy and reliability of their 
death sentences. While it is always the inmate who chooses 
to take part in postconviction litigation, it is the State that 
provides the terms and is responsible for the conditions of 
incarceration. 480 
Further, 
 
omitted)). 
  In his statement respecting the denial of certiorari in Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541 
(2009), Justice Stevens noted that it was his “strongly held view that state-caused delay in state-
sponsored killings can be unacceptably cruel.” Id. at 542 (Stevens, J., statement respecting denial 
of certiorari). Each of the petitioners in Lackey, Elledge, Knight, and Johnson, who argued that 
the lengthy delays experienced by death row inmates are cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment, had been denied relief in their state and federal habeas 
corpus proceedings and were facing imminent execution. See Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 542 and 
cases cited supra note 476. The majority of the U.S. Supreme Court does not agree with Justice 
Stevens that it is “unacceptably cruel” to require a condemned inmate to sit for decades on death 
row prior to his or her execution. See Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 544. 
 479. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969). 
Reasonable access to the courts is . . . a right [secured by the Constitution and laws of 
the United States], being guaranteed as against state action by the due process clause of 
the fourteenth amendment. In so far as access by state prisoners to federal courts is 
concerned, this right was recognized in Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549. . . . The right 
of access by state prisoners to state courts was recognized in White v. Ragen. 
Id. at 498 n.24 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 636 (9th 
Cir. 1961)) (citation omitted). 
 480. Hannah Robertson Miller, Note, “A Meaningless Ritual”: How the Lack of a 
Postconviction Competency Standard Deprives the Mentally Ill of Effective Habeas Review in 
Texas, 87 TEX. L. REV. 267, 275 (2008). 
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state action, whether through one agency or another, [must] 
be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and 
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political 
institutions and not infrequently are designated as “law of 
the land.” Those principles are applicable alike in all the 
States and do not depend upon or vary with local 
legislation. 481 
Our research has not revealed any case in which a court has been 
asked to decide whether the death penalty as it is currently 
implemented in California functionally deprives a prisoner of his due 
process right of access to the courts. Nor have we uncovered any 
California cases discussing whether there is any scenario in which 
the prejudice suffered by those prisoners who die after years of 
waiting on death row, but before their federal constitutional claims 
have been heard, could constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 482 
Alejandro Gilbert Ruiz, who was convicted and sentenced to 
death in 1980, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 1989 in 
federal court, where it remained for 18 years, and where it was still 
pending when he died in 2007. 483 Among the claims raised in Mr. 
Ruiz’s petition was the claim that he was incompetent to stand 
trial. 484 On December 21, 2006, the federal district court scheduled 
an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Ruiz’s claim that he had not been 
 
 481. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316–17 (1926). 
 482. But cf. Jones v. State, 740 So. 2d 520, 524 (Fla. 1999) (holding that a 12-year delay in 
state competency proceedings violated due process). The court in Jones noted that the 
egregious delay . . . brings to mind the criticism by Justice Breyer of the United States 
Supreme Court, who condemned excessive delays in the processing of death penalty 
appeals. Although writing in terms of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment, his comments are equally pertinent in the instant case. 
Id. (citing Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari)). 
 483. At the time of his death, Mr. Ruiz had three remaining federal habeas corpus claims 
pending before the late Honorable Florence-Marie Cooper in the U.S. District Court for the 
Central District of California. Judge Cooper’s career law clerk, Kathryn Lohmeyer, reported that 
counsel for the state of California requested that the federal proceedings be stayed because Mr. 
Ruiz’s schizophrenia and brain damage rendered him unable to effectively communicate with his 
appointed attorneys regarding his claims. On December 20, 2006, Judge Cooper denied the stay 
and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the more-than-25-year-old claim that Mr. Ruiz had not 
been competent to stand trial in 1980. The hearing date was set for April 4, 2007. Ruiz v. 
Woodford, No. 89–4126 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Minutes Setting Hearing], ECF 
No. 264 (minutes in chambers setting evidentiary hearing). Mr. Ruiz died on January 4, 2007 of 
natural causes. 
 484. Ruiz v. Woodford, No. 89-4126 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2006), ECF No. 263 (order denying 
motion for stay of federal habeas proceedings as to claim A). 
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competent to stand trial in 1980. 485 The evidentiary hearing was set 
for April 4, 2007. 486 Mr. Ruiz died on January 4, 2007, of natural 
causes. 487 
In other cases, prisoners develop debilitating physical or mental 
impairments during the decades they spend waiting to learn their 
fates from the federal courts charged with reviewing their claims of 
federal constitutional violations. These infirmities effectively render 
them unable to assist in their own defense, should the federal court 
grant them a new trial. Ralph International Thomas was convicted 
and sentenced to death on September 25, 1986. 488 The California 
Supreme Court denied Mr. Thomas’s automatic appeal and affirmed 
his conviction and sentence on April 23, 1992. 489 While the 
automatic appeal was pending, Mr. Thomas filed a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, seeking relief on 
the ground that he had received ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
during the guilt phase of his trial. 490 This claim was supported by 22 
declarations, including those of trial counsel James Chaffee, his law 
clerk and “second counsel” Susan Walsh, and wound pathology 
expert Dr. Martin Fackler. 491 The California Supreme Court denied 
the habeas petition, with neither hearing nor opinion, on 
September 4, 1991. 492 A petition for writ of certiorari was filed with 
the U.S. Supreme Court and was denied on January 11, 1993. 493 
In 1993, Mr. Thomas began his federal habeas corpus 
proceedings. 494 The California Appellate Project filed a pro forma 
petition on Mr. Thomas’s behalf in the federal district court, on 
February 18, 1993. 495 
 
 485. Minutes Setting Hearing, supra note 483. 
 486. Id. 
 487. See Ruiz v. Woodford, No. 89-4126 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2007), ECF No. 270 (order 
dismissing case with prejudice). 
 488. People v. Thomas (Ralph I.), S004729 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1986) (filed certified copy of 
judgment of death rendered). 
 489. People v. Thomas, 828 P.2d 101, 105 (Cal. 1992). 
 490. Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 13, Thomas v. Brown, No. 93–0616 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2008). 
 491. Id. 
 492. Id. 
 493. Thomas v. California, 506 U.S. 1063 (1993). 
 494. Thomas v. Brown, No. 93-0616 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 1993) ECF No. 1 (application for 
appointment of counsel and request for stay of execution). 
 495. Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 490, at 13. 
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On September 3, 1993, the Court appointed Alex Reisman 
(who had represented [Mr. Thomas] before the California 
Supreme Court) and William Snyder, Jr., to represent [Mr. 
Thomas]. Having, for the first time, adequate resources to 
do so, counsel for [Mr. Thomas] undertook a thorough 
investigation of the case and uncovered a number of 
significant, exculpatory witnesses. 496 
Fifteen years later, on January 30, 2008, following state 
exhaustion proceedings and discovery, Mr. Thomas filed his post-
exhaustion amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
federal district court. 497 On July 2, 2008, a response was filed to Mr. 
Thomas’s amended petition. 498 On January 8, 2009, Mr. Thomas 
filed a traverse. 499 On June 16, 2009, counsel for Mr. Thomas 
informed the federal district court that Mr. Thomas’s medical 
condition had taken “a serious turn for the worse” and requested that 
the court resolve Mr. Thomas’s pending petition “at the Court’s very 
earliest opportunity.” 500 
 
 496. Id. at 13–14. 
 497. Thomas v. Brown, No. 93-0616 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2008), ECF No. 221 (amended 
petition for writ of habeas corpus). 
 498. Thomas v. Brown, No. 93-0616 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2008) ECF No. 232 (response answer 
to post-exhaustion amended petition for writ of habeas corpus). 
 499. Thomas v. Brown, No. 93-0616 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2009) ECF No. 248 (traverse to 
answer to post-exhaustion amended petition). 
 500. Thomas v. Brown, No. 93-0616 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2009) ECF No. 257 (letter from 
petitioner’s counsel regarding petitioner’s medical condition). Counsel for petitioner explained: 
  Late last week, lead counsel Alex Reisman had a conversation with Mr. Thomas’s 
treating physician, Dr. Michael Rowe. According to Dr. Rowe, Mr. Thomas has had a 
series of “strokes,” and seems to be suffering more generalized seizures as well. Mr. 
Thomas’s motor function is greatly impaired and he is also “fairly demented.” 
(Although he had seen Dr. Rowe many times, Mr. Thomas did not know who he was 
last Friday morning). 
  Mr. Thomas is being kept in a rehabilitation facility outside of the prison (Dr. Rowe 
was not at liberty to reveal where), but Dr. Rowe believes that Mr. Thomas is not 
strong enough physically or mentally to actually improve through rehabilitation. 
Rather, he is being held in the rehabilitation facility because he requires more care than 
can be afforded him in the hospital unit at San Quentin. Dr. Rowe’s opinion is that Mr. 
Thomas will never get better, and will continue to deteriorate. 
  We were alerted to this problem by Mr. Thomas’s family—his mother and sister, 
who have remained quite devoted to him. It is their fond hope (and Mr. Thomas’s, 
when he is lucid) that he be able to come home before he dies. 
  The portion of the petition now pending the Court’s determination asserts that Mr. 
Thomas was wrongfully convicted; if the Court finds merit in it, there is at least some 
real possibility that Mr. Thomas will be able to live his last days with his family. Of 
course, that fact should not and will not affect the Court’s decision on the merits. But if 
there is anything the Court can do to expedite its decision, that in itself would be a 
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Twenty-three years after Mr. Thomas was convicted and 
sentenced to death, on September 9, 2009, the federal district court 
granted Mr. Thomas’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on 
his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in the guilt phase of 
his trial. 501 The state of California conceded that Mr. Thomas’s trial 
counsel’s performance was deficient but argued that he was not 
prejudiced. 502 The federal district court found that Mr. Thomas was 
prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance during the guilt 
phase of his trial because “the evidence against petitioner was 
entirely circumstantial and not substantial.” 503 The federal district 
court explained: 
 Although the sum of circumstantial evidence presented 
against petitioner was perhaps sufficient to justify his 
conviction, it does not follow that his trial would have 
yielded the same result had a competent investigation been 
completed. Indeed, had . . . all three [witnesses,] . . . whom 
the state court conceded would have been found through a 
competent investigation, testified at trial, there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would have 
been different. 504 
 
great kindness. 
  We make this request reluctantly, because there is no sense in which this Court has 
been less than attentive to the case or timely in its rulings. However, there now appears 
to be a strong possibility that, absent expeditious determination, the case will become 
either actually or effectively moot. 
Id. 
 501. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
at 28, Thomas v. Wong, No. 93-0616 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Order Granting 
Petition in Part]. 
 502. In re Thomas, 129 P.3d 49, 51 (Cal. 2006). 
 503. Thomas, ECF No. 258, No. 93-0616 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2009), at 23; see also supra 
note 26 (noting that our research indicates that in the 24 of the 43 cases, relief was granted on the 
ground that the condemned prisoner’s appointed counsel was ineffective; in only five cases 
during the guilt phase, and in 19 cases during the penalty phase—typically for counsel’s failure to 
investigate mitigating evidence). 
 504. Order Granting Petition in Part, supra note 501, at 24. The district court also explained 
that Mr. Thomas’s trial counsel, 
Chaffee[,] did not follow any of the [Alameda County Public Defender’s Office] 
procedures or make use of the resources available to him. He conducted the 
investigation himself, and did not make a single request for assistance from an 
investigator during the six months he spent preparing for trial. As an investigator, he 
interviewed almost none of the potential witnesses who could have had a decisive 
impact on the outcome of trial. He declined the opportunity to work with a second 
chair, until he accepted the help of Susan Walsh, then still a law clerk, who was 
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The federal court vacated Mr. Thomas’s conviction and ordered 
that the case be remanded to the Alameda County Superior Court for 
a new guilt phase trial. 505 In a request that Mr. Thomas be released 
from custody pending the state’s appeal of the federal district court’s 
order granting habeas corpus relief, counsel for Mr. Thomas argued 
as follows: 
 Ralph International Thomas has been imprisoned by 
the State for 24 years, 23 of them on Death Row. The years 
of confinement have taken not only most of his adult life, 
but his physical health and mental abilities as well—as a 
result of a series of strokes, he is now severely demented 
and cannot perform the basic “activities of daily life,” such 
as dressing himself or keeping himself clean. This Court 
has determined that the trial which led to Mr. Thomas’ 
imprisonment did not measure up to constitutional 
standards; even more important, the evidence discussed by 
the Court suggests at least a significant likelihood that he 
never committed the crimes for which he has paid so 
dearly. . . . 
 Petitioner is so thoroughly debilitated that he could 
pose no risk of fleeing or of endangering the public, even if 
he had any inclination to do either of those things. On the 
other hand, his continued imprisonment by the State would 
not only cause him the irreparable injury that accrues in 
every case in which someone is held in violation of the 
Constitution. Given his terrible medical condition, and the 
proven deficiencies in the medical care provided in the 
California prisons, it could very well destroy what is left of 
his life. 506 
The federal court declined to grant Mr. Thomas’s request for 
 
assigned to petitioner’s case in March 1986, the month that trial began. [He] also 
rejected offers to be relieved of his other cases and duties. Finally, [he] failed to 
complete even the basic investigative duties that were mapped out at the beginning of 
the case. For example, he did not conduct a canvass of Rainbow Village, other than 
talk to a few permanent residents who had no useful information, and did not try to 
contact anyone in the Grateful Dead community. 
Id. at 10–11 (citations omitted). 
 505. Id. at 28. The matter is currently on appeal before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 506. Petitioner’s Request for Release From Custody Pending State’s Appeal at 1, Thomas v. 
Ayers, No. 93-0616 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2009). 
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release pending the outcome of the state’s appeal from the district 
court’s order, which granted federal habeas corpus relief to Mr. 
Thomas. 507 As of June 2011, this appeal is pending before the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. 508 We express no opinion here as to the 
merits of this case. We include Mr. Thomas’s case in our discussion 
because it should be noted that based on the records filed in the 
district court, which are public, Mr. Thomas has been on death row 
for the last 23 years, maintaining his innocence and attempting to 
gain meaningful review of his claim—that his federal constitutional 
right to the effective assistance of counsel during his capital trial was 
violated. 
The courts have not yet been asked to consider whether there is 
a point at which delays in judicial review of capital cases become 
cruel and unusual, because such delays effectively deprive many 
condemned inmates of the opportunity for meaningful review of their 
claims of constitutional violations. In California, the unavailability of 
counsel to represent condemned inmates in post-conviction 
proceedings is coupled with a severe state court capital litigation 
backlog that results in prisoners dying before their direct appeals—
and possibly meritorious claims of constitutional violations—have 
been reviewed. Considering that habeas corpus relief has been 
granted by federal courts in 70% of California’s death row inmates’ 
cases, a significant number of the inmates who died while their 
petitions were pending may have had their convictions or death 
sentences set aside on federal constitutional grounds, but for the 
unconscionable delay in judicial review. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to determine whether the denial 
of review of federal constitutional claims for decades constitutes a 
denial of a timely hearing under the Due Process Clause. 
D.  Is Our View of the Worst of the Worst Overbroad? 
Last, some argue that the continuous expansion of special 
circumstances by voter initiatives has expanded California’s death 
penalty scheme beyond one that is sufficiently narrow to satisfy 
Furman. That case’s holding, in effect, requires that states adopt 
 
 507. Thomas v. Brown, No. 93-0616 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2009), ECF No. 283 (order granting 
respondent’s motion for order staying retrial pending appeal and denying petitioner’s request for 
release pending appeal). 
 508. Ralph Thomas v. Robert Wong, No. 09-99024. 
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procedures that limit the death-eligible pool to those convicted 
murderers particularly deserving of the penalty. 509 The holding in 
Furman, as explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in Gregg v. 
Georgia, 510 was that the imposition and carrying out of the death 
penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments unless “discretion is afforded a 
sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether 
a human life should be taken or spared, [and] that discretion must be 
suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly 
arbitrary and capricious action.” 511 
In Gregg, Justice White, writing for himself, the Chief Justice, 
and Justice Rehnquist, explained the Court’s expectations: 
 As the types of murders for which the death penalty 
may be imposed become more narrowly defined and are 
limited to those which are particularly serious or for which 
the death penalty is peculiarly appropriate . . . it becomes 
reasonable to expect that juries—even given discretion not 
to impose the death penalty—will impose the death penalty 
in a substantial portion of the cases so defined. If they do, it 
can no longer be said that the penalty is being imposed 
wantonly and freakishly or so infrequently that it loses its 
usefulness as a sentencing device. 512 
Over 15 years ago, Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals cautioned: 
 The key to a solution, if there is to be one, lies in the 
hands of the majority [of the electorate], precisely those 
substantial numbers in our midst who strive for the 
 
 509. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972). We note that Petitioner Troy 
Ashmus, who has been on death row since 1986, has a petition for writ of habeas corpus currently 
pending in federal court, which raises precisely this challenge. We express no opinion as to the 
merits of such a claim. We include this in our discussion simply to inform the electorate that 
California’s death penalty laws are under constitutional fire on the ground that the reach of these 
voter initiated laws is too broad and “simply ignore[s] the U.S. Supreme Court ruling that states 
must limit the breadth of their death penalty laws by legislatively guiding the discretion of 
prosecutors and judges.” Uelmen, supra note 63, at 1E (“In that challenge, brought by the 
California Habeas Corpus Resource Center, the lawyer who drafted the initiative that gave 
California our death penalty law in 1978 testified that the marching orders he received from state 
Sen. John Briggs were essentially to open the floodgates.”). 
 510. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
 511. Id. at189. 
 512. Id. at 222 (White, J., concurring). 
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application of the death penalty to an ever-widening circle 
of crimes. The majority must come to realize that this is a 
self-defeating tactic. Increasing the number of crimes 
punishable by death, widening the circumstances under 
which death may be imposed, obtaining more guilty 
verdicts, and expanding the population of death rows will 
not do a single thing to accomplish the objective, namely to 
ensure that the very worst members of our society—those 
who, by their heinous and depraved conduct have 
relinquished all claim to human compassion—are put to 
death. . . . 
. . . . 
 The Supreme Court already requires the states and the 
federal government to differentiate between murderers who 
deserve the death penalty and murderers who do not, and 
that directive has proved difficult to implement. Further 
differentiating only the most depraved killers would not be 
an easy task; it would not be pleasant; it would require 
some painful soul-searching about the nature of human evil. 
But it would have . . . very significant advantages. First, it 
would ensure that, in a world of limited resources and in the 
face of a determined opposition, we will run a machinery of 
death that only convicts about the number of people we 
truly have the means and the will to execute. Not only 
would the monetary and opportunity costs avoided by this 
change be substantial, but a streamlined death penalty 
would bring greater deterrent and retributive effect. Second, 
we would ensure that the few who suffer the death penalty 
really are the worst of the very bad—mass murderers, hired 
killers, terrorists. This is surely better than the current 
system, where we load our death rows with many more than 
we can possibly execute, and then pick those who will 
actually die essentially at random. 513 
Examining the federal death penalty system alongside California’s 
provides an interesting comparison for purposes of understanding 
how narrowing the death penalty in California could work. The 
federal system punishes defendants throughout the nation who have 
 
 513. Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 36, at 29–31 (footnotes omitted). 
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been convicted of federal capital crimes and sentenced to death in a 
federal court. Like California, which has 39 death-eligible crimes, 514 
the federal system has 41 death-eligible crimes. 515 Unlike 
California’s bloated death row, which now houses over 700 
condemned inmates, however, “[s]ince the reinstatement of the 
federal death penalty in 1988, 68 defendants have been sentenced to 
death . . . .” 516 Of these 68 condemned federal prisoners, “3 have 
been executed and 7 have had their death sentence removed.” 517 
In the federal system, the U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal 
Division, has created a Capital Case Unit that is “charged with 
overseeing the Department’s capital prosecutions. The purpose of the 
[Capital Case Unit] is to promote consistency and fairness in the 
application of the death penalty throughout the United States . . . .” 518 
The nature of the murders for which many of the 58 current 
condemned federal inmates received death sentences strongly 
suggests that the U.S. Department of Justice is seeking the death 
penalty primarily in those cases in which the defendants represent the 
worst of the worst. For example, 11 of the 58 condemned inmates on 
federal death row were convicted of murders that demonstrate that 
 
 514. ROBERT SANGER ET AL., DEATH PENALTY FOCUS, THE REPORT OF THE FOXES: 
ANALYSIS OF “PROSECUTORS’ PERSPECTIVE ON CALIFORNIA’S DEATH PENALTY” 3 (2003). 
 515. See Federal Laws Providing for the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-laws-providing-death-penalty (last visited Mar. 17, 
2011); see also ELIZABETH BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: AN 
OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY STATUTES 3–15 (2005), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL30962.pdf (listing capital offenses). 
 516. List of Death Row Prisoners, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-death-row-prisoners#list (last visited May 30, 2011). 
 517. Id. The following three men have been executed under the federal death penalty system: 
Timothy McVeigh (sentenced to death in June 1997 for the bombing of the Oklahoma City 
federal building in 1995), Juan Raul Garza (sentenced to death in August 1993 in Texas for the 
murders of three other drug traffickers), Louis Jones (sentenced to death in November 1995 in 
Texas for the kidnap and murder of Private Tracie Joy McBride, a young female soldier). Id. The 
average time between conviction and execution in these three cases was six-and-a-half years. See 
id. It should be noted, however, that Timothy McVeigh waived his final appeals, which shortened 
the delay in his case to four years. OKLA. CITY NAT’L MEM’L & MUSEUM, LESSONS FROM THE 
OKLAHOMA CITY BOMBING 9 (2010), available at http://www.oklahomacitynationalmemorial. 
org/uploads/documents/OKCNM_Bkgd%20Invest%20Pros%20Timeline.pdf. 
 518. USDOJ: CRM: Capital Case Unit (CCU), POLITIFI (July 12, 2010) (on file with 
authors); see also List of Death Row Prisoners, supra note 516 (listing inmates on federal death 
row and indicating that they were convicted and sentenced to death under federal law in the 
following states: Arizona (1); Arkansas (2); California (2); Florida (2); Georgia (3); Idaho (1); 
Illinois (2); Indiana (1); Iowa (2); Louisiana (1); Maryland (2); Massachusetts (1); Michigan (1); 
Missouri (7); New York (1); North Carolina (3); North Dakota (1); Ohio (1); Oklahoma (2); 
South Carolina (2); Tennessee (1); Texas (12); Vermont (1); and Virginia (6)). 
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the perpetrators cannot be safely incarcerated for the duration of their 
sentences without posing a risk of serious harm or death to others: 
murdering fellow inmates (7); murdering a prison guard (1); and 
murdering while in the course of escaping from prison (3). Another 
16 of the 58 condemned inmates on federal death row were 
convicted of murdering law enforcement officers or others charged 
with maintaining order in a civilized society: murder of law 
enforcement officers (3); murder of persons on military bases (2); 
murder of federal workers (2); murder of guards or others employed 
by federally insured banks (4); murder of witnesses (3); and murder 
on federal property (2). Another 12 of the 58 federal death row 
inmates were convicted of multiple murders. 519 Thus, 64% of the 
prisoners on federal death row have been convicted of crimes that 
come within a very narrowly defined set of circumstances. 520 
As discussed in the Commission’s Final Report, a broad 
consensus of a blue-ribbon bipartisan commission composed of 
members of the criminal justice community, assembled by the 
Constitution Project, have agreed that there are five special 
circumstances that represent circumstances that should render 
murder cases death-eligible. 521 Those circumstances, known as the 
“Mandatory Justice” factors, are: (1) murder of a peace officer in the 
performance of his or her official duties; (2) murder of any person 
occurring at a correctional facility; (3) multiple murders involving an 
intent to kill or knowledge that the defendant’s actions would cause, 
or create a strong probability of, death or great bodily harm to one or 
more of the victims; (4) murder involving torture; and (5) murder by 
a person suspected or convicted of a felony or the murder of anyone 
involved in the investigation, prosecution, or defense of that crime, 
e.g., witnesses, jurors, judges, prosecutors, and investigators. 522 
These Mandatory Justice factors seem consistent with the focus and 
application of the death penalty in the majority of federal death 
penalty cases. 
 
 519. See List of Death Row Prisoners, supra note 516. 
 520. Id. The remaining prisoners on federal death row have been convicted of murders falling 
largely into the following categories: murder(s) in connection with illegal narcotics trafficking or 
other drug transactions (8); carjacking (3); and other felony murders (10). Id. 
 521. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 138–39 & n.86 (citing THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, 
MANDATORY JUSTICE: THE DEATH PENALTY REVISITED, at xxiv–xxv (2005 update), available at 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/30.pdf). 
 522. Id. at 138; THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 521, at xxiv–xxv. 
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The Commission undertook a review of 822 death penalty 
judgments in California and determined that one of the Constitution 
Project’s five so-called Mandatory Justice factors was found in 55% 
of those cases. 523 The Commission’s researchers also identified a 
growing trend in a narrowing of the use of California’s special 
circumstances to mirror the Mandatory Justice factors: 
Our analysis of the special circumstances found by juries in 
California death penalty cases shows a growing trend in the 
percentage of cases where at least one Mandatory Justice 
factor is found. Compare 1980, where only 37% of the 
cases that year had at least one Mandatory Justice factor, 
with 2007, where 79% of the cases had at least one factor. 
Since 1998, a Mandatory Justice factor has been found in at 
least 59% of the cases each year—most years over 65% of 
the total cases. However, there is significant disparity from 
county to county with several counties falling far below the 
state average. 524 
Narrowing the list of California’s special circumstances to bring 
it in line with the Mandatory Justice factors, and commuting the 
death sentences to sentences of life without the possibility of parole 
for those death row inmates convicted of murders not falling within 
the narrower scope, would address the issue of whether, under 
Furman’s narrowing requirement, California’s death penalty is 
overbroad in its reach. Narrowing the list would ensure that those 
criminals eligible for the death penalty in California truly comprise 
the worst of the worst convicted murderers. It would also save 
taxpayers money because it would reduce California’s current death 
row population by approximately 55% 525 and would significantly 
slow its population growth. 
IV.  THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: REMEDIES REVISITED 
In Remedies, we identified some of the systemic problems that 
have caused the delay—now approaching 30 years—in the 
 
 523. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 139. 
 524. Id. at 139–40 (quoting KREITZBERG ET AL., CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF 
JUSTICE, THE DEATH PENALTY: A REVIEW OF SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN CALIFORNIA DEATH 
PENALTY CASES 10 (2008)). 
 525. This assumes commutation of the sentences of those condemned inmates not convicted 
of murder involving a Mandatory Justice factor. 
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processing of direct appeals and state and federal capital habeas 
corpus petitions in California death penalty cases. We also proposed 
procedural solutions to address these unacceptable delays. We 
concluded that, unless the California Legislature is willing to take 
action, including authorizing increased funding for attorneys 
representing condemned inmates on direct appeal and in post-
conviction collateral attacks, the present delays may result in a 
determination by the U.S. Supreme Court that decades of 
incarceration on death row without access to the courts is in itself 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution. 526 
A year later, in June 2008, the Commission published its Final 
Report, which summarized the flaws that render California’s death 
penalty system dysfunctional and made specific recommendations as 
to what is needed to repair it. 527 In its Final Report, the Commission 
warned that “doing nothing would be the worst possible course.” 528 
 
 526. Alarcón, supra note 3, at 725–26. 
 527. A year after the publication of Remedies, the California Commission on the Fair 
Administration of Justice issued its Final Report and Recommendations on the Administration of 
the Death Penalty in California. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4. The Commission was charged with 
the following mission: 
(1) To study and review the administration of criminal justice in California to 
determine the extent to which that process has failed in the past, resulting in wrongful 
executions or the wrongful conviction of innocent persons (2) To examine ways of 
providing safeguards and making improvements in the way the criminal justice system 
functions (3) To make any recommendations and proposals designed to further ensure 
that the application and administration of criminal justice in California is just, fair, and 
accurate. 
S. RES. 44, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-
08/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sr_10_bill_20070301_introduced.pdf. 
 528. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 115. The distinguished individuals responsible for the 
fine work reflected in the Final Report are: former California Attorney General John K. Van De 
Kamp, Chair; distinguished San Francisco litigator John Streeter, Vice Chair; Professor Gerald F. 
Uelmen, Executive Director; the following Commissioners: Diane Bellas, Alameda County 
Public Defender; Harold “Bosco” Boscovich, former Director of the Victim/Witness Assistance 
Division of the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office; William J. Bratton, Los Angeles 
Chief of Police and former chief of the Boston and New York police departments; Edmund G. 
“Jerry” Brown, then-Attorney General of California; Gerald Chaleff, Bureau Chief and 
Commanding Officer of the Consent Decree Bureau of the LAPD; Ron Cottingham, President of 
the Peace Officers Research Association of California; Glen Craig, former Sheriff of Sacramento 
County and former President of the California Peace Officer’s Association; Pete Dunbar, Chief of 
the Pleasant Hill Police Department; James P. Fox, former President of the California District 
Attorneys’ Association and current president of the National District Attorneys’ Association; 
Rabbi Allen I. Freehling, Executive Director of the Human Relations Commission of Los 
Angeles; Janet Gaard, Director of Legislative Affairs for the California Department of Justice; 
Michael Hersek, State Public Defender; Sheriff Curtis Hill, Officer with the State Sheriffs and 
former Sheriff of Benito County; Bill Ong Hing, Professor of Law at UC Davis; Michael P. 
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Former Chief Justice Ronald M. George told the Commission that if 
steps are not taken to remedy the backlog in post-conviction 
proceedings, they will continue to grow in number “until the system 
falls of its own weight.” 529 
In Remedies, we drew attention to several specific areas in 
urgent need of legislative action to promote fairness and to ensure 
that California’s death penalty complies with federal constitutional 
standards. 530 In its Final Report, the Commission supported or 
adopted several of the recommendations that we had made in 
Remedies. 531 
Despite the startling findings reported in these and other recent 
studies, the California Legislature has failed to respond to the urgent 
calls for relief made by the Commission that it had appointed to 
study the critical issues concerning the fair administration of criminal 
justice in California. The Governor’s office has also failed to 
recommend solutions to the constitutional crisis confronting 
California in its processing of capital litigation. As a result, the 
 
Judge, Chief Public Defender for Los Angeles County; George Kennedy, Santa Clara County 
District Attorney; Michael Laurence, Executive Director of the Habeas Corpus Resource Center; 
Alejandro Mayorkas, former U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California; Judge John 
Moulds, Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of California; Kathleen “Cookie” M. Ridolfi, 
Professor of Law and Co-Founder of the Northern California Innocence Project at Santa Clara 
University; Douglas R. Ring, Real Estate Investor and Attorney; Gregory D. Totten, Ventura 
County District Attorney; and staff member Chris Boscia. Id. at 1–9. 
 529. Id. at 115. Moreover as recently as 2010, 
[Chief Justice George] said one of his biggest regrets was that he had been unable to 
speed up the resolution of death penalty cases in California, which usually are in the 
courts for two to three decades after trial. “It isn’t fair to those involved, including the 
families of the victims,” he said. 
  Capital punishment cannot function without adequate funding, he said, but 
supporters of the death penalty don’t want to provide the money, and opponents are 
happy with the slow pace. 
  Californians, he observed, also have mixed feelings about the death penalty. “They 
like to have it on the books, but they are not prepared to have one or two executions 
every week like they do in some places[]” . . . . 
Maura Dolan, He’s Happy to Be Calling It a Career, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, at AA4. 
 530. Alarcón, supra note 3, at 745–49. 
 531. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 118 (“The Commission recommends that . . . serious 
consideration be given to a proposed constitutional amendment to permit the California Supreme 
Court to transfer fully briefed pending death penalty appeals from the Supreme Court to the 
Courts of Appeal . . . [and] changes [ be made] to California statutes, rules and policies . . . to 
encourage more factual hearings and findings in state habeas proceedings in death penalty cases, 
including a proposal to require petitions be filed in the Superior Court, with right of appeal to the 
Courts of Appeal and discretionary review by the California Supreme Court”); id. at 137 
(recommending continuity of representation by encouraging the same attorney for state and 
federal habeas claims). 
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dysfunctional condition of California’s death penalty system 
worsens. 
The following discussion is intended to build on the 
Commission’s work, and on our previous article, to provide an 
updated view of what California’s capital punishment scheme is 
costing taxpayers. We also offer additional ideas for addressing those 
costs. We will briefly summarize some of the specific 
recommendations made in both Remedies and the Final Report, 
which the California Legislature has ignored. 
A.  Automatic Review by the California Court of Appeal 
As of October 26, 2010, 356 direct appeals from judgments of 
death were pending before the California Supreme Court. 532 As of 
2008, approximately 80 of them had been fully briefed and were 
awaiting oral argument. 533 The average opening brief in an automatic 
appeal from a judgment of death is between 250 and 350 pages long 
and includes 30 to 40 claimed errors, not including those pro forma 
challenges raised in every brief, i.e., that the death penalty law 
violates the Constitution. 534 
Despite its best efforts, there is no indication that the California 
Supreme Court will see an end to the backlog in automatic appeals 
from judgments of death in the near future. For example, in 2010 the 
court decided 23 cases, while another 33 prisoners were sentenced to 
death and added to death row to begin their long wait for 
appointment of appellate counsel. 535 
Then–Chief Justice Ronald M. George testified before the 
Commission on January 10, 2008. He stated: 
The basic statistics I have recited demonstrate that even if 
the Supreme Court were to become solely a death penalty 
court and were to completely put aside proceedings related 
to all civil and criminal matters other than capital appeals 
 
 532. Summary of Post-Conviction Capital Litigation in the California Supreme Court, supra 
note 129. 
 533. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 131, 147 (stating that 80 direct appeals were fully 
briefed and awaiting oral argument as of June 1, 2008); see Uelmen, supra note 63, at 1E. From 
2004 to 2008, Gerald F. Uelmen served as executive director of the CCFAJ, which undertook a 
comprehensive review of California’s death penalty law. Gerald F. Uelmen is a professor of law 
at Santa Clara University School of Law. Id. 
 534. Telephone Interview with Robert Reichman, supra note 121. 
 535. Id. 
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and related habeas corpus petitions, it probably would take 
a minimum of three to four years to process the existing 
backlog of death-penalty-related appeals and habeas corpus 
petitions. During that time, petitions for review in other 
types of cases would continue to be filed, and additional 
death penalty and other cases would become fully briefed. 
The backlog would continue to grow, and the systemic 
costs of this narrow focus on death penalty cases would be 
profound. 536 
We recommended in Remedies that the California Legislature 
remove the impossible burden on the California Supreme Court of 
having to review automatically every direct appeal from a judgment 
of death. This could be accomplished by amending the California 
Constitution to shift this burden to the justices of the six districts of 
the California Court of Appeal, with discretionary review by the 
California Supreme Court to correct any erroneous rulings or to 
resolve conflicts between the various districts and divisions of 
California’s intermediate appellate courts. 537 
On November 20, 2007, then–Chief Justice Ronald M. George 
announced that, after months of study and consideration, the 
California Supreme Court justices had unanimously endorsed a 
proposal to seek amendment of California Constitution, article VI, 
section 12, to permit transfer of capital appeals from the California 
Supreme Court to the California Court of Appeal. 538 On March 25, 
2008, however, the Chief Justice announced that in view of 
California’s budget situation, the court would defer pursuing its 
proposal to amend the California Constitution to permit transferring 
 
 536. Testimony of Chief Justice Ronald M. George, supra note 8, at 18–19. 
 537. Alarcón, supra note 3, at 727. We noted that “[t]his recommendation precisely parallels 
present federal law. A federal death row inmate convicted in federal court of a capital offense 
does not have the right to a direct appeal to the United States Supreme Court.” Id. 
  In Remedies, we also recommended that appellate counsel should be appointed 
according to a triage system. Id. at 733–34. Under such a system, trial counsel would be required 
to prepare a brief appellate memorandum for submission to the clerk of the superior court clerk 
within 30 days of the judgment of guilt, setting forth each of the anticipated alleged errors to be 
considered on appeal; the reviewing court would then appoint appellate counsel with regard to the 
likelihood of success on appeal as to the question of guilt. Id. at 734. We renew that suggestion 
here and additionally note that this task could also be performed by the courts of appeal. 
 538. News Release No. 76, Judicial Council of Cal., Lynn Holton, Supreme Court Proposes 
Amendments to Constitution in Death Penalty Appeals 1–2 (Nov. 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/xbcr/cc/NR76-07.PDF. 
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capital appeals to the California Court of Appeal. 539 
In its Final Report, “the Commission majority recommend[ed] 
adoption of the [California Supreme Court’s] proposed constitutional 
amendment,” provided that other recommendations—concerning 
adequate funding for the appointment of both appellate and habeas 
counsel in death cases and adequate staffing for the California Court 
of Appeal—also be adopted. 540 
On February 11, 2010, Senate Constitutional Amendment 
(SCA) 27 was introduced in the Senate Committee on Public Safety 
to amend the California Constitution “to provide that the Supreme 
Court may transfer a death sentence case to an appellate court and 
therefore the Supreme Court will no longer have the sole appellate 
jurisdiction over death penalty cases.” 541 On February 25, 2010, 
SCA 27 was sent to the Committee on Public Safety and the 
Committee on Elections, Reapportionment and Constitutional 
Amendments. At the April 20, 2010, hearing on SCA 27, the 
proponent of the amendment, State Senator Tom Harman, cited 
Remedies and the California Supreme Court’s press release of 
November 19, 2007, in support of his proposed constitutional 
amendment. 542 Several questions were raised as to whether the 
proposed amendment was an appropriate reform without additional 
funding for counsel and other recommendations to reform the death 
penalty. SCA 27 failed to pass in committee. 543 
B.  State Habeas Petitions Filed First in the Trial Courts 
As of October 10, 2010, the number of fully briefed habeas 
corpus petitions awaiting review by the California Supreme Court 
was 89. 544 In Remedies, we recommended that the California 
Legislature pass laws relieving the California Supreme Court of its 
duty to review every petition for state habeas corpus relief by 
requiring that original petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in capital 
 
 539. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 148. 
 540. Id. 
 541. S. 27, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010), available at ftp://leginfo.public.ca.gov/pub/09-
10/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sca_27_cfa_20100419_135824_sen_comm.html (unenacted bill 
analysis). The Judicial Council and Crime Victims United of California supported the 
amendment. Id. 
 542. Id. 
 543. Id. 
 544. Uelmen, supra note 63, at 1E. 
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cases be filed in the first instance in the superior court that had 
entered the judgment of death. 545 We recommended that the trial 
court be required to issue a reasoned decision explaining its 
disposition of the claims. 546 This change would not require a 
constitutional amendment because California Constitution, article VI, 
section 10, already provides that “[t]he Supreme Court, courts of 
appeal, superior courts, and their judges have original jurisdiction in 
habeas corpus proceedings.” 547 As we explained in Remedies, 
however, 
there is a strong financial incentive [for condemned 
inmates] to file in the Supreme Court [because i]f a death 
row inmate is indigent, [and almost all are,] the California 
Supreme Court will . . . [only] “compensate counsel for the 
filing of any other motion, petition, or pleading in [its own 
court and not in] any other California or federal court or 
court of another state.” 548 
On February 21, 2008, California State Senator George Runner 
introduced Senate Bill (S.B.) 1471. 549 It would have required that 
habeas petitions in death penalty cases be filed within one year in the 
superior court. The bill died on April 15, 2008, when it failed to pass 
in the Senate Public Safety Committee. 
On February 11, 2010, California State Senator Tom Harman 
introduced S.B. 1025, which would have “require[d] the Supreme 
Court to develop necessary rules and procedures for initiating habeas 
corpus proceedings in the superior court, as specified” in death 
penalty cases. 550 The bill was supported by Crime Victims United of 
California and, if amended, by the California Judges Association. 551 
 
 545. Alarcón, supra note 3, at 743. 
 546. Id. 
 547. Id. at 736, 737 & n.230. 
 548. Id. (quoting CAL. SUPREME COURT, SUPREME COURT POLICIES REGARDING CASES 
ARISING FROM JUDGMENTS OF DEATH 5–6 (1989), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/ 
courts/supreme/aa02f.pdf). 
 549. S.B. 1471, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008), available at http://leginfo.public.ca.gov/ 
pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_1451-1500/sb_1471_bill_20080221_introduced.html. 
 550. S.B. 1025, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-
10/bill/sen/sb_1001-1050/sb_1025_bill_20100211_introduced.pdf. 
 551. S.B. 1025, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-
10/bill/sen/sb_1001-1050/sb_1025_cfa_20100419_141607_sen_comm.html (unenacted bill 
analysis). 
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S.B. 1025 failed to pass in committee, with two votes in favor and 
five votes against. 552 
C.  Increase Funding for Capital Appellate and Habeas Counsel 
1.  Direct Appeals 
As of November 3, 2010, there were 99 prisoners on death row 
awaiting the appointment of counsel for their automatic appeals. 553 
Attorneys who are appointed to represent condemned inmates in 
death penalty appeals and habeas corpus proceedings must possess 
highly specialized qualifications. 554 To address the shortage of 
qualified capital appellate counsel, we recommended in Remedies 
that the California Legislature increase funding to compensate 
qualified counsel who are appointed to handle death penalty cases. 555 
While a modest $5-per-hour increase in authorized compensation for 
appellate and post-conviction counsel was subsequently adopted, an 
hourly rate of $145 remains far short of what could reasonably be 
considered fair compensation. 556 
In 2008, the Commission similarly concluded that the California 
Legislature must increase public funding for the Office of the State 
Public Defender to address the backlog of cases awaiting 
 
 552. S.B. 1025, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/ 
pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_1001-1050/sb_1025_vote_20100420_000003_ sen_comm.html (unofficial 
ballot). 
 553. E-mail from Michael Laurence to Authors, supra note 125; see also FINAL REPORT, 
supra note 4, at 133 (listing the number of inmates awaiting counsel as of 2008 at 79). 
 554. Rule 8.605(b) of the 2010 California Rules of Court requires that counsel appointed in 
death penalty appeals and habeas corpus proceedings “[have] demonstrated the commitment, 
knowledge, and skills necessary to competently represent the defendant . . . [and] be willing to 
cooperate with an assisting counsel or entity that the court may designate.” CAL. RULES OF 
COURT 8.605(b) (Judicial Council of Cal. 2011), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/ 
documents/pdfFiles/title_8.pdf. 
 555. In addition to authorizing funds to increase the hourly rate paid to appointed counsel, we 
recommended in Remedies that the California Legislature help increase the number of lawyers 
qualified to represent death row inmates by providing grants to law schools to train students and 
lawyers who wish to specialize as appellate advocates and/or habeas corpus counsel in capital 
cases. Alarcón, supra note 3, at 734–35. 
 556. Since 2006, when Remedies was written, the hourly rate an appointed attorney in a 
capital case receives to represent a death row inmate in an automatic appeal or in state post-
conviction proceedings was increased from $140 per hour to $145 per hour. See Uelmen, supra 
note 64, at 499. Compensation for counsel representing state capital defendants in federal habeas 
corpus proceedings has increased from $160 to $178 per hour since 2006. See U.S. COURTS, 
supra note 139, § 630.10.10(a), at 7–8. CJA Panel attorneys, however, are only reimbursed for 
time billed pursuant to the district court’s approved budgeting procedures. 
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appointment of counsel to handle direct appeals. 557 With regard to 
private counsel, the Commission concluded that “[d]elays in the 
appointment of counsel to handle direct appeals are attributable to 
the small pool of qualified California lawyers willing to accept such 
assignments.” 558 The Commission noted that “[m]any of the 
experienced appellate lawyers who have handled [the appellate 
review of] California death cases [have] retir[ed] or decline to take 
new cases that will tie them up for ten or twelve years.” 559 Because 
the California Legislature has refused to authorize a fair payment to 
private lawyers who accept an appointment in direct appeals of death 
penalty cases, “at least twenty of the lawyers handling California 
death penalty appeals can no longer afford to live in California, and 
are currently residing in other states.” 560 
As a result of the California Legislature’s failure to authorize 
additional funding for capital appellate counsel, the absence of 
available competent counsel continues to “prejudice the right to a fair 
trial for those prisoners [who are entitled to a new trial due to] trial 
court errors in the admission of evidence or in its jury instructions, 
prosecutorial misconduct, or state and federal constitutional 
violations.” 561 
 
 557. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 133. With regard to trial counsel, the Commission 
recommended that California counties provide adequate funding for the appointment and 
performance of trial counsel in death penalty cases in full compliance with ABA Guidelines 
10.7(A), 9.1(B)(1), 3.1(B), and 4.1(A)(2). Id. While the issue of trial counsel in capital cases is 
beyond the scope of this article, we note that the requirement for the provision of competent 
counsel for indigents is constitutionally mandated. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 
(1932) (holding that defendants subject to the death penalty are entitled to counsel). 
 558. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 132. 
 559. Id. 
 560. Id. 
 561. Alarcón, supra note 3, at 751; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 133, 135 
(discussing the need to increase funding for counsel handling direct appeals and habeas corpus 
cases for death row inmates). 
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2.  State and Federal Habeas Corpus: 
The Need for Continuity of Counsel 
The shortage of available, qualified counsel to represent 
condemned inmates in the filing of their state habeas corpus petitions 
remains at a crisis level. 562 At publication, 324 prisoners await the 
appointment of counsel to file their state habeas corpus petitions. 563 
Once state habeas counsel is finally appointed, there remains a 
serious shortfall in state funding to those attorneys appointed to 
investigate the claims that are or should be raised in habeas corpus 
petitions filed in state courts. 564 The shortage of counsel has resulted 
in condemned inmates waiting many years before counsel is 
appointed to represent them in their state habeas corpus proceedings. 
As a result, on August 30, 2010, the California Supreme Court had to 
decide whether to allow a capital prisoner who had been on death 
row for 13 years without habeas counsel to file a “cursory one-claim 
habeas corpus petition, which lacks any supporting exhibits,” 565 also 
known as a “shell petition.” The court had allowed the shell petition 
 
 562. Letter from Michael Laurence to Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, supra note 180 
(discussing “crisis” cases where prisoners are at risk of losing access to federal court because they 
must comply with the strict one-year statute of limitation required under AEDPA). 
 563. E-mail from Michael Laurence to Authors, supra note 125. 
YEAR NUMBER OF INMATES 
AWAITING APPOINTMENT OF 
STATE HABEAS COUNSEL 
DATA SOURCE 
2006 156 Memorandum from the Habeas Corpus Research 
Ctr., Law Firm Appointments in Capital State 
Habeas Corpus Proceedings 1 (Mar. 6, 2006) (on 
file with authors). 
2008 291 FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 133. 
2009 303 HCRC ANNUAL REPORT (2008–2009), at 9 (on 
file with authors). 
2010 324 Supra note 125. 
See also Uelmen, supra note 63, at 1E (estimating that “[m]ore than 40 percent of the 713 
inmates on California’s death row are still waiting for the appointment of a lawyer to handle the 
habeas corpus reviews to which they are constitutionally entitled”). 
 564. As the Commission noted in its Final Report, the maximum funding authorized for the 
investigation of a condemned inmate’s habeas corpus claims filed in the state courts was 
increased recently from $25,000 to $50,000. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 135. This remains 
severely deficient as “expenses for a habeas investigation and the retaining of necessary experts 
can easily exceed this maximum.” Id. “For the successful habeas petition in In Re Lucas, the law 
firm of Cooley Godward LLP provided 8,000 hours of pro bono attorney time, 7,000 hours of 
paralegal time, and litigation expenses of $328,000.” Id. at 135 n.71 (citation omitted). 
 565. In re Morgan, 237 P.3d 993, 994 (Cal. 2010). 
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practice in the past, without addressing its procedural correctness, 
because it was the only means by which a capital inmate could 
preserve his right to file a completed petition once the California 
Supreme Court had “appoint[ed] habeas corpus counsel and . . . that 
attorney has had a reasonable opportunity to investigate various 
factual and legal matters that may lead to additional claims for relief, 
[which can] be presented in an amended petition.” 566 The California 
Attorney General opposed the shell petition procedure and urged the 
California Supreme Court to deny the pending petition as meritless. 
The supreme court granted the petitioners’ request. The court 
explained: 
 Ideally, the appointment of habeas corpus counsel 
should occur shortly after an indigent defendant’s judgment 
of death. An expeditious appointment would enable habeas 
corpus counsel to investigate potential claims for relief and 
to prepare a habeas corpus petition at roughly the same time 
that appellate counsel is preparing an opening brief on 
appeal. This would ensure the filing of a habeas corpus 
petition soon after completion of the briefing on the appeal. 
 But our task of recruiting counsel has been made 
difficult by a serious shortage of qualified counsel willing 
to accept an appointment as habeas corpus counsel in a 
death penalty case. Quite few in number are the attorneys 
who meet this court’s standards for representation and are 
willing to represent capital inmates in habeas corpus 
proceedings. The reasons are these: First, work on a capital 
habeas petition demands a unique combination of skills. 
The tasks of investigating potential claims and interviewing 
potential witnesses require the skills of a trial attorney, but 
the task of writing the petition, supported by points and 
authorities, requires the skills of an appellate attorney. 
Many criminal law practitioners possess one of these skills, 
but few have both. Second, the need for qualified habeas 
corpus counsel has increased dramatically in the past 20 
years: The number of inmates on California’s death row has 
 
 566. In re Morgan, 237 P.3d at 994; see also In re Morgan’s companion case In re Jimenez, 
237 P.3d 1004 (Cal. 2010) (holding that, under extraordinary circumstances, petitioner be granted 
leave to amend his previously submitted cursory habeas corpus petition). 
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increased from 203 in 1987 to 670 in 2007. 
 California does have a Habeas Corpus Resource Center 
(HCRC), which the California Legislature established in 
1998 to represent indigent capital inmates in postconviction 
habeas corpus matters. But, as has been observed, “the 
number of cases the HCRC can accept is limited both by a 
statutory cap on the number of attorneys it may hire and by 
available fiscal resources.” 567 
 Although hundreds of indigent death row inmates 
already have been provided with appointed habeas corpus 
counsel, approximately 300 of these inmates still lack such 
counsel. The search for qualified counsel can take eight to 
10 years or longer. Here, petitioner still does not have 
habeas corpus counsel after 13 years on death row. 
 In filing a cursory one-claim habeas corpus petition 
now rather than awaiting this court’s appointment of habeas 
corpus counsel who could file a more thorough petition at 
some future date, petitioner’s apparent purpose is to 
preserve his right to seek habeas corpus relief in the federal 
courts. Remedies in state court must be exhausted before a 
state prisoner can seek habeas corpus relief in the federal 
courts, which require that the habeas corpus petition be 
filed within one year from “the date on which the judgment 
became final by the conclusion of direct review or the 
expiration of the time for seeking such review.” A judgment 
of death is “final” upon the United States Supreme Court’s 
denial of a capital inmate’s petition for writ of certiorari 
after our affirmance of the judgment, or upon expiration of 
the time in which the inmate may seek certiorari in the 
federal high court. To permit the inmate to exhaust state 
remedies as to claims that must be raised in a habeas corpus 
petition rather than on appeal, the federal statute of 
limitations is tolled while there is pending in state court a 
“properly filed application for State post-conviction or 
other collateral review.” 
 If consideration of the current habeas corpus petition is 
 
 567. In re Morgan, 237 P.3d at 996–97 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Alarcón, supra note 3, at 739). 
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deferred as petitioner has requested, and if that petition is 
ultimately denied in this court, presumably petitioner will 
then seek habeas corpus relief in federal court challenging 
his state court conviction and judgment of death, and 
asserting the tolling of the federal statute of limitations 
during the pendency of his current petition in our court. To 
date, no published federal court decision has addressed this 
specific tolling issue under federal law. We express no view 
on this issue, observing only that a denial of the current 
habeas corpus petition, a result advocated by the Attorney 
General, would immediately stop the tolling of the federal 
statute of limitations. 568 
Thus, in In re Morgan and In re Jiminez, the California Supreme 
Court sanctioned in published opinions what it had been allowing as 
an “unofficial practice” since December 2001, when it permitted the 
petitioner to do so in the case of In re Taylor. 569 
The scarcity of available, qualified counsel to represent 
condemned inmates in their state habeas corpus proceedings is 
compounded by the fact that almost all prisoners currently are 
appointed separate counsel for their state and federal habeas corpus 
petitions. 570 We recommended in Remedies that the Legislature act to 
provide for continuity of state and federal habeas counsel, which 
would promote fairness and efficiency in the system by facilitating a 
fuller and more complete investigation into a petitioner’s claims 
 
 568. Id. at 997  (first emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), (d)(2) (2006)). 
 569. See id. at 1000 (Corrigan, J., concurring and dissenting) (“The first shell petition filing 
was allowed in December 2001, in the case of In re Taylor, S102652. Taylor’s habeas counsel 
had withdrawn relatively late in the proceedings, and the Habeas Corpus Resource Center 
(HCRC) refused to accept an appointment unless we allowed it to file a shell petition. After 
informal discussions with HCRC and with no input from the Attorney General, [the Court] agreed 
to accept a placeholder, or ‘shell,’ petition in that one case.”). 
 570. Both the state and federal systems have rules mandating that attorneys appointed to 
capital habeas representations possess certain specialized experience. See CAL. RULES OF COURT 
8.605(e) (West 2011). Rule 8.605 (f) of the 2010 California Rules of Court provides for “alternate 
qualifications” for attorneys who do not meet the requirements of (d) or (e) but who have other 
qualifications that the court deems appropriate. Id. 8.605(f). 
  In the federal system, “[d]ue to the complex, demanding, and protracted nature of death 
penalty proceedings, judicial officers should consider appointing at least two attorneys. . . . Under 
18 U.S.C. § 3599(c), at least one of the attorneys appointed must have been admitted to practice 
in the court of appeals for not less than five years, and must have had not less than three years 
experience in the handling of appeals in felony cases in the court.” U.S. COURTS, supra note 139. 
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years earlier than the practice under the current system. 571 
The proposition that continuity of state and federal habeas 
corpus counsel would promote fairness by significantly reducing the 
delay experienced in the full and fair investigation into alleged 
federal constitutional violations has long been supported by 
numerous authorities, including judges, legislators, and 
policymakers. The Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in 
Capital Cases for the Judicial Conference of the United States, 
known as the Powell Committee, concluded in 1989 that 
[o]ur present system of multi-layered state and federal 
appeal and collateral review has led to piecemeal and 
repetitious litigation, and years of delay between sentencing 
and judicial resolution as to whether the sentence was 
permissible under the law. . . . The lack of coordination 
between the federal and state legal systems often results in 
inefficient and unnecessary steps in the course of litigation. 
Prisoners, for example, often spend significant time moving 
back and forth between the federal and state systems in the 
process of exhausting state remedies. . . . Capital cases 
should be subject to one complete and fair course of 
collateral review in the state and federal system, free from 
the time pressure of impending execution, and with the 
assistance of competent counsel for the defendant. 572 
 
 571. Alarcón, supra note 3, at 744. In Remedies, we noted that 
[t]he failure of the California legislature to provide sufficient funding to permit state 
habeas counsel to investigate each death row inmate’s federal constitutional claims 
cannot be understated. It shifts to the federal government the burden of providing 
sufficient funds to permit federal habeas counsel to discover evidence to demonstrate 
additional federal constitutional violations. 
Id. at 748. 
  Then–Chief Justice Ronald M. George testified before the Commission that he fully 
supported Judge Alarcón’s call for providing continuity between state and federal habeas corpus 
proceedings. Testimony of Chief Justice Ronald M. George, supra note 8, at 18–19. 
 572. AD HOC COMM. ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, REPORT ON 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES, at S24694–95 (Aug. 23, 1989) [hereinafter 
POWELL COMMITTEE REPORT] (emphasis added). Similarly, in 1995, in a report on death penalty 
representation prepared by the Committee on Defender Services, Judicial Conference of the 
United States, the Subcommittee on Death Penalty Representation concluded that 
[w]hen the same attorney represents the inmate in both state and federal post-
conviction proceedings, both time and money is saved. Assuming that the state system 
has provided adequate resources for the investigation, preparation, and litigation of a 
case, the attorney representing the inmate in the state proceeding is in the best position 
expeditiously to prepare the case for federal court. On the contrary, when the federal 
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In 2005, the California Federal-State Judicial Council 
unanimously adopted a joint recommendation “endors[ing] the 
concept that the same counsel should represent petitioners in both 
state and federal capital habeas corpus proceedings.” 573 On 
November 29, 2005, then–Chief Justice Ronald George wrote to U.S. 
Senator Dianne Feinstein, explaining that (1) insufficient resources 
to recruit qualified death penalty attorneys are a primary cause of the 
delay in processing capital habeas corpus litigation; and (2) the 
capital habeas caseload burdens on the California Supreme Court 
prevent it from providing comprehensive opinions in capital habeas 
cases; and (3) having the same attorney handle a capital inmate’s 
habeas corpus petitions at both the state and federal levels would 
expedite the process and reduce costs. 574 
On December 8, 2005, Senator Feinstein recommended to then–
California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger that 
the California legal system be allocated adequate resources 
to ensure the effective and timely functioning of capital 
appeals. . . . The failure to provide counsel for those on 
death row compromises our justice system by introducing 
lengthy and unnecessary delays that deny justice to victims, 
the accused, and society. . . . [M]aintaining continuity of 
counsel throughout the capital habeas process would 
expedite appeals and reduce costs. 575 
The Commission also agreed that “continuity of representation 
by the same attorney for state and federal habeas claims be 
encouraged” and that “the unmet need for habeas counsel be met by 
expanding HCRC.” 576 In response to the Final Report, then–
 
court must appoint new counsel, time and money are wasted while the new attorney 
rereads the record, re-investigates the case, and redrafts the pleadings. 
COMM. ON DEFENDER SERVICES, REPORT ON DEATH PENALTY REPRESENTATION 5 Appendix A 
(1995) (on file with authors). 
 573. Letter from Dianne Feinstein, U.S. Senator, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal. 
(Dec. 8, 2005) (on file with authors). 
 574. Letter from Ronald M. George, Chief Justice of Cal. Supreme Court, to Dianne 
Feinstein, U.S. Senator (Nov. 29, 2005) (on file with authors). 
 575. Letter from Dianne Feinstein, U.S. Senator, to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of 
Cal., supra note 573. There is no response on record from the Governor Schwarzenegger’s office 
in connection with Senator Feinstein’s request. 
 576. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 137. The Commission recommended that the need for 
additional habeas counsel be met by legislative action expanding the HCRC to an authorized 
strength of 150 lawyers, phased in over a five year period, which would require a five-fold 
increase over the current $14.9 million annual budget of HCRC. Id. at 135. 
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California Attorney General Edmund G. Brown, Jr., stated that 
 [m]aintaining consistency between state and federal 
habeas corpus representation can substantially reduce delay 
in the federal review process. The appointment of substitute 
counsel in federal court frequently causes further delay 
because new counsel asserts additional claims that must 
first be developed in state court. However, no such delay 
should be necessary if qualified counsel is appointed on 
state habeas. It should be anticipated that such counsel will 
raise all claims in state court and then continue to represent 
the defendant in federal court without the interruption of 
litigation of new claims in state court. Given that all claims 
must be fully exhausted in state court before seeking federal 
relief, and given the one year limitation period for filing in 
federal court established by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), it is 
also in the best interest of the inmate to insure as much as 
possible continuity of habeas counsel. 577 
A year later, in 2009, Steve Asin, Deputy Chief, Administrative 
Offices of the U.S. Courts, Defender Services Division, indicated 
that “[i]t is Judicial Conference policy, based in part on the Powell 
Committee Report, that continuity of counsel is needed in capital 
habeas corpus proceedings.” 578 Similarly, Michael Laurence, 
Executive Director of the HCRC, also indicated that 
 
 577. CAL. COMM’N ON FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF DANE R. GILLETTE, CHIEF 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, OFFICE OF THE CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL 11–12 
(2008), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/dp/expert/AG% 
27sWrittenStatement.pdf. 
 578. Notes of Conference Call Regarding Continuity of Counsel in California Capital Post-
Conviction Relief Proceedings in State and Federal Courts (July 16, 2009) (on file with the 
authors). See also U.S. COURTS, supra note 139, § 620.70,which provides: 
Continuity of Representation: 
(a) In the interest of justice and judicial and fiscal economy, unless precluded by a 
conflict of interest, presiding judicial officers are urged to continue the appointment of 
state post-conviction counsel, if qualified under Guide, Vol 7A, § 620.60, when the 
case enters the federal system. 
(b) Section 3599(e) of Title 18, U.S. Code. provides that, unless replaced by an 
attorney similarly qualified under Guide, Vol 7A, § 620.60 by counsel’s own motion or 
upon motion of the defendant, counsel “shall represent the defendant throughout every 
subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings,” including: pretrial proceedings; 
trial; sentencing; motion for a new trial; appeals; applications for writ of certiorari to 
the Supreme Court of the United States; all post-conviction processes; applications for 
stays of execution and other appropriate motions and procedures; competency 
proceedings; and proceedings for executive or other clemency. 
Id. 
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there are significant problems stemming from the inability 
or unwillingness of state counsel to continue representing 
death-row inmates in federal proceedings, the inefficiency 
that results when new federal counsel replicates many of 
the tasks that state counsel performed, and the need for 
exhaustion proceedings because the initial state habeas 
corpus petition did not contain all potentially meritorious 
claims for relief. Funding an entity, such as the HCRC, to 
provide continuity of counsel between state and federal 
court and ensuring that all potentially meritorious 
constitutional claims for relief are presented in the first state 
habeas corpus petition would significantly increase the 
timely review of such claims and reduce the inefficient use 
of scarce resources. 579 
Mr. Laurence explained by way of example that as of August 
2009 the HCRC had been appointed by the federal district courts in 
three cases for which the HCRC had filed the initial state habeas 
corpus petition. Of these three cases, only one case was remanded for 
the filing of an exhaustion petition. The exhaustion petition in that 
case contained “limited claims resulting from the discovery of a 
document in state post-conviction discovery proceedings and from 
changes in the law that occurred after the filing of the state 
petition.” 580 
D.  Roadblocks, Detours and Dead Ends: 
The Legislature’s Failure to Repair the System 
Despite the consensus of state and federal officials supporting 
the call for Congress, the California Legislature, and the Governor to 
implement the necessary changes to provide for continuity of state 
and federal capital habeas counsel, no action has been taken to 
address this complete breakdown in the system. 581 
There have been no fewer than 13 bills introduced in the 
 
 579. Letter from Michael Laurence to Honorable Arthur L. Alarcón, supra note 180. 
 580. Id. 
 581. On February 11, 2010, S.B. 1025, which would have “remove[d] the limitation on the 
number of attorneys who may be employed by the California Habeas Corpus Resource Center,” 
was introduced in the California State Senate by Senator Tom Harman. S.B. 1025, 2010 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009), available at http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_1001-
1050/sb_1025_bill_20100211_introduced.pdf. When the bill was amended on April 8, 2010, this 
provision was removed. S192, Reg. Sess. B, at 1 (Cal. 2010). 
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California Legislature since 2005 that have proposed various reforms 
to the administration of the death penalty in California, including 
moratoriums, capital trials, appeals, habeas proceedings, or housing 
of death row inmates. All have either died in committee or failed to 
pass. 582 
2005 
(1) S.B. 378: Bill would have: (1) created a new expedited post-
conviction review eliminating state habeas corpus for capital cases, 
filed within six months; (2) reduced standards for appointed counsel 
to five years of State Bar membership and three years’ experience in 
appeals or post-conviction felony proceedings (requirements do not 
need to be met if court has good cause); (3) added personnel to State 
Public Defender and Attorney General; (4) added two new members 
to the existing five HCRC Board members; and (5) had each member 
be appointed by each Justice of the California Supreme Court. Failed 
passage in committee. 
(2) A.B. 1121: Bill would have placed moratorium on carrying 
out executions under particular circumstances until the California 
Commission for the Fair Administration of Justice (CCFAJ) had 
finished its report or until January 1, 2009. This bill was allowed to 
“die quietly” because Democrats were split on it. 583 FISCAL EFFECT: 
“As this measure does not add, reduce or delay legal appeals, 
costs/savings are limited for the period of the moratorium. Assuming 
a delayed execution every two months in 2007 and 2008, the 
increased [] cost of housing these inmates would be in the range of 
$400,000.” Died in committee (Jan. 31, 2006), pursuant to article IV, 
section 10(c) of the California Constitution. 
(3) A.B. 2266: Bill would have placed moratorium on imposition 
of the death penalty until the Legislature could consider CCFAJ 
recommendations and enact legislation ending or extending the 
moratorium. Moratorium would only have been effective if 
submitted to and approved by California voters. FISCAL EFFECT: “As 
this measure does not add, reduce or delay legal appeals, 
costs/savings are limited to the cost of housing additional inmates for 
the period of the moratorium. Assuming a delayed execution every 3 
 
 582. Information concerning all of the failed bills can be found at Official California 
Legislative Information, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov. 
 583. See Jim Sanders, State’s Death Penalty on Hold; The Legal Wrangling May Last Most of 
the Year, Official Says, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 23, 2006, at A1. 
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months, the increased [] cost of housing these inmates would likely 
exceed $150,000.” Died: received in committee without further 
action (Nov. 30, 2006). 
 
2006 
(4) S.B. 1119: Bill would have required “the Board of Parole 
Hearings (BPH) to conduct clemency hearings whenever an inmate 
sentenced to death submit[ted] a written request for a hearing, and 
[would have] require[d] the Supreme Court to appoint counsel to 
represent indigent defendants consistent with the competency 
standards used by the Judicial Council and the Supreme Court for 
appointed counsel representing death penalty defendants in direct 
appeals and habeas corpus proceedings.” This bill also would have: 
(1) authorized the Supreme Court to compensate appointed clemency 
counsel during clemency proceedings at a rate of at least $125 per 
hour and required the Supreme Court to set limits on investigative 
and other expenses for clemency petitions (in the same manner as 
required in death penalty cases and post-conviction proceedings); 
(2) provided that if the superior court sets a public session to set an 
execution date and clemency counsel has not been appointed at least 
90 days prior to the public session, the California Supreme Court or 
any other court must stay the public session and execution date; 
(3) required that any material regarding the facts of the case that is 
received by the Governor or BPH must be furnished without delay to 
the opposing party. FISCAL EFFECT: (1) Minor costs to the BPH for 
required clemency hearings, likely in the range of $40,000, assuming 
three to five clemency hearings per year; (2) minor absorbable costs 
to the Judicial Counsel and the Supreme Court to adopt competency 
standards for appointment of counsel in clemency cases, similar to 
standards currently required for direct death penalty appeals and 
habeas corpus proceedings; (3) minor costs for appointed clemency 
counsel, assuming in most cases such counsel would be appointed 
with or without this bill. Died in Assembly without further action 
(Nov. 30, 2006). 
(5) S.B. 294: Bill would have provided: (1) that a prisoner may 
move the California court that imposed his or her sentence to vacate, 
set aside, or correct the sentence if he or she claims the judgment is 
subject to collateral attack on any habeas corpus ground (prior to 
enactment of this bill); (2) that the court will offer counsel to a 
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prisoner sentenced to death after entry of judgment in the trial court; 
(3) that appointed counsel will meet capital habeas case 
qualifications, unless court has established different qualifications 
specifically for counsel appointed; (4) that either party may appeal 
court’s decision on motion to the court; (5) that the initial motion in 
capital cases will be filed within one year of the order entered (and 
within one year of the date the prisoner retained or was appointed 
counsel, or within five years of the judgment in noncapital cases); 
(6) that an untimely motion shall be dismissed when filed, unless the 
court finds that the defendant is actually innocent of the crime for 
which he or she was convicted (a voluntary intoxication claim, a 
mental disease claim, or a claim that goes only to sentence is not a 
claim of innocence for this purpose); (7) that an application for writ 
of habeas corpus will not be considered on bases of claim that was or 
could have been considered under this section; (8) that it is a 
California policy to qualify the federal law 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261–2266; 
and (9) that the California Supreme Court and Judicial Council will 
adopt rules as necessary to achieve and maintain this chapter’s 
qualifications. It will apply to all cases in which judgment is entered 
after the effective date and all cases in which judgment was entered 
earlier but no application for habeas corpus had been filed by the 
effective date. If a habeas petition is pending under the effective date 
of this section, the court may convert it to a motion under this section 
and transfer it to the court that imposed the sentence. Failed passage 
in committee. 
(6) S.B. 1257: Bill would have provided that: (1) the Legislature 
declare that all capital appeals should be decided expeditiously; 
(2) counsel for the defendant on appeal will be appointed within one 
year of the pronouncement of judgment (for cases in which a death 
sentence has been imposed on or after July 1, 2006); (3) for cases in 
which a death sentence was imposed prior to July 1, 2006, and no 
counsel has been appointed for the defendant, counsel will be 
appointed within one year of the effective date of this legislation; 
(4) the record on appeal will be certified and transmitted to the 
California Supreme Court within one year after the appointment of 
counsel; (5) appellant’s opening brief on appeal must be filed within 
one year after the record is certified and transmitted to the supreme 
court; and (6) any attorney who accepts appointments to represent 
indigent appellants before any District Court of Appeal must be 
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available to be appointed as appellate counsel before the California 
Supreme Court in capital cases. Failed in committee. 
 
2007 
(7) S.B. 315: Bill would have provided that: (1) attorneys who 
accept appointments for indigent parties must take capital appeals, 
regardless of their qualifications; (2) appellate counsel must be 
appointed for a death penalty inmate within one year of conviction; 
and (3) certification of record on appeal must be done within one 
year of appointment of counsel. FISCAL EFFECT: “unknown.” Failed 
passage in committee. 
(8) S.B. 636: Bill would have: (1) created a new type of post-
conviction review of capital cases instead of habeas corpus; 
(2) changed the standards for counsel in capital cases; (3) added 
personnel to the State Public Defender and the Attorney General; and 
(4) made changes to the board of the HCRC. Failed passage in 
committee. 
 
2008 
(9) S.B. 1471: Bill would have: (1) required habeas petitions in 
death penalty cases to be filed within one year; (2) changed the 
standards for competent counsel; and (3) provided that habeas 
petitions in capital cases be filed in superior court. Legislative 
analysis discusses fiscal consequences resulting from prison 
overcrowding, which sometimes results in significant medical costs. 
Failed passage in committee. 
(10) PROPOSITION 9: VICTIM RIGHTS AND PROTECTION ACT 
(early draft proposed using California Court of Appeal for death 
penalty direct appeals). The proposition was revised and the 
provision was removed. Proposition 9 was passed by voters in 2008. 
 
2009 
(11) A.B. 633: An act to amend section 190.4 of the Penal Code, 
relating to the death penalty. In cases in which the defendant has 
been found guilty of first-degree murder by a jury, and the jury has 
been unable to reach a unanimous verdict that one or more of the 
special circumstances exist, the court will dismiss the jury and 
impose a punishment of confinement in state prison for 25 years. 
This bill would provide for the submission of its provisions to the 
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voters for approval. Hearing cancelled in committee at author’s 
request. (May 13, 2009). 
(12) A.B. 1359: Housing of Death Row Inmates. This bill would 
have authorized the CDCR to house death row inmates (at the time 
there were 641; design capacity was 636) in any Level IV security 
prison, rather than solely at San Quentin, though executions would 
continue to take place only at San Quentin. Specifically, this bill 
would: (1) require that when a condemned inmate is housed in a 
Level IV prison, procedures relating to privileges and classification 
provided to condemned inmates at San Quentin must be similarly 
instituted; such classification procedures would include the right to 
review the classification no less than every 90 days and the 
opportunity to petition for a return to San Quentin; (2) attorney-client 
access procedures provided to death row inmates at San Quentin 
would be provided to condemned inmates housed in any Level IV 
prison; (3) require condemned inmates housed in a Level IV prison 
to be returned to San Quentin when appellate counsel is appointed 
for an inmate’s automatic appeal; (4) increase the number of 
condemned inmates CDCR may house at the California State Prison 
in Sacramento (New Folsom), as specified, from 15 to 30 (currently 
there are two); (5) delete provisions of law requiring female 
condemned inmates to be housed in the Central California Women’s 
Facility (Chowchilla) (currently there are 15). Passed in Committee: 
(Apr. 14, 2009); Hearing postponed in committee (May 28, 2009). 
FISCAL EFFECT: (1) Significant one-time and ongoing costs, 
potentially in the tens of millions of dollars, depending on how many 
condemned inmates are moved to what would in effect be a series of 
presumably smaller death rows at Level IV prisons. For example, in 
2003 CDCR estimated it would cost about $30 million in one-time 
costs to move death row to California State Prison Sacramento. To 
the extent CDCR opted to move death row inmates to multiple 
facilities, economies of scale would diminish and costs would 
increase. One-time costs include significant retrofitting to 
accommodate special law libraries, visitation, attorney access, 
separate exercise yards, egress and ingress, and multiple security 
renovations. Ongoing costs include increased security staffing and 
special transportation to multiple prisons, and to San Quentin when 
condemned inmates are assigned their appellate attorneys. (2) The 
2003 estimate also identified a $175 million cost to build a new 
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1,024-cell prison for Level IV inmates who would be displaced and 
relocated. That figure would be closer to $250 million in 2010, 
largely due to cost increases in materials. CDCR anticipates a Level 
IV–bed deficit of about 1,200 by 2012. (3) If the administration 
opted to abandon the approved and budgeted CIC project and pursue 
the death row strategy authorized by this bill, there could be 
significant one-time savings. Aside from about $20 million in CIC 
spending that cannot be recouped, there would be about $335 million 
in lease-revenue bonds available to fund the retrofitting referenced 
above, and to replace the Level IV capacity lost to death row 
housing. Moderate ongoing cost increases, largely for staffing and 
transportation, would continue with multiple death rows. The 
administration, however, has indicated no interest in halting the CIC 
project, and siting/community issues related to relocating death row 
may make these savings difficult to achieve. 
 
2010 
(13) S.B. 1025: On February 11, 2010, S.B. 1025 was introduced 
in the California State Senate; it would have removed the limitation 
on how many attorneys the HCRC may employ. When the bill was 
amended on April 8, 2010, this provision was removed. 
As predicted, the Legislature’s failure over the last four years to 
implement any of the recommendations made in Remedies, including 
those that were later adopted in the Final Report, has resulted in a de 
facto moratorium on the fair administration of the death penalty in 
California. The Legislature’s refusal to correct the causes for the 
unconscionable delay continues to burden the taxpayers who have 
already spent billions of dollars to fund a death penalty system that 
does not work. 
E.  Alternate Routes Available: When Legislatures Lead and 
Governors Govern—Investigation and Public Debate Concerning the 
Cost of the Death Penalty in Other States 
Justice Stevens remarked in 2008 that “[t]he time for a 
dispassionate, impartial comparison of the enormous costs that death 
penalty litigation imposes on society with the benefits that it 
produces has surely arrived.” 584 Several states that authorize capital 
 
 584. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 81 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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punishment in homicide prosecutions are currently weighing their 
death penalty statutes’ effectiveness against the cost of carrying out 
capital punishment. 585 Some states have concluded that capital 
punishment is not justified by the costs of enforcing the death 
penalty. Instead, they have either abolished or reduced the 
application of the death penalty based on a cost-benefit analysis. Of 
the states that have undertaken cost-benefit analyses to determine 
whether the death penalty’s benefits outweigh its costs, California 
outspends them all by an order of magnitude. And yet, the California 
Legislature continues to keep the public in the dark about the current 
cost of administering the death penalty in the state, as well as would-
be additional costs to taxpayers to implement reforms necessary to 
create a system that is both fair and effective. 
1.  New Jersey 
In 2005, the New Jersey Legislature authorized the New Jersey 
Death Penalty Study Commission to study all aspects of the death 
penalty as currently administered in the state, including its costs. On 
January 2, 2007, the commission reported its findings and 
recommendations to the Governor and the New Jersey Legislature. 586 
The New Jersey Commission found that “[t]he costs of the death 
penalty are greater than the costs of life in prison without parole, but 
it is not possible to measure these costs with any degree of 
precision.” 587 The New Jersey Commission recommended “that the 
 
 585. The following states have the death penalty: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. The following states are undergoing cost studies: Colorado, 
Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North 
Carolina, Oregon, and Tennessee. 
 586. See N.J. DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM’N, NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY 
COMMISSION REPORT (2007), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/committees/dpsc_ 
final.pdf. This study explains that 
[t]he Office of the Public Defender estimated that, given its current caseload of 19 
death penalty cases (as of August 2006), elimination of the death penalty would result 
in a cost savings of $1.46 million per year . . . . The Department of Corrections 
estimated that eliminating the death penalty would save the State $974,430 to 
$1,299,240 per inmate over each inmate’s lifetime. . . . The A[dminsitrative] O[ffice] 
[of the] C[ourts] estimated that each proportionality review costs an average of 
$93,018 in additional salary costs for court staff. 
Id. at 31–32. 
 587. Id. at 31. 
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death penalty in New Jersey be abolished and replaced with life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, to be served in a 
maximum security facility.” 588 The New Jersey Commission also 
recommended to the Legislature “that any cost savings resulting 
from the abolition of the death penalty be used for benefits and 
services for survivors of victims of homicide.” 589 On December 17, 
2007, Governor Jon S. Corzine signed into law a measure repealing 
New Jersey’s death penalty. He also commuted the sentences of 
death row inmates to life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole. 
2.  New Mexico 
In 2007, the New Mexico Supreme Court stayed prosecution of 
a death penalty case based on its ruling that the state’s failure to 
make adequate funds available for defense counsel violated the 
defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel. 590 The Legislature failed to respond and adjourned for the 
year. 591 A trial judge then ruled that the state could not pursue the 
death penalty in a homicide prosecution, and the Attorney General’s 
Office concurred, thus halting capital prosecutions in that state. 592 A 
bill was introduced in the House Assembly to abolish the death 
penalty. 593 The fiscal impact report for the bill abolishing the state’s 
death penalty concluded that the death penalty amounted to a net 
expense to the state and the taxpayers. 594 Death penalty opponents 
have argued that it costs New Mexico between $3 million and 
$4 million per year even though there had only been one execution in 
the state since 1960. 595 Citing costs, among other reasons, on 
March 18, 2009, Governor Bill Richardson signed legislation to 
 
 588. Id. at 2. 
 589. Id. 
 590. State v. Young, 172 P.3d 138, 144 (N.M. 2007) (staying prosecution in death penalty 
case where defense counsels’ compensation was inadequate). 
 591. Scott Sandlin, Death Penalty out in Guard Killing, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL, Apr. 4, 
2008, available at http://www.abqjournal.com/news/state/298432nm04-04-08.htm. 
 592. Id. 
 593. N.M. H.R., FISCAL IMPACT REPORT, H.B. No. 285, Regular Session, at 2–3 (2009). 
 594. Id. 
 595. Joline Gutierrez Krueger, New Mexico Courts Taking Death Penalty into Their Own 
Hands, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Jan. 8, 2008, http://www.abqtrib.com/news/2008/jan/08/new-
mexico-courts-taking-death-penalty-their-own-h/. 
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repeal the death penalty. 596 This made New Mexico the second state 
to enact such legislation. 597 
3.  Maryland 
The Maryland Commission on Capital Punishment studied the 
cost of administering that state’s death penalty. 598 On December 12, 
2008, the commission issued its final report to the General 
Assembly. 599 The commission relied heavily on a study conducted in 
2008 by the Urban Institute’s Justice Policy Center. The study 
concluded that the death penalty would cost Maryland more than a 
term of life in prison without the possibility of parole would cost. 600  
The study estimated that the average cost to Maryland taxpayers 
for reaching a single death sentence is nearly $2 million more than 
the cost of a non–death penalty case. (This estimate includes 
investigation, trial, appeals, and incarceration costs.) The study 
examined 162 capital cases that were prosecuted between 1978 and 
1999 and found that those cases had cost a total of $186 million more 
than what they would have cost had the death penalty not existed as a 
punishment. 601 
The Maryland study concluded that capital murder cases cost 
more than noncapital murder cases. 602 Of the 162 capital cases, there 
were 106 cases in which a death sentence was sought by the 
prosecution but not imposed. 603 Those cases cost the state 
$71 million more than did non–death penalty cases. 604 The ultimate 
outcome in those cases was a life sentence or a long-term prison 
sentence. Maryland taxpayers spent $22.4 million above the cost of 
imprisonment on appeal litigation for 56 people sentenced to death 
 
 596. Associated Press, Death Penalty Is Repealed in New Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 
2009, at A16; Citing Cost, States Consider End to Death Penalty, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 24, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/us/25death.html. 
 597. Id. 
 598. MD. COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, FINAL REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
(2008). 
 599. Id. 
 600. See JOHN ROMAN ET AL., THE COST OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN MARYLAND 2 (2008), 
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411625_md_death_penalty.pdf. 
 601. Id. at 3. 
 602. Id. at 2. 
 603. Id. at 3. 
 604. Id. 
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since 1978. 605 
The Maryland Commission recommended that capital 
punishment be abolished. 606 The recommendation was not adopted. 
However, based on the report’s findings, Maryland Governor Martin 
O’Malley signed a bill on May 7, 2009, that has restricted the 
application of the state’s death penalty. Thus, Maryland now has one 
of the most “narrowly crafted” death penalty laws in the nation. 607 
The new law is expected to save the state hundreds of millions of 
dollars, as it restricts capital punishment to murder cases with 
biological evidence such as DNA, videotaped evidence of a murder, 
or a videotaped confession. 608 The Governor said the bill will “help 
us prevent the possibility of ever putting an innocent person to 
death.” 609 
4.  Illinois 
On January 31, 2000, Governor George Ryan concluded that the 
imposition of capital punishment was “fraught with error” and 
imposed a moratorium on executions. 610 On March 9, 2000, a special 
Governor’s Commission was appointed to study how the death 
penalty system in Illinois could be reformed. 611 Governor Ryan 
 
 605. Tim Jones, Capital Punishment Is on the Decline in the U.S., L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2007, 
at A16. 
 606. See MD. COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 598, at 9. 
 607. Laura Smitherman, O’Malley Signs Contested Bills, BALT. SUN, May 8, 2009, at 3A 
(quoting Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley). 
 608. Id. 
 609. Id. (quoting Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley). 
 610. Press Release, George H. Ryan, Governor Ryan Declares Moratorium on Execution, 
Will Appoint Commission to Review Capital Punishment System (Jan. 31, 2000). Thirteen 
people who had been condemned to Illinois’s Death Row were subsequently determined to be 
innocent. Id.; see Exec. Order No. 24 Ill. Reg. 7439 (May 12, 2000), available at 2000 WL 
635067. 
 611. See GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1 (2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/ 
commission_report/index.html. 
  On April 15, 2002, after two years of study, the Illinois Governor’s Commission 
issued its Report. The Report made eighty-five specific recommendations for 
corrections to the Illinois death penalty system, backed by 207 pages of analysis and 
appended materials. Although discussion of the death penalty’s abolition was not 
within the mandate of the Commission, after reporting on the various reform 
recommendations, the Commissioners stated: “The Commission was unanimous in the 
belief that no system, given human nature and frailties, could ever be devised or 
constructed that would work perfectly and guarantee absolutely that no innocent person 
is ever again sentenced to death.” 
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pardoned four death row inmates and issued a blanket commutation 
of the death sentences of 167 other condemned prisoners to life 
imprisonment. 612 Governor Ryan’s successor, Rod R. Blagojevich, 
kept the moratorium on the imposition of the death penalty in 
effect. 613 Notwithstanding the moratorium on executions, Illinois 
continued to pursue the death penalty, trying more than 500 death 
penalty cases in the last 10 years and adding 15 men to Illinois’s 
death row. 614 
On January 6, 2011, the Illinois House approved legislation to 
abolish the state’s death penalty by a vote of 60–54. 615 On 
January 11, 2011, the state Senate passed the legislation by a vote of 
32–25, sending the bill to outgoing Governor Patrick J. Quinn for 
signature. 616 On March 9, 2011, Governor Quinn signed the bill into 
law. 617 
 
Robert M. Sanger, Comparison of the Illinois Commission Report on Capital Punishment With 
the Capital Punishment System in California, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 103, 104 (2003) 
(footnotes omitted). 
  The state of Connecticut did a very similar study in 2003. STATE OF CONN. COMM’N ON 
THE DEATH PENALTY, STUDY PURSUANT TO PUBLIC ACT NO. 01-151 OF THE IMPOSITION OF THE 
DEATH PENALTY IN CONNECTICUT (2003). The Commission was unfunded and was limited to 14 
topics presented by the legislature. Id. at 1–2. Nevertheless, the Connecticut Commission came to 
the same conclusions as the Illinois Commission on several issues. See, e.g., id. at 35 
(recommending that preliminary decisions to seek the death penalty be reviewed by a statewide 
committee comprised of State’s Attorneys, similar to Illinois recommendation 30), id. at 56–62 
(recommending changes to police procedures to ensure “best practices” in criminal investigations, 
similar to Illinois recommendations 1 through 19). 
 612. Illinois Governor’s Blanket Pardon Spares Lives of 167 Condemned Inmates, 
FOXNEWS.COM, Jan. 11, 2003, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,75170,00.html. 
 613. Associated Press, Illinois Keeps a Moratorium on Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 
2003, at A26. 
 614. Editorial, The Senate’s Turn, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 2011, at C12. 
 615. Ray Long & Todd Wilson, House Votes to Repeal Illinois Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., 
Jan. 7, 2011, at C6. 
 616. Monica Davey, Illinois Bill Eliminating Death Row Is Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 
2011, at A12. 
 617. A bill to abolish the death penalty passed the House Committee on March 5, 2009, and 
was re-referred to the House Rules Committee April 3, 2009. On December 1, 2010, “[o]n a 
partisan vote, an Illinois House committee Wednesday narrowly approved a bill that would 
abolish the death penalty in Illinois.” Doug Finke, Committee OKs Call to Abolish Death Penalty, 
STATE J.-REG. (Springfield, Ill.), Dec. 1, 2010, http://www.sj-r.com/top-stories/x1384148524/ 
Committee-OKs-call-to-abolish-death-penalty-in-Illinois (“Four Democrats on the House 
Judiciary-Criminal Law Committee voted for Senate Bill 3539, while three Republicans on the 
committee opposed it.”); Martha Neil, Illinois Senate OKs Ban on Death Penalty; Gov Now 
Decides Whether to Sign, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 11, 2011 4:16 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/ 
article/illinois_senate_oks_ban_on_death_penalty_state_gov_now_must_decide_whether_/; John 
Schwartz & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Illinois Governor Signs Capital Punishment Ban, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2011 (“‘Since our experience has shown that there is no way to design a perfect 
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V.  ROADMAP FOR REFORM 
“Like so many pressing issues in California, putting limits 
on the death penalty has been taken off the legislative table. 
Since we enacted our death penalty law by popular 
initiative, the only way we can limit it or abolish it is with 
another initiative.” 618 
We have demonstrated that the California Legislature’s failure 
to implement the reforms needed to reduce the delays and costs 
associated with administering the state’s death penalty has resulted in 
the quiet expenditure of $4 billion on a system of capital punishment 
that has yielded only 13 executions since a majority of California 
voters restored the death penalty in 1978. There is no indication of an 
end to this long-standing legislative paralysis anywhere in sight. If 
California continues on its current path, by the year 2030, taxpayers 
will have spent more than $9 billion for the execution of 
approximately 25 death row inmates, while more than 125 prisoners 
will have died on death row of other causes. 619 
The solution to this untenable situation now rests in the hands of 
the electorate. The voters must decide whether to spend the 
additional money required to make the needed reforms to the current 
 
death penalty system, free from the numerous flaws that can lead to wrongful convictions or 
discriminatory treatment, I have concluded that the proper course of action is to abolish it,’ Mr. 
Quinn said in a statement.”) 
 618. Uelmen, supra note 63, at 1E. 
 619. We have calculated the actual costs (1978 to 2010) and projected costs over the next 20 
years (2011–2030) for California’s death penalty, assuming there are no changes to the current 
system, to be $9.64 billion, for a total of 23 executions (estimated); and 126 other deaths 
(estimated). Our calculation is based on the following: 
Costs 1978–2010: $4.04 billion. 
$4 billion [trial, appeals, state post-conviction, partial federal habeas, housing], plus $619 million 
[cost to process remaining federal habeas for judgments of death imposed 1978–2010. Total 
Executions 1978–2010: 13; Other Deaths: 76. 
Projected Costs 2011–2030 [assuming no reforms are made to the current system]: $5.04 billion. 
$3.4 billion [assumes 20 new death sentences per year, 400 new condemned inmates total; based 
upon costs per year as of 2009 of $170 million for trial, appeals, state post-conviction, housing], 
plus $443 million [cost to process federal habeas corpus proceedings for judgments of death 
imposed 2011–2030 (assumes CJA Panel Attorneys and FPD represent condemned prisoners in 
200 cases each)]; construction of new Condemned Inmate Complex: $1.2 billion [estimated cost 
to build and operate over the next 20 years]. Total prisoners on death row by 2030: 1058 [714 + 
400 = 1114 (minus executions (estimated to be 10 based upon current rate of execution) and other 
deaths (estimated to be 50 based upon current rate of mortality) 1114 – 60 = 1054.] Total 
executions by 2030: 23 [13 + 10 (estimated if current rate continues) = 23]; Other Deaths: 126 
[76 + 50 (estimated if current rate of other deaths continues) = 126]. Total Cost 1978–2030: $9.64 
billion. 
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system, limit or narrow the current system, or end capital punishment 
in California and replace the death penalty with the sentence of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.620 The voters can 
initiate these changes at the ballot box by weighing in on proposed 
direct initiatives. To offer guidance to the electorate, we offer the 
following proposed initiatives for consideration. The failure to 
implement these or similar reforms will result in the continued 
wasted expenditure of billions of dollars in the decades to come, on 
an ever-increasing scale, until “the system falls of its own weight.”621 
We urge the voters to consider the following options and choose 
among them. 
A.  Propositions 1 and 2: Reform the Death Penalty But Leave Its 
Current Scope Unchanged622 
If Californians want the application of and current scope of the 
death penalty to remain unaltered (i.e., have it apply to 39 separate 
crimes), the voters must initiate legislation that will direct the 
Legislature to eliminate the waste of taxpayer dollars and to remedy 
the fatal flaws undermining the current system. The present poorly 
administered scheme compromises the system’s integrity and has 
resulted in the expenditure of billions of taxpayer dollars on the 
costly incarceration of condemned inmates who languish for decades 
on death row, after which time they are—in large numbers—dying 
before review of their automatic appeals and/or post-conviction 
petitions has taken place. 
 
 620. Alternatively, the voters could pass an initiative to amend California Constitution, 
article II, section 10(c), which permits the Legislature to amend or repeal an initiative statute by 
another statute “only when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits 
amendment or repeal without their approval,” to permit the California Legislature to amend or 
repeal a death penalty statute enacted through a voter initiative as the Legislature deems 
appropriate. 
 621. Former Chief Justice George told the Commission that if nothing is done to reform the 
system, the backlogs in post-conviction proceedings alone will continue to grow “until the system 
falls of its own weight.” FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 115. 
 622. While the voters could choose to pass one but not both Propositions 1 and 2, these 
propositions operate best in tandem. For example, if the voters were to pass Proposition 1, but not 
Proposition 2, the delays resulting from the bottleneck created by the automatic appeal to the 
California Supreme Court would still exist. Similarly, if the voters were to pass Proposition 2, but 
not Proposition 1, the delays resulting from the shortage of qualified counsel would not be 
addressed, and the waste of resources associated with the backlogs in the system would thus 
continue. 
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PROPOSITION 1: DIRECTS THE LEGISLATURE TO REPAIR THE 
DYSFUNCTIONAL DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA AND HOLDS THE 
LEGISLATURE ACCOUNTABLE FOR KEEPING THE ELECTORATE 
INFORMED ABOUT COSTS OF THE DEATH PENALTY. 
 
This proposed initiative would direct the California Legislature 
to take four steps toward addressing the most serious problems in the 
administration of the death penalty: (1) provide funding for counsel 
representing condemned inmates in appeals and post-conviction 
proceedings; (2) create an agency that will provide for continuity of 
counsel in state and federal proceedings; (3) publically disclose how 
much taxpayers are spending annually on the administration of the 
death penalty; and (4) accurately inform voters what the actual costs 
will be should there be future proposals to further expand the death 
penalty to apply to more crimes. 
FISCAL IMPACT: The current sum of $184 million per year that is 
being expended on the death penalty is a wasteful use of the state’s 
limited resources caused by the Legislature’s failure to bring about 
needed reforms. Assuming the reforms proposed in this initiative are 
implemented, and the anticipated reductions in the delays in the 
system are realized, the annual cost to implement the death penalty in 
California will increase initially by at least $85 million per year, and 
then will begin to reduce over time. The annual cost of incarcerating 
condemned inmates would decrease from the present amount as a 
function of the reduced delays brought about by more efficient 
procedures throughout the system. 
The Legislature Should Be Required to Provide Adequate 
Funding for the Appointment of Qualified Counsel; Including 
Increasing the Staff of the HCRC and the OSPD to Represent 
Condemned Inmates in Their Direct Appeals and State Habeas 
Corpus Proceedings and Raising the Hourly Rate for Appointed 
Counsel in State Proceedings, with Periodic Increases Scheduled to 
Keep Pace with Inflation and the Rising Cost of Living. 
The current lack of adequate funding for the appointment of 
qualified counsel results in the significant waste of taxpayer funds 
because condemned inmates are warehoused for many years on 
California’s costly death row, waiting for counsel to be appointed to 
represent them in their appeals. The state must, at a minimum, match 
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the $175 per hour provided by the federal government to CJA Panel 
attorneys representing death row inmates in federal proceedings if it 
is to attract qualified counsel in sufficient number to decrease the 
current backlog in the direct appeals of death row inmates. FISCAL 
IMPACT: $85 million per year. 623 
The Legislature Should Be Required to Create an Agency to 
Ensure Continuity of Post-Conviction Counsel for Death Row 
Prisoners and for the Adequate Investigation of Condemned Inmates’ 
Claims of Federal Constitutional Violations to Be Raised in Their 
State Petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus. 
The scarcity of available, qualified counsel to represent 
condemned inmates in their state habeas corpus proceedings is 
compounded by the fact that almost all prisoners currently are 
appointed separate counsel for their state and federal habeas corpus 
petitions. Additionally, under the current dysfunctional system, 
federal taxpayers are forced to finance the investigation of these 
claims because they are not adequately funded in the first instance by 
the state of California. The delays compromise the system’s integrity 
because, among other reasons, prisoners are dying in large numbers 
before their claims of federal constitutional violations have been 
fully reviewed by the federal courts. 
To reduce the delay facing the 141 current inmates in state 
habeas proceedings to the 10-to-12-year national average, and to 
avoid an increase in the backlog due to the additional inmates who 
arrive on death row each year, the HCRC should be expanded (or a 
separate agency should be created—including perhaps a combination 
of HCRC and FPD CHU resources) to represent indigents on death 
row in both state and federal court, to provide for continuity of 
 
 623. In reaching this figure, we accept the Commission’s recommendations that in order to 
reduce the delay in adjudicating death row cases to the national average of 10 to 12 years, the 
budget for the OSPD must be increased one-third, by $6 million per year; the budget for the 
HCRC must be increased to five times its current level, by $70 million per year; the funds 
allocated to the Attorney General for litigating capital cases must be increased by $6 million; and 
the California Supreme Court’s budget for review of capital appeals (which may, at least in part, 
be reallocated to the California Court of Appeal pursuant to Proposition 2) must be increased by 
$3 million per year for the appointment of qualified counsel. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 
116–17, 146. We note that, while increasing the hourly compensation for appointed private 
counsel to the federal rate of $175 per hour may reduce competition with the federal government 
for appointments in habeas proceedings, in light of the complexity, difficulty, time-consuming 
nature, and expertise required in death row representation, as well as the significantly greater 
compensation received by many private attorneys in other contexts, this modest increase may be 
insufficient to attract qualified counsel for these appointments. 
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counsel, and to reduce the delay in investigating federal 
constitutional violations not litigated during state court proceedings. 
Streamlining the process would provide petitioners with a fairly 
and fully funded investigation into their claims in a timely manner. It 
would also maximize the efficient use of resources. More 
importantly, meritorious claims warranting grants of relief would be 
heard and ruled on earlier, whether in state or federal proceedings. 
This would save the state the cost incurred for the lengthier time 
prisoners currently spend on death row awaiting review of their 
claims of federal constitutional violations. Additionally, counsel who 
are familiar with petitioners’ claims can more efficiently present 
those claims in state and federal courts. 
Federal taxpayers currently foot the bill for the cost of 
ameliorating the California Legislature’s failure to provide funding 
for the proper investigation of petitioners’ claims of federal 
constitutional violations alleged to have occurred in California state 
proceedings. Much, if not all, of the expense associated with 
investigating these claims ought rightfully be borne by California 
taxpayers, rather than by the federal government. FISCAL IMPACT: 
Several million dollars per year. 624 
The Legislature Should Be Required to Disclose the Actual 
Costs to Taxpayers of the Current Death Penalty System on an 
Annual Basis. 
 
 624. An exact figure is difficult to calculate for the reasons discussed in this Article, e.g., 
failure of the state to track what costs are incurred at the various stages of capital post-conviction 
proceedings. For purposes of calculating that it will cost several millions of dollars per year to 
fund an agency that ensures continuity of post-conviction counsel for death row prisoners, we 
have assumed that this expenditure is in addition to the allocation of the $70 million in funding to 
increase the size of the HCRC for the provisions of adequate counsel proposed in Proposition 1. 
  We have also considered the Commission’s conclusion that the $50,000 currently 
available to appointed counsel for purposes of investigation of constitutional claims in state 
habeas proceedings is grossly insufficient and accept the statement of Mr. Millman, Executive 
Director of the California Appellate Project, that an average adequately performed investigation is 
likely to cost between $250,000 and $300,000. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 135. Thus, to 
fund an adequate investigation for each of the 141 current inmates in state habeas proceedings, 
and the 324 inmates currently without representation, it will cost the state $132 million [$300,000 
per case x 465 inmates = $139.5 million], rather than the $22 million currently budgeted [$50,000 
per case x 465 inmates = $23 million]. To reduce the delay facing these inmates in their state 
habeas proceedings, and to avoid an increase in the backlog due to the additional inmates who 
arrive on death row each year, the state must allocate additional funds for purposes of the 
investigation of habeas claims at the state level alone. If this agency successfully reduces the 
delays in the system attributable to delays in post-conviction proceedings, the total cost of 
incarcerating condemned inmates would be reduced considerably as a function of their shorter 
tenure on death row. 
  
SPECIAL ISSUE]       EXECUTING THE WILL OF THE VOTERS? S217 
The Director of Finance should be directed to prepare and 
present to the Legislature on an annual basis a detailed estimate of 
the costs incurred to house and guard condemned prisoners on death 
row and the costs incurred by the taxpayers in providing qualified 
counsel for condemned prisoners. The report should include an 
accounting by the Attorney General reporting on the yearly cost of 
employing counsel to represent the State of California in all the 
stages of state and federal post-conviction proceedings in capital 
cases. FISCAL IMPACT: $120,000 per year. 625 
The Legislature Should Be Required to Direct the Legislative 
Analyst to Prepare, and Include in Voter Information Guides, a 
Detailed Estimate of the Cost of Adding to the List of Circumstances 
Under Which Prosecutors May Pursue the Death Penalty (“Special 
Circumstances”) Each Time Such an Initiative Is on the Ballot. 
The Legislative Analyst’s failure to inform the voters in the past 
of the actual costs of implementing legislation that expands the death 
penalty’s scope has resulted in voters casting their ballots based on 
misleading information concerning the cost issue. The Legislature 
should be directed to provide a detailed estimate to voters which 
reflects the actual costs of capital punishment, including trial court 
costs, reimbursement of public defenders and appointed private 
counsel, prosecution expenses, reimbursement of counsel appointed 
for the direct appeal and state habeas corpus proceedings, and the 
cost of investigating state and federal constitutional claims. FISCAL 
IMPACT: none. 626 
 
 625. This is the amount typically incurred by the Department of Finance to hire a contractor 
to compile information and submit a report to the legislature. See, e.g., CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., 
Department of Finance Bill Analysis (AB 10), available at http://www.dof.ca.gov/legislative_ 
analyses/LIS_PDF/07/AB-10-20080727013028PM-AB00010.pdf. 
 626. Provided the Legislature complies with the requirement that it fully disclose on an 
annual basis the actual costs to taxpayers of the death penalty system (listed as 3 above), this data 
should be readily available and easily included in the Voter Information Guides. 
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PROPOSITION 2: AMENDS THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION TO 
PROVIDE FOR THE REVIEW BY THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL OF 
THE DIRECT APPEALS OF CONDEMNED INMATES IN THE FIRST 
INSTANCE. 
 
 
 
This Proposed Initiative Would Amend the California 
Constitution, Article VI, Section 12, to Provide That the California 
Supreme Court No Longer Has Exclusive Jurisdiction over Appeals 
Involving Judgments of Death to Relieve the Seven Justices of the 
California Supreme Court of Their Present Duty to Review the 
Direct Appeals of All Prisoners Who Have Been Sentenced to Death. 
There is no indication that the California Supreme Court will see 
an end to the backlog in automatic appeals from judgments of death 
in the near future. Amending the California Constitution to shift this 
burden to the justices of the six districts of the California Court of 
Appeal, with discretionary review by the California Supreme Court 
to correct any erroneous rulings or to resolve conflicts between the 
various districts and divisions of California’s intermediate appellate 
courts, will address this issue. FISCAL IMPACT: As compared to the 
costs of the current system, this initiative would eventually result in a 
net savings over time of hundreds of millions of dollars, due to 
condemned inmates spending fewer years on death row awaiting 
review of their automatic appeals. 
B.  Propositions 3 and 4: Reform the Death Penalty by Narrowing 
the Number of Death-Eligible Crimes 
Voters could also choose to address the problems in the current 
system by narrowing the death penalty’s scope.627 
Because the electorate has not been properly informed of the 
cost of administering capital punishment or of expanding the list of 
death-eligible crimes prior to voting on past initiatives, it is possible 
 
 627. If the voters elect to limit the death penalty—as suggested in Propositions 3 and 4 set 
forth below, the reforms suggested in Proposition 1would likely still need to occur, though on a 
modified scale. Accordingly, if the electorate were to favor narrowing the scope of the death 
penalty as suggested in Propositions 3 and 4, the voters ought to authorize the Legislature to 
modify the reforms proposed in Proposition 1 to provide for a scaled down version that will 
effectively and efficiently remedy the problems relating to lack of available qualified counsel, and 
the shortage of funding for investigations. 
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that such knowledge would have affected voters’ decisions to vote 
for or against expanding capital punishment in California. In view of 
the disclosure of the actual costs of administering the death penalty 
in California, both in terms of exorbitant costs incurred and the 
compromised effectiveness of the now-bloated system wherein few 
executions occur, consideration should be given to proposing 
initiatives that would permit the electorate to determine whether 
narrowing the list of crimes for which the death penalty applies 
would be a wiser use of the state’s resources. Additionally, while the 
Commission found no credible evidence that any wrongfully 
convicted person has ever been executed in California, the 
Commission acknowledged that it could not “conclude with 
confidence that the administration of the death penalty in California 
eliminates the risk that innocent persons might be convicted and 
sentenced to death.” 628 This concern could be addressed, at least in 
part, by limiting the death penalty to prosecutions in which there is 
(1) biological or DNA evidence that conclusively links the defendant 
to the murder; (2) a videotaped, voluntary interrogation of and 
confession by the defendant to the murder; or (3) a video recording 
that conclusively links the defendant to the murder. This is the 
system now employed in Maryland. 629 
  
 
PROPOSITION 3: REVISES CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE 
SECTION 190.2 TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF DEATH-ELIGIBLE CRIMES 
SO THAT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT APPLIES ONLY TO THOSE CRIMINALS 
WHO REPRESENT THE WORST OF THE WORST. 
  
 
This proposed initiative would revise California Penal Code 
section 190.2 to impose the death penalty only in the following five 
special circumstances: (1) murder of a peace officer in the 
performance of his or her official duties; (2) murder of any person 
occurring at a correctional facility; (3) multiple murders involving an 
intent to kill or knowledge that the defendant’s actions would cause, 
or create a strong probability of, death or great bodily harm to one or 
 
 628. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 126. 
 629. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(3) (West 2009); see Part IV.E.3, supra. 
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more of the victims; (4) murder involving torture; and (5) murder by 
a person who is under investigation for, or who has been charged 
with or convicted of a crime that would be a felony, or the murder of 
anyone involved in the investigation, prosecution, or defense of that 
crime, e.g., witnesses, jurors, judges, prosecutors, and 
investigators. 630 
Narrowing the death penalty’s scope in this manner ensures that 
it is applied to fewer crimes and is limited to those criminals who 
truly represent the worst of the worst. The decision whether the 
sentences of those condemned inmates not convicted of murder 
involving one of these five factors should be commuted to life 
without the possibility of parole would be left to the Governor’s 
discretion in the exercise of his clemency power. 
FISCAL IMPACT: An immediate net savings of at least 
$55 million per year. This initiative would result in reducing the 
number of death penalty trials by about half, saving taxpayers an 
estimated $20 million per year. Additionally, reducing the death row 
population to those whose death judgment is based on one or more of 
these five special circumstances, assuming the Governor were to 
commute those sentences to life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole, would immediately reduce the size of California’s death 
row by half, which would save taxpayers over $35 million per year 
in death row housing costs and $27 million per year in direct appeals 
and state habeas corpus costs (assuming a 45% reduction in those 
caseloads). 631 “A 45% reduction in the size of death row would also 
reduce the otherwise necessary expansion of the State Public 
Defender, the Habeas Corpus Resource Center, and the Court 
staffing needed.” 632 Some of the reforms outlined in Proposition 1 
would still be needed to address the shortage of counsel, however, 
offsetting the savings from the reduced caseloads of the State Public 
Defender and the HCRC. 633 
 
 630. These are the Mandatory Justice factors and appear to be consistent with the focus and 
application of the death penalty in the majority of federal death penalty cases. CONSTITUTION 
PROJECT, MANDATORY JUSTICE: THE DEATH PENALTY REVISITED, at xxiv-xxv (2005 update) 
(2001), available at www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/30.pdf. 
 631. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 141–42. 
 632. Id. at 142 (citing Kreitzberg study). 
 633. Id. at 146 (concluding that “[t]he reduction of the backlog by adopting the narrowing 
proposal would reduce these enhanced budgets [as set forth supra in Proposition 1] by 45%, to a 
total of $68 million.”). 
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PROPOSITION 4: NARROWS THE DEATH PENALTY TO THOSE 
CASES IN WHICH THE PROSECUTION PRESENTS SCIENTIFIC OR 
VIDEOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE OF GUILT OR IN WHICH THERE IS A 
RECORDED CONFESSION. 634 
  
 
This proposed initiative would narrow the death penalty’s scope 
in California by revising California Penal Code section 190.2 to limit 
the imposition of the death penalty to prosecutions in which there is 
(1) biological or DNA evidence that conclusively links the defendant 
to the murder; (2) a videotaped, voluntary interrogation of and 
confession by the defendant to the murder; or (3) a video recording 
that conclusively links the defendant to the murder. 
FISCAL IMPACT: An immediate net savings of tens of millions of 
dollars per year. This initiative would result in fewer death penalty 
trials, appeals, and post-conviction proceedings, which would save 
taxpayers millions of dollars per year over time. Additionally, if the 
Governor were to commute to life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole the death sentences of those prisoners whose 
convictions were not based on the specific evidence set forth in this 
initiative, California’s death row population would be immediately 
and dramatically reduced to a fraction of its current size. This would 
result in a savings to taxpayers of an additional tens of millions of 
dollars per year in death row housing costs. 
C.  Proposition 5: Abolish the Death Penalty and Replace It with the 
Punishment of Life Imprisonment Without the Possibility of Parole 
Alternatively, voters can choose to end capital punishment in 
California and replace the death penalty with the sentence of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Under the current 
costly yet dysfunctional death penalty law, many more prisoners 
have died of natural causes on death row than have been executed. 
Thus, many—if not most—death sentences in California are in 
 
 634. By choosing to pass both initiatives, the death penalty’s scope would be significantly 
reduced such that it only applied to those five types of crimes set forth in Proposition 3, and to 
crimes for which the prosecution was able to present the types of evidence set forth in Proposition 
4. The reforms in these combined propositions (3 and 4) would dramatically reduce the cost of 
implementing the death penalty in California from its current level. 
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reality sentences of lifetime incarceration. Voters can elect to end the 
death penalty based on cost considerations alone, regardless of their 
views on whether the death penalty is an effective or morally 
acceptable means of punishment, by voting in favor of an initiative 
like Proposition 5. 
 
 
PROPOSITION 5: ABOLISHES CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND 
REPLACES IT WITH THE PUNISHMENT OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT 
WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE. 
 
 
This proposed initiative would abolish the death penalty in 
California by amending or repealing section 190.2, and those other 
sections of the California Penal Code that provide for the imposition 
of the death penalty as the punishment for certain first degree 
murders, and revising those other sections necessary to provide for 
the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole 
for those crimes formerly subject to punishment by death. 
Article II, section 10(c), of the California Constitution prohibits 
the Legislature from abolishing or otherwise limiting the death 
penalty laws in California, all of which have been enacted by voter 
initiative, unless approved by another voter initiative. If passed, this 
proposition would effectively abolish the death penalty in California 
by amending or repealing relevant sections of the California Penal 
Code, by direct voter initiative, as required under the California 
Constitution. 
FISCAL IMPACT: This initiative would save taxpayers billions of 
dollars and eliminate the risks of wrongful executions entirely. An 
immediate net savings of $170 million per year would be realized—
assuming the Governor were to commute the sentences of those 
prisoners currently on death row to sentences of life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole—and a savings of $5 billion over 
the next 20 years. 635 
 
 635. Our research indicates that the annual cost of the death penalty in 2009 in California was 
$184 million—$170 million from state taxpayers and $14 million from federal taxpayers. See 
supra note 249. The Commission concluded that abolishing the death penalty and replacing it 
with LWOP could result in additional LWOP trials, due to the lack of incentive for defendants to 
enter into plea deals without the threat of the death penalty looming over them. The Commission 
estimated that these added trials would cost approximately $11.5 million per year. FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 4, at 145–46. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Despite more than 200 years of debate, capital punishment has 
been the subject of heated discussion among people from all camps 
with firmly held beliefs. Rather than weigh in on the debate over the 
proper application of or morality of the death penalty, our purpose in 
writing this Article is to educate the voters on the costs in tax dollars 
of implementing the death penalty under California’s present laws 
and procedures. By revealing what are, in some instances, rather 
shocking figures concerning the costs incurred in administering the 
death penalty, we do not suggest that the answer lies in cutting 
budgets or in spending less money. To the contrary, the message 
appears to be that maintaining the death penalty in California will 
initially require that the taxpayers contribute more, not less, to 
reform the present broken system. California has approached the 
implementation of its death penalty system with caution and, as a 
result, no evidence has been presented that the prosecution of 
persons accused of capital crimes has resulted in the execution of 
someone who was innocent. Requiring the presentation of scientific 
evidence or a video of the commission of a homicide or a video of a 
voluntary confession as a condition to imposing a death sentence 
would ensure that the execution of an innocent person would not 
occur. 
Some voters view costs as irrelevant in protecting society from 
the worst of the worst. One state’s attorney, testifying at a public 
hearing of the commission appointed by the Maryland Legislature to 
study the cost of the death penalty in that state, commented that 
“[j]ustice is not a cost-benefit analysis. Justice is doing the right 
thing, no matter how much it costs.” 636 The truth is that California’s 
administration of the death penalty has produced unconscionable and 
avoidable delay—not justice. It is unjust to incarcerate condemned 
prisoners on death row for decades without reviewing their federal 
constitutional claims while many who may have been entitled to 
release or to a new trial or sentence proceeding die. 
California’s voters must decide whether the death penalty 
system should be reformed or abolished because the cost of 
 
 636. John Gramlich, Death Penalty: Will Other States Follow NJ?, STATELINE (Dec. 10, 
2008), http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=361331 (quoting Joseph Cassilly, a 
state’s attorney in Harford County, Maryland, from his testimony at a public hearing of the 
Maryland study commission). 
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maintaining the current system without reform is insupportable. We 
urge those who have in the past voted in favor of capital 
punishment—because they believe it is an appropriate retribution for, 
or deterrent to, the killing of innocent victims—to determine whether 
any of our suggested reforms should be implemented to address the 
wasteful spending of billions of dollars and to mitigate or eliminate 
the unacceptable delays in enforcing the law. There may also be 
those who have in the past voted against the death penalty in 
California because it is overly broad, or because the manner in which 
it has been administered is ineffective and wastes the state’s 
resources, but who would be in favor of a narrower law if it were to 
be applied to a much smaller category of first degree murderers—the 
worst of the worst. 
Maintaining the death penalty’s current scope will require, at 
least initially, the expenditure of tens of millions of dollars more per 
year in state funds to implement the reforms needed to address the 
unconscionable delays currently in the system. Over time, those costs 
will reduce as the delays and backlogs reduce. Narrowing the death 
penalty’s scope will result in the immediate savings of millions of 
dollars to the state, while ensuring that those murderers who 
represent the worst of the worst remain subject to execution for their 
crimes. Abolishing the death penalty will result in the immediate 
savings of millions of dollars per year and a savings of billions of 
dollars over the next 20 years. 637 We hope that California voters, 
informed of what the death penalty actually costs them, will cast 
their informed votes in favor of a system that makes sense. 
 
 
 637. Former California Attorney General John Van de Kamp commented recently that in his 
view, “there’s . . . a strong economic argument for doing away with capital punishment. With 
California facing its most severe fiscal crisis in recent memory—with draconian cuts about to be 
imposed from Sacramento that will affect every resident of the state—it would be crazy not to 
consider the fact that it will add as much as $1 billion over the next five years simply to keep the 
death penalty on the books.” Van de Kamp, supra note 31. 
